Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah’s Diplomatic Initiatives towards the US

Casablanca – The history of Moroccan-American relations dates back to the late eighteenth century, when the sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdellah issued a declaration on December 1777, asking the Americans to conclude with his majesty a treaty of peace and friendship.

His interest in the United States of America goes beyond signing the treaty in question. He, according to Priscilla Roberts and Sherrill, B. Wells, publicly declared that American and other European vessels, with whom the sultan had no treaties before, are free to navigate in Moroccan waters and enter Moroccan ports and cities where they can take refreshment.

The sultan’s initiative towards the United States was not seriously handled by the Americans because of many reasons relating to distance existing between the two countries, the problem of language, war with the British power and the struggle for independence[1].

George Washington in one of  his letters to the sultan explained the American inaction and appreciated the sultan’s interests in and recognition of America. Moroccan and American sources regard the sultan’s initiative towards the Americans from one general point, which is establishing economic relations with the United States.

They did not delve into specific details behind the sultan’s initiative, which in turn might allow us to understand the socioeconomic and the sociopolitical infrastructure of Morocco under the reign of the Alaouite Dynasty in the eighteenth century. This paper explores some of the main and direct reasons behind the sultan’s diplomatic initiative towards the United States, 1777-1786.

After the outbreak of the American Revolution, according to Irwin,[2] the British power withdrew its protection of the American shipping in the Mediterranean by changing its maritime passes, leaving the vessels of its ‘erstwhile colonies exposed to the maraudings of the Barbary pirates’.

The United States realized this threat and looked forward to establishing new diplomatic relations with several European countries, which in turn would protect its vessels from the threat of piracy and militarily support and recognize its independence.

Therefore, it had negotiated and signed many treaties of friendship and commerce with the following powers: France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, Saxony, Hamburg, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, Venice and Sardinia.

A careful reading of the treaty of friendship and commerce signed by the United States and France in 1778 would give us an insight of the real intentions and ambitions of this newborn country in reference to its diplomatic relations with Morocco.

The part of the Franco-American treaty, which concerns the Moroccan-American diplomatic relations is article number eight. This article conveys that the Americans were afraid of the so-called Moroccan piracy in the Mediterranean[3].

In this article, both French and American diplomats agreed that the king of France would “protect, defend and secure, as far as in his Power, the Subjects, People and Inhabitants of the said United States and every of them, and their vessels and Effects of every kind, against all Attacks, Assaults, Violences, Injuries, Depredations or Plunderings by or from the king or Emperor of Morocco, or Fez, and the states of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli…”[4].

Apparently, article number eight of the Franco-American treaty shows that Americans were stark afraid of Moroccan pirates and about their commercial interests in the Mediterranean. In other words, it seems that the myth of piracy in the Mediterranean was a big obstacle for the American commerce.

Probably, France did not want the United States to be autonomous in the Mediterranean and preferred to play the role of the mediator between the Americans and the Moroccans, especially that both the French and the English powers had commercial interests in North Africa.

A plain indicator of these interests is the serious problems which France, trying to get control over coastal cities, had with Moroccans in the Mediterranean; according to Alnnaciri, the French power faced severe Moroccan maritime Jihad[5] when they seized and attacked Rabat and Salé in 1764 and Lexus ‘Laaraiche’ in 1765[6]. Two years later, France was obliged to follow a new policy based on diplomatic relations by signing a treaty of peace with Morocco in 1767[7].

Actually, America would not ask for the French mediation with the Emperor of Morocco, if the French and the English powers did not create and propagate the myth of piracy in the Mediterranean. This is simply one political strategy that France and Britain adopted to keep their control over commerce with North Africa through the Mediterranean.

Sidi Mohamed III, according to Priscilla Roberts, received the news of the Franco-American treaty through his ambassador Tahar Fennish who was on a mission in Paris[8]. Then after the Sukey event[9], he realized that the Americans lost the protection of the British power in the Mediterranean and alternatively sought the mediation and protection of France from Moroccan naval authorities, whom they referred to as corsairs.

