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Rabat – When King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne twenty-five years ago, the conflict over the Western Sahara region in southern Morocco was stagnant. In fact, it can be said that the winds of the political process initiated by the United Nations in 1991 were not blowing in Morocco’s favor, especially since the United Nations was adamant about organizing a self-determination referendum in the region.
However, over the past two decades, Morocco has withstood all international pressures aimed at making it concede its sovereignty over the Sahara and has managed to impose its approach.
Crucially, Morocco has managed to establish its autonomy plan as the only and most viable path to a lasting and politically feasible solution to the Sahara dispute. This decisive success of Morocco’s increasingly assertive diplomacy, whose seeds were planted in the early years of King Mohammed VI’s reign but blossomed in most recent years, took place in three stages.
The first stage (1999-2006)
During this period, Morocco had to withstand international pressures to comply with the provisions of the 1991 settlement plan, under which the country was required to commit to the organization of a self-determination referendum.
In this phase, the UN-led political process was essentially driven by the urgency of allowing the population of Western Sahara to determine the political future of the region, either through integration with Morocco or the establishment of an independent state.
However, the procedural flaws in the Settlement Plan and the seemingly irreconcilable differences between Morocco and the Polisario over who should participate in the referendum were the main obstacles for the UN in this first phase. Additional hurdles were the Polisario’s stubbornness in complying with the Secretary-General’s recommendations regarding the conditions for participation in the referendum and Morocco’s gradual loss of faith in the possibility and viability of a potential referendum.
Having completely lost faith in the referendum route by the turn of the century, Morocco undertook to push for a rethinking of UN mediation by introducing the idea of reaching a settlement through a political compromise.
By the end of 2003, Morocco was beginning to reap the benefits of this new political approach, which emphasized the need for a mutually acceptable political solution while preserving its territorial integrity. Since then, a self-determination referendum has tellingly disappeared from the Security Council’s list of options to help the parties reach a final political settlement. Instead, the Security Council started calling on the parties to present proposals that could form a basis for reaching a final solution.
The briefing presented by the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum in 2006, in which he affirmed the impossibility of reaching a solution through a referendum and the impossibility of establishing an independent state in the Sahara, gave a strong boost to Morocco’s position.
Thus, the flexibility shown by Moroccan diplomacy has gradually persuaded the Security Council of the need to adopt a new approach that is compatible with the political reality on the ground and with the Moroccan resolve not to jeopardize its sovereignty over the Saharan territory.,
The second stage (2007-2017)
The year 2007 marked a historic turning point in the course of the conflict within the United Nations. With the adoption of Resolution 1754, the Security Council gave clear signals that the option of a referendum was no longer among the choices available to the parties to the conflict, and the only way to resolve it was through negotiations aimed at reaching a politically acceptable solution.
Moreover, the Security Council responded positively to the autonomy plan presented by Morocco on April 11, 2007. The Council described the Moroccan plan as realistic and credible, while hailing it for providing a genuine basis for reaching a lasting political solution. This position was consistently expressed by influential countries within the Council. Conversely, the counter-plan submitted by the Polisario on April 10 of the same year failed to be accepted by the Security Council, which merely took note of the proposal.
However, the initial support expressed by influential countries such as France and the United States remained merely rhetoric. Throughout this second phase, none of these countries took any additional practical steps that would decisively bolster Morocco’s position.
Despite the significant political shift by Morocco during this phase, it had to confront a wave of human rights abuse allegations from some non-governmental organizations sympathetic to the separatist agenda. To undermine Morocco’s progress by burying the Security Council’s push for a politically negotiated self-determination, these organizations used the human rights card. They hoped to undermine Morocco’s gains and push influential countries within the Security Council to reconsider their supportive stance—at least at the level of political discourse—towards Morocco’s position.
One of the most significant outcomes of this human rights campaign was the United States’ proposal in April 2013 of a draft resolution calling for a mechanism to monitor the human rights situation in both the Sahara and the Tindouf camps. This proposal angered Morocco and led to unprecedented tension in Moroccan-American relations.
But Morocco eventually managed to neutralize all efforts aimed at thwarting its diplomatic achievements. By the end of 2016, and with the end of the second term of former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon—who had shown notable sympathy towards the separatist agenda—the human rights question was no longer among the core issues of the conflict.
