Donald Trump’s Second Term: Accelerating History and Birth a New World Order

The international system is undergoing profound and structural upheavals, and is moving towards a more fragmented and diverse “multi-order” system characterized by the coexistence and interaction of multiple international orders, each based on its own values, identities and institutions (Trine Flockhart 2016). Flockhart argues that this transition is already underway and stresses the need for policymakers to prepare for it.

This “multi-order” system breaks with previous models and imposes a reassessment of the diplomacy, global governance, and institutions needed to manage the increased diversity and complexity of international relations. Driven by combative nationalism and the instrumentalization of the past, some powers employ a variety of strategies: sharp power, spiritual or religious discourse, manipulation of information, historical rewriting and economic coercion.

The world order in the making is shaped by the interaction between a handful of strongman leaders at the head of revisionist “neo-empires”, who seek to reshape the system to their advantage, without restoring the feudal structures of overlords and vassals.

Political scientist Robert Gilpin analyzes the international system through the prism of hegemonic realism, where a dominant power imposes its rules until a new equilibrium emerges under the pressure of rising powers. However, most analysts focus on the Trump phenomenon and his atypical style in foreign policy, with his spectacular announcements aimed at redrawing the world order to the benefit of the United States. From the Greenland purchase proposal to his statements on Canada to his tumultuous meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, these events illustrate above all the acceleration of the transformations of the international system under Washington’s leadership.

The war in Ukraine is the fault line between the powers of the status quo and the revisionist ones. Beyond defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the West, and in particular the Biden administration, has embarked on a colossal effort to weaken Moscow and better focus its attention on China and the BRICS, perceived as the real threats to US hegemony. However, as this war of attrition has not produced all its effects, the new Trump administration marks a strategic turnaround by opting for dialogue with Vladimir Putin in order to end the conflict, judging that it no longer serves American interests.

President Trump has launched high-level peace talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, aimed at resolving the conflict in Ukraine. These discussions, held in Saudi Arabia, have excluded any Ukrainian or European representation, drawing criticism from Kiev and Western allies. The administration has also cut back on military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine, exacerbating tensions in the U.S.-Ukraine relationship. [At the time of publishing this contribution, an agreement has been signed between the Americans and Ukrainians in Saudi Arabia. This automatically leads to the lifting of the suspension of American aid]

This approach reminds us of that of President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, when they moved closer to Mao Zedong’s China to isolate the USSR. Today, China is adopting a pragmatic posture: as Ikenberry pointed out, it is exploiting the international system to its advantage without seeking to overthrow it brutally. Beijing is taking advantage of the institutions and rules put in place by the West to accelerate its rise, while quietly preparing the foundations of a new world order in which its influence will be preponderant. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus indicates the end of an era and the dawn of a new international balance in the making.

Meanwhile, China has been able to take advantage of the situation to strengthen its economic competitiveness, widening the gap with the United States in key sectors of the new industrial revolution: renewable energy, electric vehicles, 5G, artificial intelligence, big data and rare earth control.

Trumpism or resistance to the decline of American hegemony

The current international system is indeed in major geopolitical transition. American hegemony, established after the end of the Cold War, is increasingly contested, while new centers of power emerge and Ukraine could be sacrificed at the altar of the new system that would move to a multipolar configuration with four major centers of power: the United States, China, Russia and Europe, which could join this club if it redefines its strategic and geopolitical doctrine by opting for its autonomy.

China, in particular, has become a major player on the international stage, challenging the existing economic and political order. Its rapid economic growth, massive overseas investment, and ambition to play a global leadership role challenge Western dominance. Moreover, so-called “revisionist” powers, such as Russia, seek to reshape the international order according to their own interests, including by challenging liberal norms and institutions.

The countries of the South, grouped in particular within the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), aspire to greater influence in world affairs and seek to diversify their partnerships; The creation of alternative payment systems to the US dollar testifies to this desire to free itself from Western financial hegemony.

The election of Donald Trump in January 2025 marks a break in American foreign policy. “Trumpism” is characterized by a nationalist, sovereignist and unilateralist approach : Trump prioritizes American interests above all else, questions multilateral commitments and displays a distrust of international institutions.

