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Home » Opinion » The Business of Unfinished Peace

The Business of Unfinished Peace

How institutions created to bring conflicts to an end can become part of what allows them to endure.

Hsain IlahianebyHsain Ilahiane
Nov, 04, 2026
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morocco algeria western sahara

Illustration of the Moroccan and Algerian flags against the backdrop of the Sahara. By MWN Design Team

I remember a man we called Ammi Abdelkader, or Dzayri, the Algerian, who worked at my middle school in Erfoud, a small town in southeastern Morocco. As children, we noticed his Algerian accent without understanding the history behind it. He belonged to the familiar world of our school, yet his speech suggested another place, another life. We knew him by a name that marked him as different, although we knew almost nothing about what had brought him among us.

Only much later did I learn that he was Moroccan, among those expelled from Algeria in 1975. What we had heard as an accent was also the trace of a political rupture.

That year, amid escalating tensions surrounding the Green March and the future of the Spanish-administered Sahara, Algeria launched a state-orchestrated expulsion of Moroccan residents beginning on December 8, 1975. More than 45,000 Moroccan families, an estimated 350,000 people, were reportedly uprooted. Families were separated, homes abandoned, and livelihoods abruptly disrupted. People who had spent years, sometimes generations, building lives in Algeria suddenly found themselves forced to leave, carrying with them the memories of homes, relationships, and futures they had expected to keep.

Ammi Abdelkader had crossed from one country into another, but the history of that crossing remained with him. It was audible in his voice, even to children who could not yet understand its significance.

I have often wondered what became of the lives interrupted by that moment. What happened to the friendships, businesses, marriages, and ordinary expectations that people had cultivated before political confrontation made their continuation impossible? Some may have rebuilt what they lost. Others may have found new possibilities. But certain things, the years spent in one place, the relationships broken, the futures once imagined, could not simply be restored.

More than half a century after those expulsions, another event has brought me back to Ammi Abdelkader and to a question that reaches beyond the political history of North Africa: what happens when institutions created to resolve political problems become part of how their non-resolution endures?

On 30 October 2026, the United Nations Security Council failed to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known as MINURSO. Russia vetoed an American-sponsored proposal to extend and restructure the mission, while a competing Russian proposal failed to secure sufficient support. At the end of the following day, the mandate expired. On 1 November, Secretary-General António Guterres announced the end of the mission’s peacekeeping operations and the beginning of its orderly withdrawal.

For Morocco, the end of the mission marked a significant diplomatic turning point. Its government regarded the moment as an opportunity to move beyond a framework that had endured for thirty-five years without producing the political settlement it was intended to facilitate, as reflected in a statement by the Moroccan Royal Cabinet. Algeria and the Polisario Front, which advocates an independent Sahrawi state, contested the direction of that transition. The United Nations maintained that self-determination remained unresolved and that diplomacy must continue.

The mission was ending. The disagreement that had sustained it was not.

There is a paradox here, familiar to anyone who has studied institutions. Organizations created to accomplish particular purposes acquire personnel, budgets, procedures, professional expertise, and established ways of doing things. Over time, these arrangements develop a momentum of their own. Mandates are renewed, activities continue, and institutional continuity can become increasingly detached from the achievement of the original objective.

This does not necessarily imply bureaucratic self-interest or deliberate obstruction. Institutions often endure because the problems they address are genuinely difficult and because their disappearance might make matters worse. A peacekeeping mission may prevent violence even when it cannot produce peace. Yet institutions need not create political deadlock to become part of the arrangements through which it is managed. Their routines can make the management of non-resolution administratively durable, allowing a diplomatic process to continue even when the political settlement it was intended to facilitate remains beyond reach. The danger is not necessarily that institutions prevent change, but that their continued operation can make the absence of change appear less exceptional.

For thirty-five years, the United Nations maintained a mission in Western Sahara whose defining objective, a referendum on the territory’s political future, never materialized. The mission performed other functions, including monitoring a ceasefire and maintaining an international presence. Its endurance raised a difficult question: could an institution continue to fulfill important functions while becoming increasingly disconnected from the political outcome that had justified its creation?

