Fez - Three distinct centers until the early sixties were enjoying the power of the religious field in Morocco: the Monarch, the Oulama (Scholars) and the Zawaya (the Sufi sanctuaries)[1].
Fez – Three distinct centers until the early sixties were enjoying the power of the religious field in Morocco: the Monarch, the Oulama (Scholars) and the Zawaya (the Sufi sanctuaries)[1].
These three institutions together constituted the basis for religious organization in Morocco and no single centre was to claim or to gain total domination over the religious field of the Kingdom, regardless of competition and rivalry between each of them. Of course, there were some situations where one centre would achieve a position of temporal dominance over the others, but such sequential supremacy seldom ever lasted.
This balanced situation collapsed after the penetration of the French and Spanish in Morocco[2]. Both colonizers tried to weaken the power of the Monarch vis-a-vis the Oulama and the Zawaya. This situation did not last for long, as, after achieving independence, as soon as King Hassan II replaced his father Muhammad V at the head of the royal household, the monarchy was to achieve a position of extreme control in its religious diction and political dominance.
Accordingly, King Hassan II had monopolized and exploited Islam not only to protect the political authority of the monarchy, but also to legitimize his own personal power. In the process, the king consolidated his position through the misappropriation of religious functions which were earlier the domains of three quite different institutions—that is, the Oulamas, the Zaouayas and the monarch.
In the first constitution after the independence of Morocco, the monarchy put Islam at the center of its political structure and the legitimacy of the state. Religion has been tangled with politics since article six of the constitution states that ‘Islam shall be the state religion’, and article nineteen represents the king as Amir Al-Mouminin (Commander of the Faithful), who shall be the extreme representative of the nation and the symbol of the unity and the right to control faith-related affairs in the country. The words of article nineteen are clear:
The King, Amir Al-Mouminin (Commander of the Faithful), shall be the Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender of the Faith, he shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups, and organizations. The King shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries.[3]
Therefore, dominance over the religious field has been an essential factor of the nature of political authority and the instrumentalization of Islam has been an essential part of monarchical political power. King Hassan II as well as Mohamed VI worked hard from the early days of their coming to power to keep their fathers’ portrayal as a “monarch-saint,” a fusion of a holy man and strong man[4]. Constitutionally, the monarchy is therefore “assigned the role of the ‘guardian’ and ‘protector’ of a particular form of Islam that it deems necessary for the ‘balance’ and ‘spiritual security’ of the country and its citizens”[5]. The title of Amir Al-Mouminin provides the king with all the distinction correlated to the most important decisions in the religious field. Indeed, article twenty-eight points out that “the King shall have the right to deliver addresses to the nation and to the parliament and shall not be subject to any debate”[6]. In accordance with Article twenty three, the monarch has the status of a sacred person “the person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable” [7]
Moreover, the religious symbolism of the monarchy has a practical reason as is evidenced by the annual duplication of the bay’a. Yearly, on March 3rd for Hassan II, and July 30th for Mohamed VI, governors, ministers, military and civil dignitaries, and politicians, must present their bay’a (allegiance) to the monarch. This is the occasion for the King to accentuate his inherited and formal role, not only as a head of state, but also as a overwhelming religious player who determines, according to his own interests, the position of other subsidiary actors such as the political parties, the Zaouayas and the Oulemas. The way in which the bay’a is presented by the King each time points out that its intention is to accentuate the legitimacy of the monarch as the caliph for the whole nation. Accordingly, the King is able to present himself as one who comes third in the hierarchy after God and the Prophet Muhammad, his ancestor.[8] Therefore, the King as a God’s caliph has legitimacy from both Allah and Muhammad to monopolize political and religious powers.
The monarch uses his recourse to Islam in a methodical way every time he feels that there is a political need for it. After the two attempted military overthrows of 1971 and 1972, Hassan II’s main speech was on his Baraka (charisma), the divine force which Allah gives to only the most faithful descendants of the Prophet Mohamed. Hence, the monarch has highlighted in many of his discourses[9] that his Baraka was behind the unsuccessful military attempts to remove him from power. The increase of emblematic religious action by the monarch following the two attempted overthrows can be explained in light of statements made by dissident military officers who participated in the coups. These statements highlighted the apparent contradiction between the King’s Islamic discourse and the publicized immoral practices of the royals.