The main characteristics of Trumpism in foreign policy are as follows:

• Economic nationalism : priority to the protection of American industries and jobs and the renegotiation of trade agreements (NAFTA etc.).
• Sovereignism : insistence on national sovereignty and rejection of all forms of external interference (America First, MAGA).
• Unilateralism : preference for unilateral actions and rejection of the constraints imposed by multilateralism.
• Transactionalism : Pragmatic and results-oriented approach, with a desire to conclude bilateral agreements that benefit the United States.
• Sharp power: propensity to use pressure and threats to obtain concessions from other countries

Trumpism challenges the foundations of traditional US foreign policy of the establishment, based on multilateral leadership and the defense of democratic values. This approach creates uncertainty and tends to weaken long-established alliances, including NATO; its traditional “Jacksonian” approach (Walter Russel Mead’s Typology of foreign policy traditions) focuses first on America, challenging international alliances, favoring protectionist economic policies, and adopting a tough approach against external threats.

Since taking office in January 2025, President Donald Trump has implemented a series of bold foreign and trade policy measures, reshaping global economic and diplomatic relations. From imposing widespread tariffs to withdrawing from international agreements, the Trump administration has signaled a return to a protectionist and unilateral approach.

In addition, President Trump threatened in November 2024 to impose a 100% tariff on the BRICS countries if they continued their efforts to establish a currency that could compete with the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. The announcement has reignited tensions with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which see it as an attempt to hinder their economic sovereignty.

Withdrawal from international agreements

President Trump was quick to signal his disengagement from multilateral frameworks. His administration withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, reducing U.S. commitments to reduce carbon emissions. In addition, the United States has officially left the World Health Organization (WHO), citing inefficiencies and mismanagement, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Reassessment of foreign aid

On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14169, imposing a 90-day freeze on all U.S. development assistance programs. This measure was intended to reassess and realign foreign aid spending with national security interests and economic benefits. Although humanitarian programs were later exempted, this pause has had significant repercussions on international development organizations and U.S. ally’s dependent on this aid.

Reactions in the world: between silence and strategic leap

While it is too early to qualify the real winners and losers of the second Trump administration, it seems that Canada and Europe could suffer. Indeed, by wanting to appropriate Greenland and not consulting or warning European leaders before talking to Russian President, Vladimir Putin shows how insignificant Europe has become in the eyes of the US, even when its geopolitical interests are at stake. The only way to restore the geopolitical position of Europe and other Western countries is to consider three unthinkable options according to political scientist Kishore Mahbubani: leave NATO, negotiate with Vladimir Putin or join China (It’s Time for Europe to Do the Unthinkable, February 18, 2025).

Is President Donald Trump seeking to achieve a “reverse Kissinger” by attracting Vladimir Putin away from China, thus creating an unnatural alliance with Washington? This turmoil is widening a gap in transatlantic trust, weakening the image of the United States as a benevolent hegemon and threatening NATO’s cohesion, as Wolfgang Ischinger, president of the Munich Security Conference Foundation Council, points out.

The reactions of the countries concerned by the new American foreign policy, in particular the increase in customs duties to rebalance the trade balance, the reduction of foreign aid and diplomatic readjustments, offer a rich field of analysis for exploring the relevance of theories of international relations.

Rather than direct retaliation, Mexico, Brazil and Canada have opted for diplomatic dialogue with the United States, hoping to resolve trade disputes through negotiation rather than escalation of tensions, but they remain wary of the potential economic repercussions.

For its part, China has retaliated by imposing its own tariffs, and Europe, shaken, is waking up to the time lost by sheltering under the American security umbrella. It is now embarking on a race to strengthen its military capabilities.

Faced with these upheavals, aware of its strategic vulnerability, Europe is drawing the necessary lessons by rebuilding its military arsenal and redefining its defense doctrine. Other actors, such as Canada, Arab, African and Latin American countries, are adopting a policy of procrastination, hoping that the balance of power will change without them having to fully engage. This attitude is similar to the strategy of buck-passing (John Mearsheimer) or “free rider” in collective actions, where some benefit from the efforts of other powers without immediately bearing the costs.

What are the strategic options for surviving in a period of instability and decline of international law?

States that are the main actors in the international system seek to maximize their relative power to ensure their survival. In an anarchic world, where there is no higher authority, states must defend themselves and are constantly looking for ways to increase their influence.

