Join on WhatsApp 
Join on Telegram Kabylia (meaning “Land of Kabyles (tribes)”), also known as Kabylie, is a natural, cultural and historical region located in the mountainous coast of northern Algeria, between Algiers and Skikda.
It is where the region’s Amazigh people have preserved their identity and culture for centuries, using its mountains to fiercely resist against the Romans, Arabs, Turks, and the French in the 1850s.
Until 1857, the Kabylie region was independent even from colonial Algeria (created by French General Schneider in 1839), to which it was later annexed forcibly, mainly after the Kabyle uprisings of 1871.
The colonial history of Algeria records the great resistance of Kabyle people against the French invasion during, among others, the battle of Icherriden in 1857, the insurrection of 1871, and the Algerian independence war (1954-1962).
Following Algeria’s independence in July 1962, Kabyle people fought against post-colonial Algeria to regain their autonomy. This struggle was marked by the war of Kabylia against post-colonial Algeria (1963-1965), the events of At Yiraten in June 1974, the revolt of 1980 known as the “Amazigh Spring.”
Estimated at approximately 5.5 million, Algeria’s Amazigh populations claim recognition of their language and culture as well as political independence. They channel their demands through the Amazigh movement MAK-ANAVAD, which is currently organized in two branches.
There is MAK (Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia, which later became Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia). Formed in June 2003, MAK carries out field work. The second venue of the group’s self-determination advocacy is diplomatic action, which is carried out under the aegis of the Provisional Kabylian Government (GPK), formed in Paris in June 2010.
The birth and evolution of MAK
After Algeria gained independence, successive Algerian governments, strongly influenced by the National Liberation Front (FLN), promoted the Arabization of the country to the detriment of the Amazigh culture and identity.
Despite sacrificing the highest number of martyrs in the entire population during Algeria’s independence war, the Kabyle people found themselves excluded from the official definition of “Algérianité” (Algerianness) which was exclusively conceived as Arabo-islamic.
As popular – and state-sponsored – support for the arabization policy grew, Kabyle people decided to deploy efforts to preserve their identity by adopting the Amazigh flag and advocating for their cultural and linguistic rights.
On 18 April 2011, two days before the commemoration of the Amazigh Spring, the assasination of a young Kabyle high school student sparked a nationwide crisis. In what became known as the “Black Spring,” many Kabyle people took to the streets to express their frustration at the exclusion of their culture and identity from the state-sanctioned definition of Algerianness.
Exacerbating the tensions was Algeria’s Minister of interior Yazid Zerhouni’s description of the slain Kabyle high schooler as a “thug.” The protests were violently repressed by the gendarmerie and the National Company of Security (CNS), leading to the death of around 118 people.
Furthermore, the state-owned TV channel, which back then was the main and only source of information, covered Kabyle protestors as troublemakers. Rather than protests for the recognition of Kabyle’s political and cultural rights, it suggested, the uprising was “looting”, and “rioting” sponsored by forces that harbored a deep hatred of the Algerian people.
As a result, divisions between the Algerian people and Kabyle people became more pronounced, and thereupon, the Amazigh movement went from cultural and linguistic demands to a movement for political autonomy. Thus was the Movement for the Autonomy of kabylie (MAK) created in 2003 by Ferhat Mehenni, a former singer and a militant of the Amazigh cause since the 1970s.
Seven years later, in 2010, Ferhat Mehenni, who was now a refugee in France, announced from Paris the establishment of a provisional government of Kabylia (GPK), and appointed himself as president. On 4 October 2013, the movement’s objective evolved towards self-determination or independence. And it became “the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia.”
On its official website, the movement is described as a “Project for Kabyle Government” GPK, which is a means of internationalizing the Kabyle cause through diplomatic action. They aim at fostering civil disobedience and reject all elections in Kabylia until a referendum is organized for the self-determination of the region. One of their main goals is also to promote cultural self-affirmation through two venues: the teaching of Kabyle in schools and universities in Kabylia, and the use of the same language in public places.
The right to self-determination
The right of peoples to self-determination is a pillar of contemporary international law. The 1945 United Nations Charter made this right an indispensable feature of peoplehood, and several new, post-colonial states have been created on its basis.
The third generation of human rights advocacy also recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination, as enshrined in Pact I & II of Human rights. This right protects self-determination in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres.
In fact, the Algerian constitution broadcasts the North African country as a champion of self-determination causes. Article 27 of the constitution (in the constitutional revisions of 1996, March 2016 and 2020) states: ”Algeria stands in solidarity with all peoples struggling for political and economic liberation, for the right to self-determination and against all racial discrimination.”
However, although Algeria has been a long-time supporter of the Polisario Front’s self-determination claims in Morocco’s southern provinces – most commonly referred to as Western Sahara – it has failed to recognize the right of Kabyle people to self-determination.
Recent developments
In April 2021, Kabyle people commemorated both the 20th anniversary of the Black Spring and the 41st anniversary of the Amazigh Spring of 1980. During the same month, the MAK-ANAVAD launched a digital referendum of self-determination for the independence of Kabylia.
In response, the Algerian Ministry of National Defense issued a statement about the dismantling of a “criminal” and “separatist” cell composed of MAK supporters. It claimed that the separatists were in possession of automatic weapons and explosives and were planning “attacks and criminal acts” against Algerian interests and sovereignty.
As evidence for its allegations, the ministry referred to the confession of a man named “H. Nouredine,” presented as a former member of the MAK. This communique caught the attention of the French Press Agency (AFP) and a large number of French and international media.
A week later, Algeria’s High Security for Council (HCS) promptly classified the MAK on the “list of terrorist organizations” and requested that the group be “treated as such.” As a result, Ferhat Mehenni, the President of MAK-Anavad, was placed in police custody in Paris.
But these accusations were strongly condemned by a number of international institutions. For instance, Amnesty International insisted that restrictions to the right of association and assembly are only legal if they comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality.
The UN Human Rights Committee has also stated that the Algerian state must demonstrate the precise nature of the threat and that the restrictions “are genuinely necessary to avert a real, and not merely hypothetical, danger to national security.”
Most recently, the Algerian government accused MAK “terrorists” of being behind the disastrous forest fires that raged through northern Algeria earlier this month. To lend credibility to its accusations, the government said MAK had long colluded with Morocco – which successive Algerian regimes have claimed is an existential threat to Algerian interests – to destabilize Algeria.
For critics, however, such claims are part of the usual diversionary trick beleaguered and eminently unpopular governments have used to galvanize nationalism-drenched support by projecting their failures onto – real or imagined – domestic rabble-rousers and foreign enemies.
