Mauritania is the Key to the UK’s Development Goals in the Sahel and Beyond

Developments in the Sahel region should occupy an important place in the UK’s overall sustainable development plans, foreign security considerations, and international cooperation program. Most recently, the British government’s Integrated Review 2023 outlined ways in which the UK could better protect its core national interests, namely to “shape the international environment; address vulnerabilities through resilience and generate strategic advantage.”

The new Labour government’s declared strategic priorities of building equitable relationships with African partner governments that are aimed at long-term development and supporting the transition to a net-zero future are also in line with opportunities that can be pursued in the Sahel. These goals arguably rely on strategic access to the region, which has been hampered by widespread terrorism, climate change-induced instability and migration, and most recently, the destabilizing influence of Russia and China—issues that continue to fuel each other in a vicious cycle.

The Sahel has long faced complex security and humanitarian crises, and is now the foremost hotspot for terrorism in the world. In 2024, 51% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in the Sahel, with Burkina Faso and Mali leading as the primary localities. Despite regionwide challenges, Mauritania is the least affected by terrorism. Its more limited, domestic terrorism takes place as part of a spill-over effect from neighboring countries on the border with Mali, as well as in the north and northeast, near the Western Sahara region in southern Morocco and Algeria.

The Sahel also stands to be among the regions of the world most affected by climate change, with environmental factors becoming as important a source of instability, conflict, and migration as structural and local drivers. An overreliance on climate-sensitive, agriculture-based livelihoods is a risk factor, which is compounded by the overuse of water and land. This reduces resource availability over time as agricultural production falters, food prices increase, and risks of collective violence due to youth unemployment, farmer/herder conflicts, and governance-related issues grow.13

While statistics in this area is limited and less reliable, migration from the Sahel region towards the UK has been increasing as part of the overall growth in irregular migration in the Sub-Saharan African, Sahel and North African regions. While Mauritania shares the environmental challenges its neighboring countries face, its less densely populated territory and lower pressure on land and water resources, and its access to the Atlantic coastline mitigate the impact of the climate on its population to an extent. Corresponding with this is a lower rate of migration—Mauritania has primarily been a transit country rather than a country of origin for migration.

The rise of the influence of the Russian and Chinese governments in the region has been another, notable development, specifically in the context of the UK’s—and more broadly, the West’s—engagement with the region. Russia and China have been credited with orchestrating the growing discontent of local authorities and populations with Western anti-terrorism and support forces, which eventually resulted in the withdrawal of the French from Mali in 2022, and from Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023. Fuelled by similar anti-Western sentiments, Niger asked U.S. forces to leave in 2024. Meanwhile, the Sahel is increasingly becoming an arena for the proxy-style expansion of the West vs. East geopolitical rivalry. Ukrainian troops allegedly coordinated with Tuareg separatists in a recent ambush on Wagner mercenaries in Mali, and Ukrainian special forces have reportedly supported the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, aligned with the Wagner Group in Sudan.

The expansion of Russian and Chinese influence has been due in large part to the underlying governance failures and political instabilities of the region, which have fuelled unrest, military coups and terrorism. Whilst Russia entered the Sahel to provide a security service alternative to the weakened militaries and police forces of local states, China has been focusing on economic development and investments, both operating under an anti-West narrative.

Mauritania is different from its Sahelian neighbors in this sense too, considering the country’s relatively stable political environment, devoid of military takeovers and unrest in its recent history, and having transitioned to a democratic system through elections. Consequently, the country has been able to maintain a more comprehensive administrative control of its territories, with a wide coverage of social welfare services. As a result, while Russian and Chinese influence has been on the rise in Mauritania too, the country has also maintained its diplomatic and economic partnerships with the West.

British-Mauritanian relations are a recent development, with the first Embassy in Nouakchott opening in 2018. Notwithstanding, the UK has steadily been expanding its influence and interest in the country and the broader region. In 2018, recognizing the Sahel’s importance in security and migration, and the need to better understand and address the underlying causes of conflict, the UK opened two further embassies, in Niger in 2020 and Chad in 2021. If Britain is to effect meaningful change in the region for the benefit of its broader strategic goals, however, it needs to synchronize its existing initiatives and focus them on key areas of development. Mauritania, for its more advantageous security, environmental and governance landscape, serves as an ideal partner for this, potentially providing an example for the rest of the region if cooperation is successful in the areas detailed above.

