Turkey Seizes COVID-19 as Opportunity to Improve Foreign Policy

Turkey announced its first case of COVID-19 on March 11, detecting an infection in a man who had arrived from Europe. The pandemic has since spread through the country at an accelerated rate, claiming lives on a daily basis. Turkey initiated testing and tracing, suspended international flights, launched sensitization campaigns, and suspended public gatherings to curb the spread of the pandemic and its consequences.

Fighting COVID-19 on two levels

While most countries are prioritizing surviving the health crisis and recovering their local economies, others, such as Turkey, chose to fight the pandemic at two levels: Domestic and foreign.

On the international scene, Ankara supplied aid and medical supplies to more than 30 countries in America, Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The country became a leading donor in humanitarian aid, and foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu declared it “the third biggest supplier of medical aid worldwide during the coronavirus outbreak.”

The global outbreak has not significantly enhanced interstate cooperation. In theory, the eruption of a global security concern such as COVID-19 should incite countries to merge their efforts. In reality, observers note little cooperation between hard-hit countries, which questions the relevance of collective action.

Turkey distinguished its strategy against this international landscape of self-interest, suscitating fascination and raising probing questions: Why would a country where the pandemic is spreading at a high rate provide humanitarian aid for a generous list of countries? Have Turkey’s confinement measures and the health emergency not jeopardized its economy? Would a pre-Erdogan Turkey have adopted the same approach to fight COVID-19 or any other threat to public health?

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Turkey’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak

Witnessing an increasing rate of contamination in neighboring countries, Turkey’s early responses to the COVID-19 pandemic consisted of creating a scientific committee, installing thermal cameras in airports in February, and isolating travelers who arrived from overseas. The country suspended in-person activities of schools and universities, as well as international flights.

In April, the pandemic’s development pushed the government to take new measures that included isolating a number of provinces, imposing a curfew on people under 20 and over 65—with some exemptions—and implementing a general curfew during weekends.

Turkey now faces a high risk of economic recession due to the nationwide emergency measures, economic slowdown, and its halt to much international trade.

The country relies heavily on foreign direct investment from the European Union, and EU countries are the leading importers of Turkish products. The outbreak of the pandemic shrank demand from European countries. This trade situation will likely persist for some time, especially as those countries will prioritize the recovery of their domestic industries.

Ankara’s balance of trade is anything but immune to this slowdown. Still, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan maintained that no agreement will be concluded with the IMF to alleviate economic pressure, suggesting that his country will rely strictly on fiscal policies.

Given these stiffening conditions, Turkey chose to turn a moment of uncertainty into a moment of opportunity. Accordingly, it started fighting COVID-19 on the domestic and foreign fronts. The primary rationale is to build a positive reputation overseas, rooted in President Erdogan’s foreign policy fundamentals.

Turkish foreign policy: A brief overview

Providing humanitarian aid to a large number of countries is a soft power strategy, designed to serve Turkish interests in the long term. Since Erdogan ascended to the presidential palace, Turkey has primarily focused on assuming a greater role in world politics, and preserving regime security—which is threatened by regional turbulence—and the clout of actors such as the PKK and FETO. For Ankara, foreign policy success is indissociable from three fundamentals: Pragmatism, autonomy, and regional projection.

Foreign policy: A quest for pragmatism

A high level of power centralization in the executive branch has characterized the Erdogan era, reflecting the president’s pragmatic personality. Every diplomatic move is the result of realpolitik calculations meant to yield tangible benefits for Turkey. Turkey-EU relations on refugee movement illustrate this transactional logic, through which Ankara seeks less restraints on access to the EU.

Read also: The Populist Fairytales Are Crumbling Against a Global Health Crisis

Foreign policy: A quest for autonomy

Erdogan’s Turkey sought more autonomy in the form of military self-sufficiency and a large sphere of alliances. Its defense industry has gained substantial attention, translating into arms procurements, arms exports, and local manufacturing. Controlling this triad empowers Turkey to foster cordial relations with its military partners (e.g. Russia) and clients (e.g. Qatar), and enhance its military apparatus by manufacturing military equipment (e.g. armed drones).

Playing a “diversity card” has also been key in Turkey’s quest to achieve autonomy. The country developed ad hoc alliances with various parties to achieve targeted interests. The Turkey-Russia-Iran triad illustrates how Ankara pursued its agenda in Syria autonomously while meeting Moscow and Tehran on some interests.

Foreign policy: A quest for regional projection

Erdogan’s presidency sees regional projection as a distinct foreign policy fundamental. This takes two forms: Hard and soft. Using hard power, Turkey reserves the right to deploy its military in hotspots to protect its geopolitical interests. Aside from the fact that Turkey established military bases in Africa and the Middle East, Erdogan proved willing to join various war fronts. In Libya, he provides political and military support to the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj.

Erdogan also aims to revive the hallmarks of the Ottoman Empire, namely its power and geographic stretch. This state identity calls for extensive use of soft power and Turkish officials have not missed a single opportunity to build a positive image of their country.

Providing humanitarian aid amid the COVID-19 crisis is a golden opportunity that will benefit Turkey. First, it will immunize the regime from criticism regarding military activism outside the country’s borders.

Many African countries, especially Algeria and Tunisia, have frowned upon Turkish intervention in Libya. The context corroborated the assumption that supporting al-Sarraj is a means to uphold geopolitical interests in Libya and the Mediterranean basin. Supplying medical equipment to Libya will help improve not only how regional countries perceive Ankara, but will also improve perceptions from pro-Sarraj Libyans.

Second, foreign mobilization against COVID-19 will help Turkey expand its sphere of alliances. Supplying medical equipment to Spain, Italy, and the US might not pay off in the short term, but it will strengthen Turkey’s status as a peace-seeking country.

Turkey’s dual mobilization in the fight against COVID-19 aligns well with Erdogan’s foreign policy fundamentals. In uncertain times, Ankara seized an opportunity to advance its goals by offering humanitarian aid and medical supplies to countries severely hit by the pandemic. This strategy will alleviate the consequences of COVID-19, but also underlines an imbalance in Turkey’s domestic and foreign priorities.