The management of a problem had acquired a history separate from the history of its solution.

The institution could count its continuity in mandates renewed. Those living with the unresolved conflict experienced the same years differently, through changes in their circumstances and possibilities that no renewal could reverse.

The dispute emerged from the unfinished history of decolonization. Morocco regards the territory as its Southern Provinces, while the United Nations refers to it as Western Sahara. Following its independence in 1956, Morocco sought to recover territories that remained under Spanish colonial administration. The Polisario Front, founded in 1973 to oppose Spanish rule, subsequently pursued Sahrawi independence, receiving early support from Libya and later sustained political and military backing from Algeria.

In its 1975 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice acknowledged historical ties of allegiance between the Moroccan sultan and some tribes of the territory but concluded that these did not establish territorial sovereignty sufficient to displace the principle of self-determination. Morocco emphasized territorial reintegration, while the Polisario insisted that Sahrawis should determine their political future. That same year, King Hassan II organized the Green March, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Moroccans toward the Spanish-administered territory.

I remember the Green March from my childhood in southeastern Morocco. I was in fifth grade when it entered our classrooms and homes through radio broadcasts, television, patriotic songs, and a sense of collective anticipation. National history was no longer something encountered only in textbooks. It seemed to be unfolding around us.

As children, we eagerly listened to Sawt al-Haq (The Voice of Truth), broadcast from Rabat, where Mostapha Al Alaoui’s theatrical oratory, biting sarcasm, and verbal assaults on Algeria’s Houari Boumédiène and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi captivated us. Across the border, Maghrib al-Shuʿub (Maghreb of the Peoples) came over the airwaves from Algeria, broadcasting in support of the Polisario Front and challenging the Moroccan monarchy. We were warned, however, not to turn the dial toward that station. Listening was considered politically suspect, and there was always the fear that someone might report us to the authorities. We understood little of the geopolitics, but we delighted in Al Alaoui’s fiery rhetoric and knew that certain voices were forbidden. Even the simple act of turning a radio dial could carry political meaning.

The conflict also entered our family life in a more immediate way. One of my maternal cousins served in the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces and was stationed in the Sahara, where he took part in the fighting. I still remember the excitement whenever he returned home on brmassion, the word we used in Tamazight and Moroccan Arabic for military leave, borrowed from the French une permission. Still dressed in his military fatigues, he would sit surrounded by younger relatives, myself among them, eager to hear what was happening in the Sahara. For us, the war was somewhere far away. Yet whenever he returned home, it seemed to enter the room with him.

For many Moroccans, the Green March became an enduring symbol of national unity and territorial recovery. For Sahrawis who understand the territory’s history differently, 1975 marked a contested transformation whose consequences continue to shape political identity and claims to self-determination.

Armed confrontation followed. In 1991, a UN-brokered ceasefire took effect, and MINURSO was established by the Security Council to monitor it and organize a referendum. The mission’s name preserved that original purpose: the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

But the referendum never took place.

Disagreements over voter eligibility and the territory’s political future prevented its implementation. Morocco formally presented its autonomy initiative in 2007, proposing a negotiated settlement under Moroccan sovereignty, while the Polisario insisted that independence remain an option. The ceasefire substantially reduced large-scale warfare for nearly three decades, although hostilities resumed after the Polisario declared the ceasefire over in November 2020.

Meanwhile, the institution continued.

The Secretary-General submitted reports. The Security Council reviewed developments. Mandates were renewed. Diplomats met, negotiated, and returned to familiar disagreements. These procedures were not without value. Ceasefire monitoring and diplomatic engagement could reduce the risk of renewed confrontation. But the mission could carry out its activities from one year to the next even when its defining political objective remained beyond reach.

The reporting cycle could be completed, the mandate renewed, and the institution’s work judged necessary without agreement on the political question that brought it into existence.