The third stage (2018 to present)
This stage has been marked by the Security Council’s gradual shift towards considering Algeria as a main party to the Sahara conflict and emphasizing that the political process must be realistic and based on compromise. This shift was reflected in the adoption of Resolution 2440 in October 2018.
It can be said that there is a before and after this resolution. Before Resolution 2440 , there was no indication or language suggesting that the Security Council considered Algeria a principal party to the conflict. However, since the adoption of this resolution, followed by Resolutions 2460, 2494, and others up to Resolution 2703, the Security Council has repeatedly and emphatically pointed to Algeria’s full responsibility in the conflict, while urging the Algerian government to play its role in facilitating a realistic and consensual political solution.
This significant shift culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2703, which holds enormous political implications and signals the Security Council’s intention to consider Algeria a principal party to the conflict.
In particular, these resolutions have established the Geneva roundtable talks, initiated in December 2018, as the institutional framework the United Nations seeks to use to launch serious negotiations leading to a political resolution of the conflict.
Consensus has become the foundation of the political process, with the concept being emphasized three times in each of the Security Council resolutions adopted since 2018. To understand the significance of this gradual shift in the language of Security Council resolutions, consider that the resolutions adopted between 2008 and 2017 mentioned the principle of consensus only once, while it was not mentioned at all in Resolutions 1754 and 1783, adopted in April and October 2007, respectively.
The language adopted by the Security Council since 2018 aligns with Morocco’s firm stance, which has consistently called on the United Nations to recognize Algeria’s crucial role in the conflict and its responsibility to help reach a political solution that safeguards the interests of all parties and ensures the security and stability of the entire region.
These resolutions break away from Algeria’s narrative; successive Algerian governments have long insisted that Algeria is not a party to the Sahara conflict and that it only supports the Polisario Front as part of its principled commitment to the notion of self-determination.
By successfully involving Algeria in the roundtable discussions, Morocco has killed two birds with one stone: first, by demonstrating Algeria’s key role in prolonging the conflict and thus its responsibility to contribute to its resolution; and second, by avoiding direct negotiations with the Polisario, thereby preventing it from gaining legitimacy as Morocco’s main interlocutor in this conflict.
Morocco has always challenged the legitimacy of the separatist Polisario, asserting that it only represents the Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps and not the pro-union Sahrawis who support the Moroccan autonomy plan and participate in managing the region’s affairs.
In addition to the stages the Sahara issue has gone through during the reign of King Mohammed VI, Morocco has achieved four decisive diplomatic breakthroughs in the Sahara issue over the past twenty-five years:
U.S. Recognition of Moroccan Sovereignty over the Sahara
Alongside the achievements Morocco has made multilaterally within the United Nations, the most significant diplomatic breakthrough was the U S’ recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara and the acknowledgment of the Moroccan autonomy plan as the only basis for a political solution. In Algeria and among the few countries that support Polisario’s separatist aspirations, this decision caused a diplomatic earthquake.
Since the ceasefire agreement between Morocco and the Polisario in 1991, through James Baker’s first and second plans in 2001 and 2003, to the beginning of the UN-sponsored political process in 2007, Algeria has worked to influence American public opinion and decision-makers, including Congress and successive U.S. administrations, to garner support for the separatist agenda and undermine the depth of American support for Morocco.
This is why Algeria hired the public relations firm Foley Hoag in 1997, which has worked for three decades to win American support for the Algerian position, or at least to prevent the U.S. from explicitly supporting Morocco. They also hired Kenne Consulting, owned by David Keene, a close associate of former National Security Advisor John Bolton.
But Trump’s decision aborted all these Algerian efforts, dealing a heavy blow to its diplomacy.
Even more disconcerting for the Algerian regime, the administration of President Joe Biden ignored calls to derail the Trump administration’s December 10 proclamation and steered clear of undermining the political and diplomatic significance of the US’ embrace of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara.
Earlier this month, U.S. Ambassador to Algeria Elizabeth Moore Aubin confirmed in an interview with Algerian media that despite the Biden White House’s lukewarm approach to the Western Sahara issue, American support for Moroccan sovereignty has become U.S. policy since late 2020.
