The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has generated a spillover effect on the African Continent. The consolidation of the presence of the Russian “Africa Corps” as successor of Wagner Group activated the reaction of Ukraine which, according to Le Monde, provides military assistance to Tuareg separatists while Moscow is backing the Malian Government. Kiev is also eager to strengthen its diplomatic presence in Africa announcing its intention to bring the number of its diplomatic missions from 13 to 23 in the near future, while Russia has 47 embassies in the continent.
To what extent this brinkmanship game between Russia and Ukraine could affect the latent conflict between North Africa namely the conflict between Morocco and Algeria? Will Algeria, a close Moscow ally, pay the price of its alignment on Russia’s positions?
The tyranny of proximity
In North Africa, for one thing, the enduring rivalry between Morocco and Algeria has been benign until now. Although it had been simmering for many decades, it seems that neither Morocco nor Algeria is willing to entertain the probability that it could escalate into an open military confrontation. Except for their classic diplomatic scuffles in the Security Council, the state of nonthreatening belligerence between these two neighbors remains taken for granted since the ceasefire of 1991.
Although this conflict has been considered marginal for many decades, the recent launching of an attack on Moroccan territory from Algeria, besides jeopardizing the current status quo, questions the real intentions of the Algerian leadership with regards to the future of the relations between Algiers and Rabat.
As Abraham Maslow wrote, “If you have only a hammer in your toolbox, everything looks to you like a nail.” Algiers has been on a shopping spree for all kinds of armament from Moscow for many years. This saber-rattling policy does not prompt Algeria for the time being to negotiate directly with Morocco to end the Moroccan Sahara conflict despite King Mohammed VI’s policy of genuine outreach to the Algerian leadership.
It is obvious that the strategy of acquiring more firepower, as far Algeria is concerned, is not paying off since Morocco has been making diplomatic headway with its autonomy initiative as evidenced by the mounting support to the Moroccan position worldwide. Moroccan diplomacy has been successful in making crystal clear that the prospect of creating a bogus state on the Atlantic Ocean under the guise of the right of self-determination is not only unrealistic, as settled by the Security Council, but also geopolitically unconceivable.
This adverse outcome for Algeria might drive its military leaders to try to tip the balance into Algeria’s favor. In the light of the recent attack on Morocco, in case the escalation scenario is opted for, the issue the Algerian military could face is how long the Russian arsenal will stay available to sustain an armed conflict in North Africa whatever its magnitude.
Moscow itself is not clear about the duration of its war in Ukraine and how much additional military hardware it might need to win the war. The fact that Russia received military assistance from Iran and North Korea to sustain its war effort and seems ready to envision the use of tactical missiles, should send the signal that its military resources are under real strain.
The political cost for Algeria could be higher than expected
Besides the economic cost, since Algeria relies on imports and cannot afford to have a war economy, the Algerian weapons imports from Russia entails a political cost as well. It is considered by some American lawmakers as an indirect sponsorship of the Russian war in Ukraine. Senator Marco Rubio, recently appointed by the President-elect as the next Secretary of State and several of his colleagues in the US Senate, have called for sanctions against the Algerian government based on CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act).
To avert this risk, the Algerian government hired a lobbying firm BGR which, according to The Africa Report, entertains closed links with Israel. As a matter of fact, former Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Eihud Barak sits on the executive board of this firm.
It could be inferred from the insistent retraction attempts of the Algerian government of the aggressive language against Israel used in President Abdelmajid Tebboune speech before the Arab and Islamic Summit held last month in Riyad, that these desperate efforts could be a recommendation to Algeria from its new lobbyist in Washington to avoid displeasing the upcoming new US administration.
This stance is rather surprising while Algeria strives to be one of the staunchest supporters of the Palestinian cause. It is not the first time that Algerian diplomacy has disingenuously navigated in grey zones. Its strong sponsorship in the late 70’s of a “new international economic order” has bestowed on it the “mantle” of a third world advocate making some western countries uneasy about its nuisance capacity, especially during the oil embargo crisis.
At the same time, Algiers links, alongside Libya, with all sorts of radical organizations, had made Algeria a dialogue facilitator between western countries unwilling to sit on a negotiation table with these kinds of organizations.
To illustrate the puzzling nature of the Algerian regime, during the US hostages’ crisis, Algiers took the lead in helping the Carter administration and the New Islamic republic of Iran reach an agreement to free them.
Yet, in 2013, during the attack by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb terrorist group (AQIM) of a gas plant in Ain Aminas, the Algerian military decided to open fire on the vehicles transporting the terrorists and their hostages taking the lives of 40 hostages, among them mostly British and Japanese nationals. This kind of inconsistencies is the trademark of the Algerian decision-making process which reflects on the country’s image.
Algeria over-emphasis on military supremacy
As times have changed since the Berlin Wall collapse and the USSR breakdown, Algerian diplomacy lost its edge but not its drive to be a regional power to reckon with. Most importantly, Algeria maintains its destabilizing role in the Maghreb and in the Sahel region to avoid the possibility of finding itself one day utterly checkmated.
In this logic, its persistent determination to maintain an advantage over Morocco, led its military to engage in unwarranted power projection. Nowhere in the world could you find a country with a limited coastline on the Mediterranean Sea possessing eight submarines, while the UK operates only six such subs. The only explanation could be that the Algerian navy doctrine might factor among its military operations theaters the Atlantic Ocean and the Strait of Gibraltar.
Furthermore, according to some sources, Algeria is eying the acquisition of the 5th generation stealth fighter SU-57 Felon (equivalent, according to military experts, to the advanced US F-22 Raptor) which could be a serious threat to its European neighbors.
On the other hand, Algeria recently embarked on the path of procuring nuclear technology for “peaceful purposes.” It has currently two nuclear reactors both in Algiers outskirt, one was built by Argentina and the second one constructed by China. Besides, Algeria, having 29000 tonnes of proven uranium deposit in Tamanrasset (Belgacem 2016), retains the capability it needs to expand its nuclear program should it decide to go down this path.
Conclusion
In 1935, seven years before the outbreak of the Second World War, the French diplomat and novelist Jean Giraudoux wrote his famous play “The Trojan War will not take place” between Sparta and Athens (we learn at the end of this drama that the war did take place).
During the 1980s, until the ceasefire was declared in 1991, a war of varying intensity was waged not only by the Moroccan army against the Algerian and Libyan armies, but also by groups of mercenaries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Some commentators have called it “the forgotten war.” It should be noted that this is not the case in the Moroccan collective memory, as the Moroccan army had to fight regular and guerrilla wars in what was then unfamiliar terrain.
Now that the ceasefire has been unilaterally violated by the Polisario, which has resumed guerrilla tactics, are we witnessing the return or start of a scalable conflict? Nobody knows, although the psychological warfare has already begun. The appointment of the Algerian chief of staff to a cabinet post as deputy defence minister is part of this type of campaign.
In this particular case, social media is acting as a sound chamber, transforming official speech into an offensive and bellicose language. The aim is to create a “rally around the flag” effect. This is what (Haynes 2017) calls “diversionary theory.” For him, “when faced with domestic challenges to their leadership, political leaders tend to initiate interstate conflict to divert domestic attention to foreign affairs in order to remain in power.” Algeria seems to fit seamlessly into this configuration.
