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Join on Telegram The events in the Gulf region have mobilized not only the military but also geopoliticians and think tanks of all stripes who have seen and revised their scenarios on the outcome of this war, the collateral damage of which has spared almost no country on the planet following the increase in the price of strategic materials that transit through the Strait of Hormuz (oil, gas, fertilisers, helium, sulphur, ammonia etc.).
Admittedly, hostilities have temporarily ceased, but the ceasefire is fragile and is only hanging on the thread stretched by Pakistan, which is making colossal efforts.
Certainly, Pakistan is a trusted intermediary and a country known for the dexterity of its diplomats, but this role should have been played by the United Nations or the OIC, of which Iran and the GCC countries are members and of which Russia is an observer member, not to mention the confidence that the country of the headquarters, Saudi Arabia, enjoys with the United States of America.
Indeed, the OIC would have been an ideal framework to play the role of appointed mediator in the conflicts that shake the Islamic world; however, it is helpless when a crisis involves external powers, as is the case with the crisis of Hormuz.
It was only on the seventh day that communiqués of the Arab League and the OIC were issued in a moderate style, conventional for the occasion, evoking a “grave concern”, without proposing any measures, without pronouncing the word “condemnation”, at least at the beginning, it was only following the protest of the GCC countries that the former secretary general of the Arab League came out of his reserve which earned him his position afterwards.
An examination of diplomatic chronicles indicates that nearly seven out of ten states remained silent, the others were satisfied with conventional formulas. The OIC and the Arab League have not disappeared from the scene, but they are organizations that function year after year in peacetime and retain the formal appearance of a collective body, without having the capacity to act.
Moreover, the Arab League, which has a collective security pact unlike the OIC, has a meagre record in terms of collective security that is perplexing; Between 1946 and 1990, it intervened in only a quarter of inter-Arab disputes, with a success rate of around 20%. The Organization of American States and the African Union performed better in this regard. Since 2011, in the face of the Syrian, Libyan, Yemeni and Sudanese crises, it has not imposed itself decisively due to a lack of consensus.
The analysis of the diplomatic behavior of the OIC Member States in the face of international crises is very revealing of the paradox of heterogeneity in the OIC, thus there is a significant variation in the degree of collective mobilization according to the crises: the Palestinian issue is the only one that arouses exceptional convergence, with nearly 80% of the Member States having expressed a public position.
The other crises studied are characterized by significantly higher levels of reserves. Between 40% and 60% of members abstained from any official statement in the cases of Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, the Iranian-American confrontation and the Hormuz crisis. This distribution suggests that the diplomatic cohesion of the Organization tends to erode as crises directly involve the strategic, security or economic interests of its most influential members. In this context, consensus-building often fosters diplomatic restraint characterized by neutrality, strategic ambiguity, or official silence.
Mapping the behavior of the main actors in the Hormuz crisis
For the purposes of this article, we have identified the events of the Hormuz crisis by mobilizing the measurement scale and weighting system of Azar and Sloan’s event analysis, in order to quantify the cooperative and conflictual interactions of each actor. This approach was completed by a triangulation based on the analysis of discourses, strategic narratives and actions actually observed, making it possible to compare declared positions with real behaviour.
What does event-based analysis reveal?
Paradoxically, the results reveal a clear predominance of cooperative dynamics: ten of the thirteen actors studied show a positive balance in favour of cooperation, led by Pakistan (+735), China (+700), Saudi Arabia (+675), Qatar (+600) and Oman (+550). The Gulf states recorded an average balance of +579, illustrating a strong convergence in favour of regional stability, while Turkey (+520), India (+450), Russia (+400) and Egypt (+360) adopted hedging strategies aimed at limiting the risks of escalation.
Conversely, conflictual interactions remain concentrated around the small core of belligerents, with Iran in the lead (-150), followed by the United States (-50) and Israel (-30). The 885-point gap between the highest and lowest score highlights a structural asymmetry between cooperation and conflict. More than a general polarisation, the crisis thus reveals the relative isolation of the actors involved in the confrontation in the face of a broad coalition favouring mediation, de-escalation and the preservation of regional stability.
What does the narrative of the main players reveal?
The cross-analysis of 152 official communications from 22 states and organizations draws a strategic map that shakes up the narrative of a world divided into two blocs. The unsaid, the calculated abstentions and the diplomatic silences often weigh more heavily than the public declarations, as was the case in several OIC countries and especially the GCC countries.
The strategic silence of the Gulf countries and most of the neighboring countries
Despite its importance for regional security, nearly 60 percent of the 57 OIC states have not taken any public position, compared to only 20 percent in the case of Gaza. This high level of diplomatic reserve reflects the complexity of the arbitrations faced by the governments concerned. The crisis simultaneously involves several influential OIC states, geopolitical rivalries in the Middle East as well as the United States, a major security partner of many Gulf monarchies and several other OIC countries.