Great Power Rivalry and Regional Shifts

The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 placed a heavy focus on the Sahel region partnership, and the UK has proposed a development offer to the Sahel under the Sunak government, stating three key objectives for its approach. The first is to build stability and bolster conflict resolution within the Sahel; the second focuses on improving the response to the most acute humanitarian needs; and the final objective relates to the support of sustainable development through “empowering women and girls, and the most vulnerable populations” and “building climate resilience and accelerating access to climate finance.”

Complementing the above goals is the grand strategic priority of pushing back against Russian and Chinese ideological influence, which has become more pronounced in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war since 2022, with the UK having provided significant military and political support to Kyiv. Because its human and material resources are insufficient on their own, the UK’s ability to pursue the above goals relies heavily on its partnerships with key decision makers, notably including the military in Mauritania. This is all the more urgent as the British are behind the Russians and Chinese in terms of both the timeline and scale of engagement with Sahelian nations.

Russia has leveraged its influence of regional political elites and civil society and coordinated disinformation campaigns on social media in a bid to destabilize governments aligned with Paris or Washington, DC. Moscow has managed to curry favour and cast itself as a “well-intentioned and capable security partner.” Simultaneously, it has positioned its private mercenary companies as an alternative means of protection in the ensuing gap of international manpower after France and the US withdrew their forces. Although the numbers fluctuate and are hard to gauge, it is estimated that there are 3-5,000 active Wagner personnel in the region.

Mauritania, specifically, is already being courted by both the Russians and the Chinese. Putin’s meeting with Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani confirmed that “Russia and Mauritania developed close ties… and accumulated a wealth of positive experience in the area of mutually beneficial cooperation.” As a result, “Russia and Mauritania often take a common stance on the international stage…” This is also true for Mauritania’s relationship with China. In his meeting with the Mauritanian president, Chinese President Xi Jinping “stressed that China and Mauritania are good friends … [and that] China is ready to work with Mauritania to promote Belt and Road cooperation, deepen cooperation in fisheries, infrastructure and other fields, [and] leverage the role of the agricultural and animal husbandry technology.” Mauritania formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2018 and China remains its largest trading partner, holding a 23.8% share of the country’s total trade volume.

Bilateral Opportunities in the Security Field

British military and security involvement in the Sahel has been minimal. Operation Newcombe, which began in 2013, has only seen minimal numbers of training personnel and aircraft deployed, with the second phase between 2020-2022 operating a long-range reconnaissance group consisting of under 300 personnel. The operation fully withdrew in November 2022, a year before its planned end date, due to instability in Mali.

Importantly, there have been no terrorist attacks in Mauritania since 2010, although radicalization remains a risk, as does instability from neighbouring Mali. British membership of NATO is an acceptable avenue for mitigating security concerns in the country, as NATO has a Defence Capacity Building Programme with Mauritania to further professionalize its armed forces. This stability, a regionally acceptable democratic system, which was further strengthened through the re-election of President Mohamed Cheikh Mohamed Ahmed El Ghazouani for his second term in 2024, allows for a smooth continuity of relationship-building between the UK and Mauritania.

Security is a necessary condition for facilitating any path for economic development that Mauritania can also benefit from. International military support operations also act as a means for relationship building and assist the intervening force to negate any upstream impacts stemming from the region, especially due to the active anti-West propaganda of Russia.

Opportunities in Mining and Resource Diplomacy

The UK’s Civil Nuclear Roadmap, which outlines ambitious plans for the expansion of nuclear power, relies on the steady and affordable supply of uranium—a resource found in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. While British investments in Mauritania are currently limited, focusing on its mining sector can provide a strategic foothold and expand the UK’s stake in the mature commodity market. Alba Mineral Resources plc is active in uranium exploration, and key sectors also include copper, iron ore and gold—Mauritania’s top export products. In addition to this, Rare Earth Elements (REE), essential for the energy and defence industries, are present in significant quantities, with the UK’s demand for them expected to grow rapidly as part of the low-carbon energy transition.

Alba holds a 50% stake in Mauritania Ventures Limited, which held two uranium exploration licenses. It also applied for a third license, but this was granted to Australian company Aura Energy Limited. Despite not directly holding the license, this development strengthens the West’s presence in the uranium market, limiting access to China and Russia.

Alba also applied for gold and base-metal exploration licenses, with interest in 6,000 km2 of land in Mauritania. These complement the company’s discovery of copper, gold, cobalt, vanadium and nickel in its Inglefield Land project. The value of trade between the UK and Mauritania has grown by £102 million since the embassy’s opening, representing a 443% increase.