In order to survive in this period of strong turbulence in the international system, the states targeted by the offensives of the neo-empires do not have many strategic choices. John Mearsheimer lists the strategic options, namely:

• Bandwagoning : aligning with the United States to benefit from its protection or economic advantages. Some European countries, such as Giorgia Meloni’s Italy and some members of the Visegrad group, are strengthening their alliance with the United States or with Russia, such as Victor Orban’s Hungary. Mexico and even Brazil are trying to negotiate trade deals with the U.S. to avoid economic sanctions
• Hard balancing : forming alliances to counter hegemonic or revisionist power that goes on the offensive. This is the option most used by countries according to a study by Stephan Walt on alliances (88% for Bandwagoning against 12% for balancing).

The example of the European Union is currently eloquent, it is gradually returning to the doctrine of General De Gaulle by deciding to strengthen its strategic autonomy and its defense capacity to reduce its dependence on the United States.
“If Europe wants to have a place in the new chessboard, it must strengthen its geopolitical relevance” (Amanda Paul, European Policy Centre February 2025).

According to a recent report by the European think tank Bruegel, Europe would need about 300,000 additional troops, at a cost of $262 billion, to replace the United States entirely in terms of defense. The think tank concludes that “the number of staff is small enough for Europe to replace the United States entirely”, not to mention the risk of ineffectiveness of a 30-member General Staff (the 27 most common, Norway, Canada).

• Soft balancing (Stephan Walt): is a concept that refers to the use of non-military means by states to counterbalance or limit the influence of a dominant power, without resorting to direct military confrontation. This strategy is often used when hard balancing – such as the formation of military alliances or an arms race – is not feasible due to power asymmetries, economic interdependencies or the risk of escalation of the conflict.
• Buck-passing: letting other states bear the cost of balancing is what some authors call a “free rider” strategy. Some countries such as India and others may be tempted to adopt this approach in the hope that China will oppose Trump’s policies.

Similarly, some African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries, until now equidistant from the neo-empires, could turn to Russia or China to ensure their security.

Possible options for the countries of the South to navigate in a Multipolar World

In a system in virtual imbalance, the countries of the South, in particular the Arab, Islamic world and Africa, can play the role of “pendulum” and stabilizer provided that they avoid the strategy of “Bandwagoning” behind the poles that are forming by adopting appropriate strategies to defend their interests in a changing world. Soft balancing seems to be the best option for weak countries or middle powers alongside other possible options including:

• Diversification of partners : Reduce economic and political dependence on the new poles by developing relations with other non-hegemonic regional powers (India, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Indonesia etc.)
• Defending multilateralism: Supporting international institutions and norms of international law to limit unilateralism or bilateralism and promote a more just and equitable world order.

The eloquent example of the recourse to multilateralism is that of the Arab world, which has banded together in the Arab League and the OIC to confront US President Donald Trump’s plan to displace the Palestinian population from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan. The Arab League, backed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), has drawn up an alternative $53 billion plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. The plan, adopted at an extraordinary summit in Cairo, aims to rebuild Gaza without displacing its inhabitants and to re-establish the Palestinian Authority to ensure security and stability in the region. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has voiced support for the plan, calling on Trump to help rebuild without imposing forced displacement.

The Arab League’s plan includes a rapid response phase followed by reconstruction phases over five years, with the construction of 200,000 new housing units and the deployment of international peacekeepers. However, he excludes Hamas from the governance process, advocating the formation of a Palestinian technocratic committee to administer Gaza.

• Multi-alignment and Hedging: Refusing to take sides in great power conflicts and defending one’s own interests independently. Hedging is a strategy used by states to manage uncertainty by maintaining an intermediate position between balancing (balancing, opposition to a dominant power) and opportunistic alignment (bandwagoning), rapprochement with a dominant power). Rather than fully engaging on one side or the other, a state diversifies its diplomatic, economic and security commitments in order to reduce risks and maximize benefits.
• Strengthening the African, Arab, Islamic “agency”: Multipolarity will be an opportunity to strengthen the importance of “agencies”, i.e. the ability of actors in the South to define their own goals and shape their own future. This implies strengthening regional and continental cooperation, promoting a new development model and defending national sovereignty (regional value chains to enhance raw materials and move upmarket, green and blue economy, circular economy, cooperative and solidarity finance, solidarity economy, etc.).

What are the consequences for the world order?

The rise of nationalism, the rise of revisionist powers and the return of protectionism are redefining global balances, threatening the foundations of the international system inherited from 1945.

