Since the outbreak of the US-Israeli war against Iran in February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has transformed itself from a global economic artery into a tense naval battlefield. The War of Hormuz has not ended and is entering a new phase of hybrid war of attrition until the exhaustion or internal political change of one of the main belligerents.
On April 8, under Pakistani mediation, hostilities ceased, the Iranian response ceased, and the strait remained open, but under a Tehran-controlled maritime regime, with passage rights of up to two million dollars per ship. On April 13, 2026, the United States in turn decreed a blockade of Iranian ports; a weapon that proved more profitable than military strikes.
In June 2026, a window of peace opened when the United States and Iran reached a historic agreement in Geneva in the form of a roadmap to establish peace and reopen the Strait; the agreement provides for a gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for monitoring Iranian nuclear facilities by the IAEA.
Since the end of August, the United States has pivoted towards a strategy of financial and economic asphyxiation called “Economic Outcast”, announced with great fanfare by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
This configuration has produced a situation of neither war nor peace, a quasi-parity of deterrence on the military side, and a condominium regime for the logistical management of the Strait. Neither side can impose its maximum conditions, nor can it withstand the continuation of hostilities. The result is a Nash equilibrium: a stable, self-sufficient, but collectively suboptimal state, where a low-intensity conflict is perpetuated without a clear resolution.
The deterrence parity described above, and the establishment of bypass infrastructures (gas pipelines, rail corridors, alternative energies) notably by the UAE and Saudi Arabia and potentially by Iraq and Kuwait will ease the pressure on the importance of transit through Hormuz, which will see its importance diminish over time.
It should be remembered that a strait or any road or logistics point does not automatically retain its strategic value simply because of its geographical position; its centrality will depend on the ability of coastal or transit states to guarantee security, predictability and continuity of transit.
The way out of the Hormuz War, which will save the face of the two main belligerents, could be articulated, in our modest opinion, around two aspects: on the one hand, the politico-diplomatic aspect focused on the future of the Iranian nuclear program (re-establishment of IEA controls with or without an evacuation of enriched uranium or its destruction on site under international supervision) and on the other hand, the economic-logistical component via the establishment of a new system of governance of the Strait of Malacca in the image of the Strait of Malacca model.
This article will focus on the second part by recalling that the Sultanate of Oman had proposed a governance model similar to that of the Strait of Malacca, which is today one of the few tangible and sustainable successes in terms of shared management of international straits.
The governance of the Strait of Malacca: a maverick engineering
Stretching 900 kilometers between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, it narrows to just 2.7 kilometers at its narrowest point. In 2025 alone, more than 102,500 ships have sailed through its waters, carrying the lifeblood of the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean economies. Despite this density and the persistent threats of piracy, collision, and ecological disaster, Malacca remains open thanks to a carefully crafted diplomatic architecture.
This architecture is based on Article 43 of the 1982 United Nations Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires that “user States and States bordering on a strait shall cooperate by agreement” in matters of safety of navigation and pollution prevention; For a quarter of a century, the provision remained inactive; and on the other hand, the Cooperative Mechanism designed by the IMO in September 2007.
Indeed, the governance architecture of the Strait of Malacca is based on a legal compromise: although the waters of the Strait fall directly under the territorial sovereignty of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, international law guarantees a regime of innocent and unrestricted transit passage for commercial and warships from all over the world. This duality prohibits coastal States from unilaterally suspending navigation, while conferring on them exclusive responsibility for police and security in their respective jurisdictions.
To operationalize this shared sovereignty in the face of transnational threats such as piracy or marine pollution, the institutional architecture is based on the Strait of Malacca Patrols mechanism. This framework integrates the MALSINDO program, which coordinates each country’s naval interventions along maritime borders, and the combined air initiative “Eyes in the Sky”, extended to Thailand, which ensures continuous surveillance of the airspace. These physical security operations are supported by a real-time military intelligence exchange group, making it possible to create technical interoperability without merging national military commands.