Investment in the mining sector offers more than just commercial opportunity but also diplomatic favor. Investment in the largest Mauritanian mining commodity, iron ore, can be beneficial towards furthering partnerships between the UK, Mauritania and the MENA region. Key partners in the iron ore sector are Qatar and Saudi Arabia, through Saudi Basic Industries Corp’s subsidiary, Saudi Iron and Steel Company, and Qatar Steel Company. By investing in the iron sector and partnering with nations currently investing in the region, especially whom the UK has close ties with, Britain can bolster its commodity interests in the nation, use FDI to enhance its diplomatic leverage, along with buoying and building its financial and diplomatic ties with other MENA states.

Mauritania’s mining potential is vast, with over 900 identified mineral occurrences, including iron ore, copper, gold, and rare earths. The UK should seize the opportunity to promote investment and assess areas with untapped potential, leveraging resources such as Mauritania’s interactive mining register.

With China dominating the global REE supply chain, the UK’s access to these resources is crucial for maintaining competitiveness. As geopolitical tensions arise and China limits exports to the US, securing alternative sources will be vital for the UK’s strategic interests.

Opportunities in Climate-related Development

The UK manages its climate-related programs through the blanket application of regional and international programs, four of which are employed specifically in Mauritania, and three are climate-specific: the Shock Response Programme (SRP) for governmental climate response, Weather and Climate Information Services (WISER) and the African Risk Capacity (ARC). The Women’s Integrated Sexual Health program (WISH) is yet the only initiative focused on the UK’s declared Sustainable Development Goals. None of the current programs primarily focuses on Sahelian security, but this is mainly due to Mauritania’s relative safety and stability.

By continuing to directly partner with cooperative government schemes and indirectly supporting regional charities and development programs such as the international UNDP, ICRC, the UK can maintain a presence in key initiatives such as the Sahelian Alliance and the Sahel Humanitarian Assistance & Protection program. This involvement is crucial for building partnerships and influencing policymakers. Through targeted investments, the UK can catalyze changes in the approach of the international community and partner governments, leading to improved stability and development.

UK Priorities and Risks

The strategic loss of regional access by the US and France has left a power vacuum in the Sahel that China and Russia have filled. Although the UK maintains security and economic partnerships with Mauritania, it does not have the benefit of its status as a new standing partner through which investment can freely flow. Investment in Mauritania could facilitate the requirements and objectives of the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh and UK-Sahel development plan, expand upon the Mauritanian development plan, and secure new trade opportunities and rare materials. The UK should:

1. Invest in Mauritania, both via private and public avenues, as a facilitator to gain military and economic access to the Sahel.

2. Promote the Mauritanian Ministry of Petroleum, and the Mines and Energy Licence mapping service to encourage British private investment in the mining sector to secure strategic materials and invest in new mineral occurrences.

3. Maintain direct holdings of strategic assets, such as mineral holdings, to negate shortages during any great power competition between the West and the East.

4. Bolster security cooperation between the UK and Mauritania to facilitate cooperation both inside and outside the remit of the NATO alliance, promoting and offering partnership alternatives to the Russian paramilitary groups in the rest of the Sahel.

A few, important barriers remain that UK policymakers should consider. Access to electricity in the Sahel is very low, which makes economic transformation challenging—only 4% of people in Chad, 18% of people in Burkina Faso and 14% of people in Niger have access to electricity.16 This lack of access, although coverage is substantially higher in Mauritania, will make for a challenging environment in which economic transformation can take place.

Further limitations would regard the concerns of human rights in Mauritania, the government directly interacting with the nation could have negative domestic social implications. However, the re-election of the president does allow for continuity of progress, an ordered militaristic structure for negotiation will help with British commitments to gaining Sahelian access and keep the focus of military security at the forefront.

Diversification of investment is another limitation, as directly investing in one sector could upset the current equilibrium, jeopardize supply chains if interrupted, and further investment might be reduced as the Mauritanian government seeks to diversify its foreign investors. Mauritanians might seek to appease their largest trading partner, China, by withdrawing support for British investment in the coming years as world powers compete for dominance, or it might minimize the areas of investment to non-strategic assets. In the second scenario, the focus would instead be on appeasing British overseas development objectives in agriculture whilst benefiting domestically, notably at the whim of Chinese or Russian suggestions.