The Sahara Issue presented the King with another opportunity to reinforce his representation as Amir AL Mouminin. On 6th November 1975 during the Green March to the Southern territories -the Sahara, Hassan II asked approximately 350,000 unarmed Moroccan marchers to carry in addition to the Koran and Moroccan flag, his portrait. The participants were also asked to pray once they reached Sahara soil and crossed the Spanish border as a means to thank Allah for His help to His believers. The monarch, as a commander of the faithful, through his recommendations presented in his speech of Agadir to the participants, portrayed and depicted by the King as a ‘pilgrimage'[10] . King Hassan II said in his speech on the eve of that holy march:
“Dear people,
“Tomorrow you will cross the border. Tomorrow you will start your Walk. Tomorrow you will trample a land that is yours. You will touch your sands. Tomorrow, you will embrace a soil that is part of your beloved country. In our quality Guide, a Commander of the Faithful and Head of your policy, we would like you to make a few recommendations.
Dear people,
First, as soon as you cross the border, you must do your devotions, facing Mecca to give thanks to the Almighty Allah.”
Then you must know that this phase of the March differs from that which preceded it, in that it requires more of your discipline. To carry out this March to the end, you owe obedience and enforce, to the letter, the instructions of those in charge of your supervision”[11]
In order to fulfill religious, social and political legitimacy, the institution of the monarchy gradually avoided the other centers which compete with the king for religious legitimacy and to take full control of the religious affairs of the state. Such a case is that of the Islamic movements, Justice and Charity (Al adl wa al Ihssan/JC) and Movement of Unification and Reform (RUM/ Tawhid Wa El Islah), which emerged in the seventies and eighties claiming an alternative source of religious legitimacy. These two movements think that religious legitimacy holds the monarch as a sacred person and thus completely out of question. This is the very reason King II refuses to share power with those who question the same theory—for instance, the Justice and Charity Party and Union and Reform Party (PJD).
Despite such efforts and official measures taken by the King, the extent of the regime’s religious legitimacy continues to be vehemently debated. While Clifford Geertz[12], one of the prominent anthropologists, has clung to the idea that the monarchy is to be strong in terms of its ideological and religious legitimacy others anthropologists like Henry Munson have not shared the same viewpoint. Namely, he questioned Geertz’s findings in general and the veracity of some of the country’s elections in particular.
Overall, without getting into a debate with social scientists from another sphere, I find that Geertz’s perspective is more reasonable and serve my paper‘s purpose. That is to say, the monarchial institution enjoys broad authenticity and legitimacy in the heartland of the country. The question that remains to be asked is how did these two movements respond to the monopolization of the Kingdom’s Islamic affairs? Do they cave in to the monarchial institution? Do they respond similarly?
References:
[1] Mohamed Darif 2010 Monarchie Marocaine et Acteurs Religiuex, Casabalanca :Afrique Orient , chapter 1’(p(5—63)
[2] Ibid
[3] Moroccan constitution, Article 19 available at http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm
[4] Clifford Geertz Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[5] Driss AL Maghraoui in “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco” published in Mediterranean Politics,Volume 14, Issue 2, 2009,Special Issue: Reform in the Arab World: The Experience of Morocco
[6]Moroccan constitution, Article 19 available at http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm
[7] Ibid
[8] Clifford Geertz Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
9 Ahmed Rami “A Participant in two Attempted Coups D’état, Interviewed” published in “Maroc Hebdo International” July 22, 1994(Interviewed by Mostafa Tossa
[10] See the speech of the king Hassan II in Agadir 5th November 1975 available at http://www.lagencedusud.gov.ma/download/discours-SM-HassanII-75-agadir.pdf
[11] Ibid’(Translation is mine)
[12] Clifford Geertz Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
To be continued …
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