On the macroeconomic and logistical front, this architecture is complemented by the Cooperation Mechanism established in 2007 under the aegis of the IMO, which provides a framework for dialogue and financing between coastal states and user countries, and which allows major user states (such as China and Japan) to voluntarily finance infrastructure maintenance and navigational aids. This model preserves the sovereignty of coastal states while guaranteeing the security of this vital global artery.
The mechanism is based on three pillars:
- The Cooperation Forum: A platform for dialogue bringing together coastal states, user states and the maritime industry.
- The Project Coordination Committee: which manages infrastructure and security projects.
- The Aids to Navigation Fund: the financial arm for the maintenance of the Strait’s physical and digital aids to navigation.
What characterizes the Malacca Mechanism is that funding is strictly voluntary; contributions from user states and shippers are voluntary and “separate from the exercise of transit passage and are not considered charges, tolls, or payments imposed on transient vessels.” Funded by non-profit organizations such as the Nippon Foundation and industry players, the Aids to Navigation Fund raises a modest sum of about $70 million annually.
As Ambassador Tommy Koh, the model’s architect, points out: “We are the only strait in the world that has what is called a cooperative mechanism.”
Why has this mechanism proved resilient to geopolitical turbulence?
The resilience of tripartite cooperation in the Strait of Malacca is based first and foremost on a robust security consensus (Fan Jairiu Security consensus, institutional networks, and the resilience of small multilateral cooperation in the Strait of Malacca 2026); the national interests of coastal states converge, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore share an existential interest in keeping the waters open; they have a “very common interest” in preventing collisions, minimising pollution and funding oil spill response, supported by the deep solidarity of other ASEAN members (Robert Beckman, Professor Emeritus at the National University of Singapore).
The other decisive factor that pushed coastal states to overcome their territorial disputes to form a common front was the perception of an imminent external danger from the risks of intervention and interference by user countries to maintain the security of the strait in the event of failure by coastal states, such as the American RMSI project or the joint patrols proposed by Japan, which carried out initiatives perceived as direct threats to their national sovereignty.
This consensus is organized around a double imperative: to preserve strict regional autonomy in the face of external pressures on the one hand, and to coordinate the fight against non-traditional threats such as terrorism or piracy on the other. Although the extreme sensitivity linked to sovereignty prevents full military integration under a single command, the internal political stability of these three countries and their common membership in ASEAN have provided the essential foundation for maintaining this dynamic.
Strait of Hormuz under condominium: transitional governance between internationalization and national ownership
During 2026, the management of the Strait of Hormuz gradually abandoned Tehran’s desire for unilateral control in favor of a more concerted approach. This turning point originated in the joint declaration of 23 June 2026, signed by Oman and Iran. The text recorded the creation of a bilateral working group, mandated to define the future modalities of navigation and to regulate possible “service fees” in strict compliance with international law, while providing for the involvement of other coastal states.
This salutary development is in line with the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which, while guaranteeing the right of transit passage, encourages regional cooperation for maritime security, thus tracing a middle way between the sovereignty of coastal States and the imperative of the fluidity of world trade.
At the end of August 2026, this diplomatic dynamic led to a first operational compromise, a temporary transit corridor, about seven miles wide, structured into two distinct entry/exit flows. According to statements by Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, the entry route to the Gulf would pass through Iran’s territorial waters, while the exit route would extend over both Iranian and Omani maritime areas. This configuration is more akin to a pragmatic arrangement than to a rigid division of space or a total takeover by Tehran. This arrangement should be accompanied by joint initiatives to secure and clear the waters. Nevertheless, the precise navigation protocols and the exact nature of the financial mechanisms still need to be clarified.
The fragility of these talks is all the more palpable as they are taking place under the close supervision of the US and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already made it clear that they will strongly oppose any normalization of exclusive Iranian control or the introduction of tolls, considering this passage as a strategic common good.