The Gulf monarchies have practiced a strategic silence that takes up the central logic of Mearsheimer’s buck-passing (i.e. refusing to directly confront a rising threat in the hope that another state will do it in his place), not intervening, not choosing sides, letting the confrontation exhaust itself. Wait and see wait for one of the two opponents to show signs of weakness to line up discreetly.
Consequently, far from reflecting a lack of interest in the crisis of Hormuz, the silence observed appears more as the expression of a hedging strategy aimed at preserving balanced relations with all stakeholders, especially since the outcome of the war is not clear.
The countries of the Middle East, the Gulf States, are caught in a structural dilemma. Their security is based on the American umbrella (bases, naval patrols, intelligence sharing) without which these countries would be very exposed to Iranian pressure.
As a result, condemning the strikes on Iran would break the security anchor; To approve would be to alienate populations sensitive to solidarity between Muslims. The solution lies in waiting and evasive formulas (“concern”, “regional stability”). This is not hypocrisy, but strategic prudence.
Russia and China: discursive harmony, operational restraint
The China-Russia-Iran trio displays a remarkable rhetorical synchronization, with a correlation index of +0.92 between Chinese and Russian positions, one of the highest ever recorded in this type of analysis. Their communiqués never contradict each other: systematic denunciation of Washington, open support for Tehran, plea for a “polycentric order” and rejection of “unilateralism and hegemony”. The bilateral summit of May 2026 extended their neighborhood agreement and sealed some twenty to forty cooperation texts, with the two powers describing each other as Iran’s “unwavering strategic allies”.
In reality, the operational reality differs significantly. Beijing has limited itself to financial relays and the promotion of the yuan in energy exchanges, without supplying military equipment or deploying personnel. Moscow did deliver S-500 batteries, but also refrained from committing troops. This is a coalition of complementarity, not an integrated military pact. The Sino-Russian treaty remains a neighborhood agreement, without an automatic defense clause. This distinction is fundamental.
China’s restraint responds to a logic of strict interest: to secure the supply of hydrocarbons in yuan, to protect the corridors of the Silk Road, and to avoid any direct confrontation with the United States. Beijing’s strategy is structurally focused on the long term; It does not need military projection to defend its markets. For its part, Russia, absorbed by the Ukrainian front since 2022, lacks both the capacity and the political will to open a second theatre of operations. The delivery of anti-aircraft systems remains significant, but strictly calibrated.
This Eastern Pole thus functions as an arrangement of circumstance, welded together by a common mistrust of Washington rather than by a common project of Iranian victory. This is its strength (it requires little commitment) as well as its weakness (it offers few guarantees).
Neutralists in search of a balance through consultation
Bringing together Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, this group is both the most dynamic and the most emblematic on the chessboard, concentrating 42% of the diplomatic initiatives recorded, its representatives meet regularly (three ministerial meetings in one month), and a Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact (SMDA) has been signed but not activated. Islamabad has not retaliated and its inertia does not reflect structural weakness, but geostrategic prudence: Pakistan must manage Indian tension, its porous borders with Afghanistan, spare Beijing and maintain channels with Washington. He cannot afford a conflict with Tehran.
On the discursive level, the quadrilateral maintains positive relations with both sides, it is a romantic pivot (average feeling of +0.25 to +0.80 for the East, +0.40 to +0.50 for the West). It embodies an operational non-alignment, distinct from the historical postures of the radical South. Saudi Arabia has a dissonance index of 0.47: its actions follow Washington; its discourse remains neutral. This discrepancy is deliberate. It allows Riyadh to preserve its legitimacy in the face of Arab public opinion suspicious of Western interventionism, while securing its vital interests.
Turkey, with a score of 0.11, is an exception: it strictly aligns rhetoric and practice. A member of NATO, it refuses to condemn the strikes on Iran, dialogues with Moscow and acts as an autonomous regional power. It confirms the rule by demonstrating that an assumed strategic sovereignty remains compatible with Western alliances.
The only real fault line is between Iran and the US-Israeli tandem. Everywhere else, interests intersect and recompose themselves according to crises.
The determining factors of the actors’ behavior in the crisis
The positioning of countries during the Hormuz War between belligerents, economic partners, neutral mediators, Western allies or dissident allies is not due to chance; the analysis of eighteen countries, combining eleven variables, shows that three factors account for 87% of the behaviours observed: These are the intensity of trade with Iran, the degree of energy dependence on it, and the positioning in the face of the rivalry between Washington/Israel and Tehran; These variables explain why some countries have chosen cooperation, others conflict, and still others strategic silence or mediation.
Profiling the patterns of actors
The belligerents : Iran, the United States and Israel. These three countries have no significant trade with Iran. American sanctions prohibit it. Israel has never developed close economic ties with Tehran. Nor is any of them dependent on Iran for energy. Finally, they are engaged in a direct confrontation. The total absence of economic interdependence locks them into a logic of conflict from which they cannot escape. Their average score is -93.