It is possible that the sultan did not like the mediation of France and preferred to deal with the Americans directly[10]. Therefore, signing a treaty of peace and friendship with the United States might assure Americans of peace and protection in the Mediterranean. But this reason remains a little bit ambiguous, since there is no reference to it in official documents.

One main direct reason behind the sultan’s interest in the Americans can be traced back to early 1766, when the Sultan released a ‘fatwa'[11] concerning the exportation of wheat to Europeans through the port of Fdala, which the sultan built for that particular purpose. The sultan allowed his people to sell their crops, especially wheat, to Europeans, who in turn, bought and shipped large amounts of wheat and food supplies abroad.

In this context, Masson states that the exportation of wheat increased between 1770 and 1774 towards Portugal, Spain and France. In 1774, 100.000 quintal (qintar) of wheat was exported to Spain and almost the same quantity was exported to France[12].

Indeed, the exportation of wheat to Europe affected the whole country especially after successive years of drought. The rain did not fall for over seven years from 1776 to 1782, and the swarms of locust came from the south and completely destroyed crops. The country knew a serious food crisis due to the plague of locusts and drought. The prices of wheat increased rapidly, and poor people were unable to buy enough amounts. According to the French consul Louis de Chenier in one of his letters, the reserves of wheat decreased in stores and its price increased three times in 1775.[13].

Louis de Chenier describes the chaotic situation of Morocco in details. He describes the effects of a series of famines, which brought about infectious diseases, plagues of locusts and successive years of drought. The locusts ravaged the empire of Morocco, especially after the year 1778. To put in Louis de Chenier’s words ‘Clouds of locusts’ came from the south and devoured a part of the harvest.

In 1779, the quantity of young locusts eaten up the whole country, and nothing that is green on earth could escape the voracity of these insects. The consequences of swarms of locusts and successive years of drought were so fatal. The lands produced no harvest, and the people began to feel a dearth. Their cattle died with hunger. People perished of indigestible food and want. Fathers sold their children, and husbands bestowed their wives in marriage.

The sultan’s exportation of wheat and food supplies to Europeans worsened the situation of the country and made the crisis more serious. George Host related the export of wheat to the sultan’s ‘need for firearms, suggesting that when S. Muhammad had sufficient weaponry, he no longer allowed the sale of grain.'[15]

In fact, the sultan stopped exporting wheat and food supplies to Europe because he realized the serious food crisis that the whole country was enduring. He released a ‘fatwa’ through which he forbade exporting wheat to Europeans. Then, he issued a declaration on December 20, 1777, announcing that all European and American vessels could freely import wheat to Morocco. The sultan declared that all vessels importing food supplies from Europe and especially America would not pay taxes or tributes in his ports.

The importation of wheat and food from Europe and later on from America does not show the sultan’s interest in the Americans and Europeans themselves, but rather it shows the sultan’s policy to overcome the food crisis. It would be very simplistic to claim that the sultan Muhammad Ben Abdellah allowed the Americans and other Europeans with which he had no treaties before to freely enter his ports.

Priscilla Roberts either in her article (1999) or in her book ‘Thomas Barkley’ (2008) and Shrill B. Wells claim that the sultan allowed the Americans and Europeans to freely enter his ports, pretending that the sultan was trying to establish economic relations with the United States. Their argument remains too general and even simplistic, because it completely discounts the domestic situation of the country.

It is clear from this passage that B. Wells’ argument regards the sultan’s initiative towards the Americans form a polemic perspective. It does not explain why the sultan allowed the Americans and Europeans to freely enter Moroccan ports and rather gave it a general reason which is friendship and economy.

The question is: was the sultan really looking forward to gain the Americans’ friendship or to put it in Priscilla Roberts’ words “to be l’ami des Américains”[18], and why the sultan allowed the American and the European ships to freely enter Moroccan ports?