Spain’s Recognition of the Autonomy Plan as the Basis for a Political Solution
Another crucial breakthrough was the announcement by the Spanish Prime Minister in March 2022 that his government would endorse the Moroccan autonomy plan. Critically, Pedro Sánchez described the Moroccan plan as the only and most viable basis for a genuine political solution to the Sahara dispute.
Like Trump’s proclamation, this decision represented a significant diplomatic breakthrough and added to the achievements Morocco has made under the leadership of King Mohammed VI.
Symbolically and politically, the Spanish stance may be even more important than the American position, particularly considering Spain’s historical role—alongside France—in creating and prolonging the conflict.
This is especially notable given the inconsistent and sometimes ambiguous stance expressed by Spanish governments from 1978 to the early 2000s, as well as the broad support for the separatist cause among the Spanish public, media, and intellectuals. Spain’s position has pressured France to adopt a similar stance to maintain its strategic interests in Morocco in the medium and long term, especially given its primary responsibility in creating this conflict. Furthermore, Spain’s stance could encourage other European countries to gradually support the Moroccan position.
Morocco’s Return to the African Union
To be sure, the Security Council’s implicit adoption of a pro-Moroccan course, the U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty, and Spanish support for the Moroccan position have dramatically tipped the balance of Western Sahara diplomacy in Morocco’s favor.
But on the continental scene, the development that has really scuttled Algeria’s plan to establish an independent state in southern Morocco is the kingdom’s return to the African Union. Not only has this decision dealt a serious blow to Algerian diplomacy and reduced its ability to harm Morocco’s strategic interests, it has also given Rabat the upper hand in continental dynamics.
This return to the African Union was a goal that King Mohammed VI had been pursuing for more than a decade, especially since Algeria used Morocco’s three-decade absence from the organization to influence its orientations and use it as leverage against Morocco on the Sahara issue. One of Morocco’s main objectives in returning to the continental organization was to expel the self-styled Saharawi “republic” from the African Union, thereby dashing Algeria’ s hopes of establishing an independent state in southern Morocco.
Since Morocco’s return to the African Union, however, Algeria has gradually lost its continental diplomatic luster and leadership. Signs of Algeria’s declining leadership were evident even before Morocco’s return to the organization, when 28 member states petitioned the president of the African Union to suspend the membership of the Self-proclaimed Saharawi “republic.” This shift indicated that the balance of power in Africa was gradually tilting in favor of Morocco.
Analyzing the political and diplomatic achievements Morocco has garnered over the past seven years reveals overwhelmingly positive results. For one thing, what such an analysis shows is that Morocco’s decision to return to its “African family” was wise and can be considered one of the most significant political decisions made during King Mohammed VI’s reign. Morocco’s ability to neutralize the pro-Polisario axis within the AU and get the continental organization to rally behind the UN-led political process would not have been possible without its return.
The hysteria currently permeating the Algerian media and the repeated attacks on Morocco reflect the frustration and resentment within the Algerian regime over the diplomatic setbacks that Morocco has inflicted on it over the past seven years.
Since returning to the African Union, Morocco has played on Algeria and the Polisario Front’s turf, dismantling the Algiers-Abuja-Pretoria axis. No longer content with support from friendly West African countries, Morocco has moved to win over countries in East and Southern Africa. One of the most notable achievements was persuading Nigeria and Ethiopia to adopt a position of incremental positive neutrality on the Sahara issue.
Upon Morocco’s return to what King Mohammed VI called its “African family,” the Algerian regime witnessed how, in a short period, Morocco not only neutralized Algeria’s hostile policies in Africa and its influence on the African Union but also dismantled the diplomatic gains Algeria had made over decades.
A prime example of this is the partnership Morocco established with Nigeria over the past eight years—a country Algeria had relied on since 1984 to pressure Morocco and weaken its chances of maintaining its territorial integrity. Before Morocco’s return to the African Union, the Algerian regime relied on the Algiers-Abuja-Pretoria axis to impose its agenda within the African Union and shape the organization’s stance on numerous regional issues, foremost among them the Western Sahara issue.
As a result of its control over the African Union and its decision-making processes, Algeria managed to create the position of the African Union Special Envoy for the Sahara in June 2014, appointing former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano to the role.