While this order, based on multilateralism, democracy and open markets, has structured international relations since the end of the Second World War, it is now facing growing tensions.

Several major dynamics illustrate this ongoing change:

• A challenge to liberal principles

The rise of nationalism is shaking the foundations of liberalism and international law. Populist coalitions challenge key principles such as open markets, free movement and respect for international standards, thus jeopardising the stability of the multilateral system.

• Fragmentation of the Western Bloc and the Rise of the Revisionist Powers

The unity of the West, long embodied by alliances such as NATO, is weakened by internal tensions and the rise of authoritarian powers such as Russia and China. The US strategy of isolating China by moving closer to Russia paradoxically risks strengthening the revisionist powers, which are challenging the fundamental principles of the liberal order. This development accelerated the transition to a multipolar world in which Europe was temporarily marginalized, thus contributing to the fragmentation of the international system established after 1945.

• Protectionism and trade wars

The revival of economic nationalism is reflected in protectionism on an unprecedented scale, particularly in the United States. Presented as a response to the trade deficit, this protectionist turn has revived trade tensions, especially with China, Canada, Mexico and Europe. These trade wars weaken international norms and prompt other countries to adopt similar practices, accelerating the erosion of the global regulatory framework.

• Unilateralism and rejection of multilateralism

The rise of nationalism encourages a retreat into unilateral policies and a disengagement from multilateral institutions. These trends have been exacerbated, deepening the fractures between the United States and its allies on major issues such as trade, security, and democratic values. Unpredictability and unilateralism have eroded trust in American leadership, calling into question its role as a guarantor of international order.

• Decline of international law

The weakening of global leadership weakens international institutions and the legal frameworks that govern relations between states. The questioning of treaties and established norms encourages an opportunistic approach to international relations where violations of the law become more frequent and less politically costly.

Thus, the rise of nationalism, driven by the great powers, is redrawing the global balance and accelerating the transition to a more fragmented and uncertain international order. The future of the liberal system will depend on the ability of the actors to adapt to these new dynamics and to preserve, despite the tensions, a global framework of cooperation.

Towards a New World Order?

The election of President Donald Trump marks an acceleration of the trends at work in the international system. The world is becoming less unipolar, more multipolar and more uncertain. The countries of the South, in particular, must exercise caution, ingenuity and solidarity to navigate this new environment and defend their interests in a changing world. The ability of the Global South to organize, cooperate and set their own priorities will be critical in shaping the future of the world order.

The countries of the SOUTH should adapt to the “new geopolitical reality” that has been germinating for a long time but has come to light following the war in Ukraine and the new American foreign policy, so they must prioritize their autonomy and collective security in a very clear way, security being the foundation of everything.

“Security is a public good – the most important thing everyone needs. This is the prerequisite for maintaining our values, as well as a necessity for our economic success and competitiveness. If we lose security, it will take with it our well-being and our plans for the future.” (Sauli Niinstö, former Finnish president, October 2024).

Most of the revisionist powers seek mainly to expand their spheres of influence and increase their power by challenging the established international order. That is why I am advocating for a peaceful transition to a flexible multipolar order, structured around three main poles: the United States, Europe and Canada, united in a new alliance; the East, under the leadership of China and Russia. This transition could meet the aspirations of the revisionist powers while easing international tensions, thus saving our planet from a nuclear catastrophe.

A pure multipolar model could, in fact, paralyze global governance and exacerbate geopolitical tensions and stimulate the formation of rival regionalisms, generating conflicts and imbalances.

The intermediate powers and the pivotal countries of the South, taken individually, would be called upon to play an essential role of “check and balance” in this configuration. Their strategic choices would play a decisive role in the homeostasis of the system (Talcott Parsons). Their alignment with the United States, China, Russia or the future alliance of Europe could redraw the global balances and give a decisive advantage to one of the blocs.

Moreover, the United States and China would have a prominent place in this new multipolar order and would be called upon to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the international community by guaranteeing the provision of certain public goods such as: supporting a sustainable framework for international trade, peace and security, international justice, freedom of navigation,  a clean environment and the safeguarding of the common heritage of humanity (the undivided common parts) against any predation.

I am convinced that it is better to dream and work to transform today’s aspirations into tomorrow’s realities, rather than giving in to resignation in the face of new nightmares of destruction and suffering.