Economic partners: China, India, Russia and Algeria. These countries have chosen to trade with Iran. China exchanges $65 billion a year with Tehran. India, 12 billion. Russia and Algeria also maintain close economic relations. Their energy dependence on Iran remains modest. Above all, they refuse to align themselves with Washington. China and Russia are openly opposed to the United States. India practices a diplomacy of strategic independence. Algeria is following a similar path. Their logic is simple: they have economic interests to protect in Tehran. So they cooperate. Their average score reaches +524.
Neutral mediators : Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and Oman. These four countries have the highest scores, around +526. Each one reaches it by different paths, but all share a refusal to choose sides. Pakistan has positioned itself as a credible mediator between Washington and Tehran, going so far as to negotiate a ceasefire. Turkey, which is 45% dependent on Iranian gas, cannot afford to fall out with its supplier, while remaining a member of NATO. Qatar shares with Iran the world’s largest gas field and hosts the largest US base in the Middle East. Oman has always cultivated active neutrality. Their freedom of maneuver is their main asset.
Western allies: These are countries firmly anchored in the American alliance. They host U.S. military bases, buy massive amounts of weapons from Washington, and several have signed the Abraham Agreements. Their room for maneuver is quite limited and their average score (+312) remains positive but lower than that of neutral mediators, precisely because their alliance with Washington constrains them.
The dissident allies: Spain, France, Belgium, Greece, Germany, Italy and Portugal. These European countries occupy a paradoxical position. Members of NATO, and therefore theoretically allies of the United States, they nevertheless refused to participate in the war. Spain has closed its airspace and banned access to its bases. France has proposed alternative mediation. Germany has rejected the request. Their trade with Iran is negligible. They do not depend on its energy. Their refusal was explained by geographical distance, the absence of direct economic interests, and public opinion resolutely hostile to the war. Their score is estimated at +150.
Each country has acted according to its geographical location, its economic constraints, its strategic alliances and the perception of its national interest; the war in Hormuz has simply shown that, in international relations, economic interdependence, geoeconomics and freedom of strategic maneuver sometimes count more than military power.
Winners and losers
China is the silent big winner. It has not committed troops or warships, it has secured yuan settlement for Iranian oil, weakened the dollar monopoly, it has deepened its strategic partnership with Russia, and it has positioned itself as a responsible stakeholder.
Pakistan is the second big winner; He has established himself as the indispensable mediator, the organizer of the quadrilateral, the architect of the ceasefire. Its strategic relevance, long in decline, has been restored. It is now the pivot of the quadrilateral, the bridge between the Gulf, Iran and the United States.
Qatar, Oman and, to some extent, the Kingdom of Morocco are the quiet winners. They facilitated dialogue with everyone. Their neutrality has been recognized and rewarded. Qatar hosts the largest U.S. base in the Middle East while sharing the world’s largest gas field with Iran. Oman has no foreign base and maintains diplomatic relations with everyone.
Iran is a mixed case; it has demonstrated the credibility of its geo-economic deterrent and its relative resilience. He has shown that he can close the Straits and impose costs on the world economy. But the costs have been high; Its economy is at the end of the abyss, the Rial has collapsed and the regime is faltering.
The record for Israel is also mixed; the Head of Government maintains his coalition (undeclared objective of the war) he has successfully struck Iranian nuclear facilities, but the program although delayed continues as long as the enriched uranium and ballistic arsenal remain intact, and the proxies although weakened resist. The mullahs’ regime has not disappeared, it has risen from the ashes with a radicalized version dominated by the Revolutionary Guards. Israel has demonstrated its military and technological superiority, but its Achilles heel remains diplomatic isolation, despite the conclusion of the Abraham agreements, because the two states solution is not on the agenda of the current coalition in power.
Towards a frozen conflict for lack of a clear victory
Hormuz’s war did not end because of a military victory, but because of mutual exhaustion and the main belligerents are facing internal constraints. On April 8, under Pakistani mediation, the US-Israeli strikes ceased, the Iranian response stopped, and the strait remained open, but under a shipping regime controlled by Tehran, with passage rights of up to two million dollars per ship. On April 13, 2026, the United States in turn decreed a blockade of Iranian ports; a weapon that has proven to be more profitable than military strikes.
This outcome does not crown a winner. Tehran has obtained neither the lifting of sanctions, nor the American withdrawal, nor the recognition of its nuclear sovereignty. Washington has not dismantled Iran’s atomic program, nor overthrown the regime, nor imposed a new regional security architecture. Israel has not permanently neutralized Hezbollah or Hamas, nor put an end to Persian nuclear ambitions, it has only gained a few square kilometers and dislodged the fighters from southern Lebanon while the threat of the Houthis on Bab Al Mandab remains almost intact.
This configuration produces a quasi-deterrence parity. Neither side can impose its maximum conditions, neither can endure the continuation of hostilities. The result is a Nash equilibrium: a stable, self-sustaining, but collectively suboptimal state, where low-intensity conflict is perpetuated without clear resolution.