From that moment until 2017, Chissano left no stone unturned to emphasize the importance of the African Union playing a primary role in resolving the conflict in line with the Algerian agenda. He also sought to leverage the human rights card to pressure Morocco before the United Nations, attempting to present several briefings to the Security Council on the matter.
However, Morocco thwarted these plans. The envoy’s role has since diminished, particularly after the summit held in Mauritania in July 2018, which explicitly stated that the Western Sahara issue falls under the exclusive purview of the United Nations. This recognition of the centrality of the UN-led political process marked the beginning of a series of blows Morocco has gradually dealt to Algeria at the continental level.
Another significant shift in regional dynamics is Morocco’s growing diplomatic and economic engagement with Nigeria. This new chapter of strengthened bilateral relations began with the visits of King Mohammed VI to Nigeria in December 2016 and Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari to Morocco in June 2018. To date, the planned construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries marks this strategic partnership as a potential game changer in African dynamics.
While recent years have seen a decisive shift in the AU’s position on the Sahara in favor of Morocco, this pipeline project will shift the balance of power in the region even more fundamentally. The deepening of Moroccan-Nigerian relations is evident in Nigeria’s shifting stance on the Western Sahara issue. Previously a vocal supporter of the Polisario Front at the United Nations, the West African country has refrained from raising the issue in UN General Assembly discussions since 2016. This shift reflects Morocco’s growing influence in Africa.
The outcome of the 45th session of the African Union’s Executive Council, held in Accra on July 18-19, further demonstrates Morocco’s diplomatic momentum. Morocco succeeded in persuading 52 of the 54 African Union member states to adopt a resolution excluding the Polisario Front from all AU meetings with international partners.
In addition, the number of African countries that recognize the self-proclaimed Sahrawi “Republic” (SADR) has gone down from more than 30 to a mere 16.. Perhaps the most telling illustration of this shift is the increasing opening of consulates in the disputed region. To date, 28 countries have opened consulates in Laayoune and Dakhla, including 22 African states. ²Notably, some of these countries had previously maintained diplomatic relations with the SADR.
An increasingly alarmed and frustrated Algeria appears to understand that these developments are only preliminary steps and that other African countries are likely to follow suit by opening consulates in Morocco’s southern provinces. Meanwhile, the prospects of expelling the Polisario Front from the African Union seems imminent, as the political landscape within the AU increasingly favors Morocco.
Algeria’s discontent with Morocco’s diplomatic successes and its frustration over losing its continental leadership was evident in the statement made by Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf following the AU Executive Council’s decision to exclude the self-styled SADR from international meetings.
France’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty
Algiers’ frustration and outrage were even more pronounced earlier this week in the Algerian Foreign Ministry’s reaction to France’s decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Not so long ago, I had been relatively dismissive of the Moroccan media’s celebratory coverage of the French Foreign Minister’s pledge, during a visit to Rabat, that his government planned to unequivocally support Morocco’s autonomy plan.
Like any seasoned observer of France’s long history of lip service support for Morocco’s Sahara position, I worried — amid a general mood of exuberant celebration of a newfound rapprochement between Paris and Rabat — that this was yet another promise of business as usual in France’s long show. The Algerian establishment was also likely reassured that France could not actually make the risky decision to alienate its troubled relationship with Algeria.
That after relentlessly appeasing Algiers for much of the Macron presidency, Paris would ultimately not go so far as to implement the Western Sahara shift it had been signaling for months. However, to the shock of most observers and the utter dismay of Algeria, Emmanuel Macron broke this taboo with his bold and unprecedented letter to King Mohammed VI, announcing that the present and future of Western Sahara lies with Moroccan sovereignty.
All these diplomatic breakthroughs achieved by Morocco have driven Algeria into a state of frustration and resentment, prompting it to provoke Morocco and launch a fierce media campaign against the kingdom in an attempt to escalate the conflict in the region and undermine Morocco’s successes.
The increasing international recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara—especially following the U.S. recognition, Spain’s explicit support, and France’s momentous recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara—signals the beginning of an international consensus on the legitimacy of Morocco’s position, while the Polisario Front’s legitimacy is diminishing.
Samir Bennis is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. You can follow him on Twitter @SamirBennis.
