Pretoria – The outcomes of the general elections in South Africa are not merely a concern for locals, but also by global observers, particularly across the African continent.
These just concluded elections, which to a certain extent have brought back memories of South Africa in 1994, constitute today a new era into which the country expects to enter with great uncertainty.
The declining popular support for the African National Congress (ANC) party (which only secured 40% of the vote, a historic low) signaled more than just a loss of electoral support. At its core, this result underscores ANC’s failure to adapt and reinvent itself.
The emergence of former President Jacob Zuma’s MK Party — whose name recalls the ANC’s armed wing which received training and financial backing from North African capitals in the 1960s — has reshuffled the cards of the South African political landscape. Unlike past challengers like the Congress of the People (COPE) party in 2009, MK represents a significant disruption beyond just electoral numbers.
However, the gap between long-standing political rivals, President Cyril Ramaphosa and MK leader Jacob Zuma, will be difficult to bridge in the perspective of forming a national coalition.
These elections and their aftermath are particularly under scrutiny on the other side of the continent, particularly by key African Union donor states such as Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. This is not just because of a potential shift in South African foreign policy, but also — and especially — because of how the resulting government can change or rethink bilateral relations and South African positions on many issues and conflicts in the region.
ANC’s future
The ANC’s worst electoral result since the end of apartheid is not only catastrophic for the party but also for President Cyril Ramaphosa who could come under pressure from the party to resign, just like his predecessors — although for different reasons. Nevertheless, the question looms whether Ramaphosa will shoulder both political and moral responsibility for such an unprecedented decline in the ANC’s once-robust popularity.
Although there remains a possibility for the ANC to emerge victorious in this election through coalition-building, such a path is not without its pitfalls. Any such coalition would likely come at the cost of concessions to rival parties, leaving the ANC scarred from the electoral battle.
The ANC had not anticipated such a significant drop in voter support, leaving them unprepared to address challenges to Ramaphosa’s leadership or prepare a successor. However, current dynamics may be changing, bringing a change that may see Paul Mashatile, the ANC’s current Deputy President, as the next to take the helm of both the party and the South African presidency.
However, the pressures to which the ANC will be subject to may contribute to internal change being influenced from the outside, in particular from former party comrades who have since joined the MK.
The future of the ANC is also dependent on the leadership’s ability to manage internal conflicts between its different factions. The liberal current which has failed to dominate the party since its creation, and softened into moderate social democrat (representing the current leading faction), is aligned with pro-business interests while showing less inclination towards radical economic reforms, would not be against the idea of allying with the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA).
As for the left wing, historically shaped by the Tripartite Alliance with the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, it has a real chance of returning to power if the pressure exerted by the still-member Jacob Zuma is successful, or under form of coalition with the radical leftist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)..
As such, observers in Algeria and Libya are closely watching the evolution and direction towards which the historic ally of their countries is heading. The Algerian government has to date been delighted with the alignment of positions with the ANC on a number of regional and international issues, while Tripoli hopes to resolve the matter of the Khadaffi regime’s assets that are located in South Africa.
On support for the Palestinian cause
If the question of Palestine had little bearing on the conduct of the elections and voters’ choices, its impact on the aftermath will be great.
South Africa’s efforts to bring the Gaza genocide case before the ICJ were greatly welcomed by Arab public opinion, and several countries have since joined the initiative. Libya, for example, recently filed an intervention declaration in the current procedure; Egypt has declared its intention to join the ICJ case as well.
With such growing support for South Africa’s case against Israel’s brutal war on Gaza, it is unlikely that any South African government to come out of the ANC’s loss of majority would seek to back out of the ICJ proceedings. To be sure, former South African and ANC leader Nelson Mandela famously and decisively tied the freedom of the South Africans with that of Palestinians.
Yet the fact remains that the ANC’s underwhelming electoral results will push it to seek alliances in order to continue to govern. As this may require making concessions, not only internally but also externally, some observers worry whether such domestic concessions could extend to South Africa’s official support for the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people.
As far as the ANC leadership is concerned, while support for Palestine remains a distinctive mark of the party’s identity, the idea of rallying small parties to continue to exert influence is no longer on the agenda. In other words, the ANC has no choice but to seek an ally among the opposition, while still being open to garnering support from other political groups in Parliament.
The most controversial of such potential allies would be Gayton McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance, which is notoriously pro-Israel and has consistently resisted pressure to abandon its pro-Israeli stance. The option of a coalition with the DA and the IFP to guarantee a solid national majority and regain control of the provinces of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal cannot also be ruled out. Despite being part of the Multi-Party Charter, Steenhuisen and Hlabisa have notably left the door ajar to potential alliance with the ANC.
However, the DA’s proximity to Western positions, and its support for Israel — or at least its ambiguous position on the Palestinian cause — could greatly influence South Africa’s foreign policy, particularly on the question of Palestine. Egyptian analyst Rami Zohdy believes that the best thing the Democratic Alliance can offer in terms of maintaining or at least not tearing apart South Africa’s support for the Palestinian cause is to remain formally neutral, refraining from explicitly supporting Palestinians or condemning Israel.
The EFF’s possible entry into government
In light of current developments, it appears increasingly likely that the ruling party will look towards its former ANC Youth League president, Julius Malema, who in recent years has been a noticeable force on the South African political scene as the leader of the radical leftist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Indeed, Malema has maintained that the EFF sees the ANC as its natural coalition partner and expressed willingness to collaborate with them.
And given that Malema has actually signaled his willingness to provide military support to Hamas if his party comes to power, the potential inclusion of the EFF in the government could be a positive development for the most positive outcome for supporters of the Palestinian cause can hope for amid the potential consequences of the latest South African elections.
On the other hand, an alliance between the ANC and Malema’s EFF could contribute to a further deterioration of relations with Morocco. Despite being officially pro-Polisario on the Western Sahara question, the ANC has signaled its willingness to improve diplomatic and economic relations with Morocco.
Malema, on the other hand, has repeatedly maintained radically anti-Moroccan positions. Notably, the EFF leader has spoken out against Morocco’s return to the African Union and accused the North African kingdom of overseeing a supposedly malicious occupation of Western Sahara.
In its electoral manifesto, the EFF supports, and calls for, the holding of a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara. However, this proposal appears to be detached from present realities, given the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council since 2007 have resolutely buried the referendum option in favor of “a realistic, pragmatic, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution” on the Sahara issue.
Over the years, Pretoria and Rabat have exchanged mildly hostile statements in response to their diverging positions on the Sahara dispute.
For example, when asked earlier this year about South Africa’s continued call for a self-determination referendum, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bouriata said that South Africa is “a marginal actor in the question of the Moroccan Sahara and will remain so […] if it had the capacity to change the situation, it would have done so twenty years ago.”
Nevertheless, both countries have signaled on numerous occasions a certain willingness to normalize their diplomatic relations, as evidenced by an exchange of ambassadorial appointments and a recent agreement by the Moroccan and South African parliaments to strengthen “sectoral cooperation between the two parties.”
For many commentators, however, a potential EFF-ANC coalition may well finally extinguish the dimming lights of fully normalized diplomatic and economic cooperation between Pretoria and Rabat.
