The number of Moroccans sent to the front in Spain reached 10% of a population estimated at 750,000 inhabitants. Most of them never returned home.
By the early 1920s, after the emotion that the Battle of Annual created for the Spanish people, the Spanish military found itself in an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis public opinion. This situation was particularly delicate given that, since the early 20th century, Spanish public opinion had begun to adamantly oppose sending troops to Morocco, already regarded by many as a cemetery.
From that time, the Spanish military, like other colonial powers, would gradually establish a native army under Spanish command. The move would spare the lives of Spanish nationals and calm the discontent of the public. The Spanish-led native army would play a crucial role both in stifling the Moroccan resistance and later in intimidating supporters of the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War.
It is worth recalling that prior to their participation in the Civil War, Moroccans were involved, two years earlier, in the crushing of the uprising of Asturias.
Those known as “los militares interventores” (military commissioners) played a leading role in the recruitment of Moroccans. To succeed in attracting more recruits, the military commissioners made use of violence and pressure to force young Moroccan men to take up arms to join the regular forces.
Moreover, the Spanish military officials counted on the complicity of caids and tribal leaders to achieve this objective. At first this policy met with the refusal of a majority of Moroccans, who showed no interest in heeding the call of the Spanish leaders.
However, recruitment increased considerably in the early 1930s, and even more after the start of the Spanish Civil War. During Spain’s three-year long fratricide, Franco’s authorities found themselves obliged to enlarge the number of soldiers in their ranks to overcome Republican resistance.
Two factors played in favor of Franco in enlisting more Moroccans.
First, the repression Spain exerted against recalcitrant Moroccans caused many of them to bow to the will of the Spanish Caudillo. This forced allegiance heightened with a secret directive of General Mola regarding the military uprising. It stipulated that forces would immediately shoot anyone, whether Spanish or Moroccan, opposed to or suspected of being opposed to the uprising.
In the same vein, the Spanish soldiers proceeded to imprison many Moroccan nationalists, tribal leaders, and religious leaders accused of opposing the repressive policies of Franco, the military governor of Spain’s Moroccan territories.
The second and more crucial factor that caused the accession of Moroccans to fight for Franco was the extreme poverty of much of the population of the Rif. As was the case in other regions and other poor countries, economic factors forced many locals to join Franco’s ranks.
The region of northern Morocco was devoid of any economic infrastructure capable of meeting the needs of the local population and reducing its dependence on traditional agriculture, which relied on the whims and mercy of climatic fluctuations. This heightened Moroccans’ pressure to join Franco.
Indeed, the two years preceding the war, along with the first year of the conflict, were marked by worsening drought and poor agricultural harvests in the Rif region. This circumstance impoverished thousands of Moroccan families in the north. To find a livelihood and put an end to their suffering, they were forced to join the regular army, considering this choice as a lesser of evils.
In the words of María Rosa de Madariaga in her book “Los Moros que Trajo Franco: la intervención de las tropas colonial la guerra civil española,” “it is not surprising that hundreds of Moroccans rushed in the first few weeks to join Franco’s army to escape poverty.”
An initially futile resistance
Despite these factors, some of the colonial resistors, who had fought beside Mohammed Ben Abdelkrim El Khattabi against Spanish rule, refused to join the rebel army. Caids supportive of Franco’s “cause” strongly suppressed this attitude. These caids (heads of tribes who were loyalists to the Spanish Administration) used expeditious and brutal methods to tame these Moroccans and force them to sign the “loyalty” document.
Furthermore, mindful of the illiteracy and ignorance of the majority of Moroccans living in the Rif, Franco’s officials promoted an “alliance” against nature with their “protected” in order to obtain greater support from them for their cause. To exacerbate the hatred of the people of the Rif towards the Republicans, they emphasized the “brotherhood” between the people of Morocco and the Spanish people. They accused their opponents of being “godless,” “atheists,” and “enemies“ of civilization.
In some cases, the military nationalists used false promises to win the sympathy of young Moroccans. For example, they made many fighters believe they should go to Spain for a limited time to suppress, as in 1934, an insurrection. They suggested that once their task was accomplished, these Moroccans would receive land as a reward in the cities of Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia.
In the majority of cases, Spanish forces took Moroccan fighters against their will, tore them from their homes and their families, and then sent them to the battlefields. Here, they served as cannon fodder.
These two main factors favored the recruitment of a greater number of soldiers, false promises, and the military’s harsh methods to kill in the bud any opposition to its policies and force the Riffains to join its ranks were effective.
Resistance mounts
Still, the military gradually felt the grumbling and discontent of Moroccans spreading throughout the Protectorate as the families of the soldiers realized the war would be long. In response to the increasing discontent among Moroccan tribes, Franco’s authorities proceeded to make arrest, repress, or collectively punish the insurgents.
This attitude of Franco’s authorities, in a hostile territory, did nothing but alienate a population that remembered past repression and abuses. The repressive methods the Nationalists used and their silence regarding the fate of soldiers that went to Spain led to an upsurge in unrest. The fact that the families of the Moroccans involved in the war were still without news of their relatives further fueled these flames.
Several factors finally put an end to the initial enthusiasm for the war. Chief among them were the duration of the war, the failure of Franco to fulfill his fallacious promises, and the repression and intimidation Spain’s forces exerted against those who protested Spanish policies.
The effort some followers of Abdelkrim El Khattabi made to oppose recruitment also factored in. It started to fuel trouble in the Moroccan territories controlled by rebels, and led to an increase in incidents and demonstrations against Franco’s authorities.
Moreover, many desertions occurred among the fighters who were preparing to leave for Spain. To avoid exposure to Franco reprisals, most of them fled to the French zone.
The deteriorating economic situation of the Rif would amplify the Moroccans’ discontent. The three years of war affected the entire population.
Franco leverages poverty and hunger
The economic deterioration resulted from two main factors.On the one hand, scarcity of basic foodstuffs led to higher prices that the majority of the poor population could not afford.
Moreover, since the recruitment of soldiers drew men who were between 16 and 50 years old, and most families in northern Morocco lived mainly from agriculture, their arable lands became increasingly deserted. This lack of hands led to more impoverishment of much of the population of the region.
The number of Moroccans sent to the front in Spain reached 10% of a population estimated at 750,000 inhabitants. Most of them never returned home.
Given the difficulties experienced by Franco’s authorities to mobilize new recruits, they proceeded to recruit from the Ifni area in southern Morocco. Spain occupied the area in 1934. Spanish militaries managed to attract 9,000 fighters, most of whom were from the Rif and had been sent previously to the Ifni area by force.
The Franco authorities even sought to recruit Moroccans from the French zone. The French authorities made efforts and provided disincentives to prevent this recruitment.
However, the Spanish military, with the help of its recruiters living in the area, in addition to the poor economic situation of most people from the poorest regions of southern Morocco, managed to deceive French vigilance and recruit a considerable number of combatants in the French zone. In particular, Spanish nationalists drew Moroccans from the region of Marrakech and the neighboring region of Ifni.
Given the exasperation Riffians expressed against the duration of the war and the deteriorating economic situation, Franco’s authorities would seek to appease the population and to reassure it by donating money and distributing basic foodstuffs.
To be continued…
Samir Bennis is the co-founder and editor-in-chief of Morocco World News