The sultan Sidi Muhammad III was neither looking for the friendship of the Americans nor to recognize their independence in 1777.[a] But, he was rather trying to get support from Americans and Europeans to overcome the food crisis of the country, just as the Americans were looking for support from France to get their independence.

Probably, by signing the treaty of peace and friendship with the United States, the sultan would import wheat from America. The fact that the sultan was insisting on the Americans to conclude a treaty of friendship shows that he was not at ease. If he was at ease he would not show his interest in a newborn country. In fact, the situation of Morocco was worsening because of drought and the shortage of wheat and food supplies. Hence, the sultan had to take an immediate action.

I partially agree with Priscilla Roberts (1999) and Sherrill B. Wells as they state that Sidi Muhammad’s III interest in the United States stems from his policy of reform and renewal. [19] Actually, to overcome the serious famine and food crisis and other political and socioeconomic problems, the sultan stretched his hand to Americans and Europeans for support.

To put it in Wells’ words, the sultan was “faced with serious economic and political difficulties, (and) he was searching for a new method of governing which required changes in his economy”.[20] He tried to stabilize the chaotic situation of the country and overcome the political, economic, social and the financial crisis of the state. He managed to destroy ‘Abid Albukhari'[21] especially that the famine of 1776-1778 coincided with the rebellion of powerful tribes.

Moreover, the sultan renewed the maritime trade through establishing diplomatic relations with Americans and Europeans. For this purpose, he encouraged the presence of American and European vessels in coastal cities. He built new cities with big ports and big ships and frigates to fight corsairs. The sultan rebuilt the port of Anfa in 1760, the port of Mogador in 1765, expelled the Portuguese from the port of Brija. He also regained the control over the port of Agadir[23].

Priscilla Roberts in the above passage explains the sultan’s diplomatic initiative towards the United States in reference to his policy of economic reform. His renewal of ports and building new coastal cities shows his keen interest in commercial exchange. This remains one general reason behind the sultan’s initiative. Priscilla Roberts does not go beyond this main reason to investigate the domestic situation of Morocco.

As a matter of fact, the main reason behind the sultan’s initiatives towards the United States is the famine of 1776-1782, resulting from the successive years of draught and the plague of locusts, which ravaged and eaten up the whole country. In 1777, the sultan was looking forward to import wheat from the United States and other European countries with which he had no treaties before.

Probably, signing a treaty of peace and friendship with the United States was the only strategy possible to establish diplomatic relations. Such a treaty would play an important role in commercial exchange between Morocco and America especially in times of distress.

In conclusion, it must be reiterated that the famine of 1776-1782 was a direct reason behind the sultan’s initiative towards the United States of America. The treaty of peace and friendship paved the way for the sultan to import wheat and food supplies from America as well as from Spain and Portugal. Priscilla Roberts and Sherrill B. Wells dealt with the sultan’s initiative polemically.

Why should the sultan bother himself to be “l’ami des Américains” or allow American and European vessels to “take refreshment” in his ports? Was it due to his old age and weak mental ability as Priscilla Roberts puts it “he was increasingly fickle and forgetful, and he was lapsing into senility, his mind worn out by hard services and old age.”[25] This is not, of course, the main reason behind the sultan’s initiative, and it would be misleading to believe that the sultan was unwise.

El Houssine Lahsini is a Moroccan student currently enrolled in a master program majoring in Moroccan-American Studies at Hassan II University, Faculty of Humanities/Ben M’sik. He obtained his BA in English studies at Chouaaib Doukkali University in 2010 and his Licence Professionelle in English Language Teaching in 2011 from the same university. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Morocco World News’ editorial policy.

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Mohammed Ahmed Al-Bazzaz, “The crisis in the era of Algdaúah Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdullah during the years 1776-1782“, University of Moulay Ali Sharif (of the third session), (1991), p: 79