On 31 October 2025, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2797, placing Morocco’s autonomy proposal at the center of negotiations toward a mutually acceptable political solution providing for Sahrawi self-determination. The resolution recognized genuine autonomy as a potentially feasible outcome while maintaining the requirement for a negotiated settlement. It extended MINURSO’s mandate until 31 October 2026 and requested a strategic review of the mission’s future.

The resolution did not settle the sovereignty dispute or establish an autonomy statute. But it signaled a change in the diplomatic framework, directing negotiations toward a proposal that had been central to Morocco’s position since 2007.

One year later, the Security Council confronted the institutional implications of that shift.

The American-sponsored draft proposed renewing and restructuring the mission, reducing its military role and moving away from the referendum-centered framework. Russia opposed the proposal, arguing that it prejudged the political outcome and compromised the principle of self-determination. Its alternative would have extended the existing mission for another year.

Neither resolution passed.

The result was unusual. An institution that had survived decades of diplomatic disagreement did not end because the conflict had been resolved. It ended because the Security Council could no longer agree on the terms of its continuation.

What becomes visible when the machinery of conflict management stops operating? Not simply that the conflict remains unresolved, but that managing it and resolving it have become distinct political activities. The termination of a mission can expose that distinction without settling the disagreement beneath it. It can also reveal how much depended on the institution’s continued presence: monitoring arrangements, diplomatic channels, and the fragile stability that conflict management may have helped preserve.

The expiration of MINURSO’s mandate was not itself a peace agreement, nor did it establish that the mission had caused the political deadlock. The principal obstacles remained disagreements over sovereignty, self-determination, regional rivalry, and the willingness of political actors to accept a settlement. Yet the moment raised a question long obscured by the routine of renewal: whether preserving the existing framework was still the most useful way to pursue a political solution.

The Moroccan Royal Cabinet’s statement of 30 October 2026 gave that question a revealing formulation. It presented the non-renewal as the end of a thirty-five-year chapter and described King Mohammed VI’s approach as a shift from a logic of management (al-tadbīr) to one of transformation (al-taghyīr).

The distinction between management and transformation expresses two different relationships to political time. Management organizes the continuation of an existing condition; transformation seeks to interrupt it. The first can be measured through successive mandates, reports, and negotiations. The second must ultimately be judged by whether the circumstances of people’s lives change.

Yet management and transformation are not moral opposites. Managing a conflict can save lives; transforming its institutions can introduce new uncertainties. The question is not whether continuity should always give way to change, but whether the arrangements that preserve stability also leave room for a political settlement, and whether a proposed transformation can produce a peace that those affected recognize as legitimate.

Morocco viewed the end of MINURSO as an opportunity to move beyond an exhausted diplomatic framework. Algeria and the Polisario Front, which it has long supported politically and militarily, maintained that the principle of self-determination could not be subordinated to Morocco’s sovereignty claims. The United Nations, meanwhile, reaffirmed that the mission’s termination did not extinguish the right to self-determination and cautioned that the security situation remained fragile.

Morocco’s autonomy proposal now occupies a central place in the diplomatic process. From the Moroccan perspective, it offers a framework for resolving the dispute under Moroccan sovereignty while providing for regional self-government. Translating that proposal into a durable political settlement would require credible arrangements for political participation, legal protections, security, and economic development. It would also require engagement with differing political positions, including those that contest Moroccan sovereignty.

The legitimacy of any eventual settlement cannot be measured solely by the recognition it receives from governments and international institutions. It must also be judged by the possibilities it creates for the people whose lives it will govern. Sahrawis living in Moroccan Sahara, in refugee camps near Tindouf, and across the diaspora have experienced the conflict differently and do not necessarily envision its resolution in the same terms. Can families move more freely? Can political participation and protected rights become ordinary features of public life? Can younger generations pursue education, work, and relationships without inheriting the full burden of antagonisms that began before they were born?