In this context, the commitment made on 23 June to consult the “riparian states” goes beyond simple diplomatic courtesy: it is an absolute geopolitical necessity to avoid a frontal rejection of the agreement. In addition to this regional pressure, there is the weight of Washington. Tehran uses the Single Undertaking rule by linking the total opening of the strait to American concessions, particularly on the sanctions and blockade of its ports and the situation of its proxies in Lebanon and Yemen.
Can the Malacca model be transposed to the Strait of Hormuz?
Developments in negotiations between Oman and Iran show that a model inspired by the Strait of Malacca could be a third way between Iranian control and a full internationalization of the management of Hormuz. Oman’s July proposal was based on a regional mechanism involving the two states and voluntary contributions to finance certain maritime services. Iran rejected it, saying that a 50/50 split of routes did not address its security concerns. Since then, the two countries have moved towards a temporary compromise: a corridor of about seven miles, entering Iranian territorial waters and exiting via a route that crosses Omani and Iranian waters, coupled with envisaged cooperation for mine clearance.
However, the transposition of the Malacca model to the Strait of Hormuz comes up against three series of difficulties to be overcome. First of all, geography, the Strait of Malacca has alternatives – the Straits of Lombok or Sonda – while Hormuz is the main maritime outlet of the Persian Gulf. Of course, bypass routes exist (Bab el-Mandeb and the Cape of Good Hope), but they considerably lengthen distances and costs. Onshore oil and gas pipelines are either operational (the East-West Saudi oil pipeline 7 million barrels per day or the Emirates pipeline to Fujairah), or under development, like the Iraqi or Kuwaiti projects to Turkey and Syria. According to Goldman Sachs, this infrastructure could divert 7.3 million barrels per day by 2028. However, it remains vulnerable, expensive and takes a long time to develop. The monopoly of Hormuz is not absolute, but it gives Iran significant strategic leverage.
Secondly, the law is a major obstacle. The legal status of Hormuz is divisive. For the majority of States, the Strait falls under the scope of transit passage (UNCLOS, Articles 37 to 44), which guarantees continuous and non-suspendable passage (Iran and the United States have not ratified the Convention). Tehran favors a reading based on innocent passage, which leaves the coastal State with broader prerogatives. This interpretation is contested: many consider transit passage to be a customary rule (GCC countries and the international community and the IMO). With regard to the imposition of fees, Article 26 of UNCLOS authorizes the coastal State to collect sums for services actually rendered to ships in transit, but it cannot therefore justify a toll.
Finally, politics complicates transposition. The Malacca model works because the three coastal states share a common interest in keeping the Strait open and have built mutual trust over the decades. There is nothing like this in the Gulf; Iran intends to make the Strait an instrument of power. Regional rivalries, particularly with Saudi Arabia, and external pressure complicate the search for consensus.
However, regional diplomatic developments, following the signing of the Mecca Defense Pact on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, could change the situation. According to unconfirmed reports, Iran has been invited to join. Talks between Iran and the Gulf countries, under the aegis of Qatar, are being prepared and some observers do not rule out a scenario – still hypothetical, in the longer term, in the form of an association of Iran with the GCC – this eventuality could reduce tensions and pave the way for a shared governance of the Strait.
A lasting compromise could not be based on a toll imposed by Iran, nor on a mechanism giving a single state a right of veto over transit; the most realistic path would be functional and regional governance: coordinated roads, maritime services paid for in a transparent manner, joint mine clearance, consultation with other riparian states and the main users. The Malacca model would not be reproduced identically, but adapted to the geography, the balance of power and the legal constraints specific to Hormuz.
The crisis in the Gulf offers a lesson for the rest of the world. The rules governing international maritime chokepoints are not immutable laws, they are fragile diplomatic constructs. The closure of Hormuz has already forced Asian countries to look at Malacca with concern. If the international community accepts a new practice of managing transit passages through the straits, in this case the imposition of passage fees, this will be the starting point for a new international custom that could be generalized to other straits and become in the future the positive law that will be codified in a new United Nations convention on the law of the sea.
