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In a post on his Facebook account, Christopher Ross responded to Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, a former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Western Sahara, in which “he (Weisbrod-Weber) lamented that (introducing human rights to the mandate of the MINURSO) would add yet another un-implementable element to MINURSO’s work”.
Mr. Ross said that “Morocco would find a way to block it on the ground,” justifying this by saying that Morocco did the same things “in 2000 with MINURSO‘s preparations for a referendum.” I am sorry to say that it is Mr. Ross who deliberately does not tell the whole story about the issue, and not Mr. Weisbrod-Weber, as Mr. Ross claims.
First, historical facts that Mr. Ross knows but chooses to ignore: the identification process was undertaken in the late 90s whereby “chioukhs” (persons known for their knowledge of the sociological fabric of the Sahrawi populations) from both parties identify who is eligible to vote; the process resulted in close to 135000 people appealing the decision of the identification committee to not accept them as eligible voters in the referendum.
Mr. Ross, in a cavalier manner, translated that into Morocco blocking the referendum process. It is understandable that Algeria and Polisario make that claim but it is strange for Mr. Ross, who was supposed to be neutral as UNSG Special Envoy, and who does not accept to be called pro-Algerian, to make that unwarranted intellectual (political?) leap.
Second, the referendum was halted not because of Morocco, but because of the Polisraio’s categorical refusal that Sahrawi tribes, expelled outside the territory by the 1958 French-Spanish Ecouvillon Operation, be eligible to vote.
After that, it was clear for the UN and the Security Council that the referendum option was no longer a viable nor a realistic option. UNSC Resolutions 1675 and 1720 (2006) reaffirmed the council’s commitment to help the parties “to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution.” On April, 21, 2008, Peter van Walsum, Mr. Ross’ predecessor, declared that the independence of the Western Sahara is not “a realistic proposition.”
It is in this context that Morocco presented the Autonomy Plan, declared “credible and realistic” by several ensuing UNSC resolutions.
Mr. Ross equates Morocco’s adoption of a compromising attitude to Polisario’s zero-sum-game attachment to referendum, which is at odds with the call of the UNSC resolution 1309 (2000) on the parties to seek political and mutually agreed upon solutions to the conflict. Mr. Ross knows that the referendum option would not be an agreed upon and compromising solution and that it will take the parties to the 1990s and back again to the stalemate but he insists, strangely enough, on putting it on the table as a viable alternative.
Third, monitoring human rights in Western Sahara: Mr. Ross thinks that Morocco refuses such a mechanism because it is afraid that the outside world would understand the views of the Sahrawis living in the territory. Not only is he wrong about this, but he deliberately ignores an important question for Moroccans: letting an outside body monitor human rights issues is relinquishing a big part of their sovereignty over the territory.
Yet sovereignty is the main issue of the conflict. It is almost like you want to impose a de facto solution before the solution itself is reached. Moreover, dissident views exist in the territory and National Human Rights Council chapters make reports on abuses like they do in other Moroccan locations.
The Sahrawis vote massively in the local and national elections: their voices are heard. Several independent international bodies have declared recent elections in Morocco (like the ones preceding them) to be free and fair. Why is not that a basis for Mr. Ross to declare that the Sahrawis’ (living in the territory) voices are heard? For a reason: Mr. Ross sides with Algeria and Polisario in saying that Moroccan politics are rigged and therefore not trustworthy. He is entitled to that opinion but he should not be ashamed to declare it (as appeared from his Facebook reaction to some Moroccans’ unacceptable personal attacks on him).
Mr. Ross: the human rights situation in Tindouf Camp, on Algerian soil, where Sahrawis are warehoused with no political or civil rights is bleak and incomparable to what is happening in the Western Sahara territory.
The Sahrawis in the camps are considered refugees (Morocco rightly considers them “forcibly sequestrated populations”) by Algeria but the latter illegally delegates their management to the Polisario. Plus, they are not identified nor counted, as constantly demanded by the UNSC and the UNHCR.
They are not allowed free movement or gainful employment as stipulated by the Geneva convention. Dissent therein leads to torture, exile or death. The most notorious example is that of Mustapha Salma Oueld Sidi Mouloud who dared support the Morocco autonomy plan and was tortured for months by Algerian and Polisario security officials before being exiled to Mauritania.
Your equation of the human rights situation inside the territories and in the camps, is not unfair but deliberately unethical and unworthy of an ex-personal envoy of the Secretary General, who is supposed to be neutral, objective and unbiased. Too bad for a conflict wherein supposedly honest peace brokers are unashamedly taking sides while covering their political views in supposedly legal and neutral UN discourse.