The termination of MINURSO therefore presents an unresolved test. Ending an institution may interrupt an established political routine, but it does not by itself produce the agreements, trust, or protections necessary for peace. What matters is whether political transformation produces changes beyond the diplomatic process itself.

Whatever political settlement eventually emerges, it will arrive in a region already transformed by decades of waiting.

The consequences of prolonged non-resolution are not confined to the institutions that manage it. A diplomatic process can continue through successive mandates and negotiations, but the societies living with an unresolved conflict do not remain suspended in time. They continue to grow, invest, work, migrate, and imagine their futures under conditions shaped by political uncertainty.

These losses cannot be attributed to MINURSO. They arise from the wider political antagonism that the mission neither created nor resolved. But they reveal what institutional calendars tend to obscure: the consequences of prolonged non-resolution continue accumulating even when the diplomatic process appears unchanged.

The institutional calendar can begin again each year. The human calendar cannot.

For Morocco and Algeria, prolonged political antagonism has constrained the possibilities of regional cooperation for generations. Algeria’s longstanding support for the Polisario Front has been a central source of tension with Morocco, reinforcing a rivalry that has directed political attention and resources toward security and territorial confrontation. The costs extend beyond diplomatic estrangement and military expenditures to economic opportunities foregone: cross-border commerce, investment, infrastructure, and productive relationships that geographic proximity might otherwise have encouraged. Although both countries have continued to pursue their own developmental trajectories, their enduring rivalry has limited the possibilities of regional integration and the economic benefits it might have brought to their societies.

The implications extend across the Maghreb. In a 2019 study of economic integration, the International Monetary Fund described the region as the least economically integrated in the world, with trade among its countries accounting for less than 5 per cent of their total trade. The comparison is striking: intraregional trade accounted for approximately 16 per cent of trade in Africa more broadly and 19 per cent in Latin America. The IMF identified geopolitical tensions alongside restrictive economic policies and weak coordination as obstacles to greater integration.

Behind those figures lies a history of possibilities left unrealized: markets that might have been connected, investments that might have crossed borders, industries that might have developed across national economies, and employment opportunities that greater cooperation might have supported.

These foregone possibilities are especially consequential for younger generations confronting unemployment and limited economic prospects. Greater regional integration could have supported growth, employment, and sustainable development, creating more opportunities at home for those who might otherwise seek livelihoods abroad through regular or irregular migration. Migration has many causes, and political rivalry cannot explain them all. Yet the failure to develop the region’s economic potential has narrowed the range of possibilities available to both societies.

The closed Morocco–Algeria border, shut since 1994, has become a visible expression of this wider impasse. It divides not only two states but families, communities, and economic possibilities that geography might otherwise have brought together.

In November 2021, a TelQuel report from the Moroccan village of Oulad Bouarfa, east of Oujda, described the experience of Fatima Chaaoufi, whose brother had died in an Algerian village just across the border. She had not seen him since the frontier closed. When news of his death reached her, she ran toward the barbed wire separating the two countries. She could see his funeral procession in the distance but could not join the mourners.

A border may eventually reopen. Trade may resume, and diplomatic relations may be restored. But a missed funeral cannot be recovered.

I return, finally, to Ammi Abdelkader.

As children, we knew him by an accent that seemed to distinguish him from us. We did not know that his presence in our school was connected to a political rupture that had displaced him from another country. What I remember now is not only the history concealed in his voice but the ordinary life he continued to build after that rupture.

For the United Nations, thirty-five years can be counted in resolutions, mandates, reports, and negotiations. For governments, they can be measured in diplomatic initiatives, changing alliances, and political calculations.

For ordinary people, those years are measured differently: in childhoods, educations, livelihoods, migrations, families, and futures.

A diplomatic process can be renewed. A peacekeeping mandate can be extended, or allowed to end. Negotiations can begin again.

But a generation cannot be given back the years it has spent waiting for peace.

Tags: Morocco and AlgeriaUN Sahara mission (MINURSO)UN security Council resolution
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