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History and nothing but history! The archives and nothing but the archives! The manuscripts and nothing but the manuscripts! No matter how much we want to project ourselves into the future to escape the present by wiping the slate clean of the past, it doesn’t work. We are caught up by the past and challenged by the present. It is to the credit of certain leaders to refer to the history of international relations to help practitioners and the public see more clearly – and to make amends.
Thucydides, who wrote about the Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BC) between Athens and Sparta, became known to the general public through the popularization of the term “Thucydides’ Trap” thanks to Graham Allison, an American political scientist and international relations theorist (2011 and 2017).
Recently, during the visit of American President Donald Trump to Beijing (May 13 and 14, 2026), Chinese President Xi Jinping cleverly referenced the Greek philosopher Thucydides to invite his American counterpart not to fall into the zero-sum game trap.
The Thucydides Trap deals with the balance of power between an emerging power and a power that is fully in control of all its means, but fears losing ground to its main rival.
This mention of Thucydides allows me to revisit the relevance of the diplomatic messages that political leaders sometimes launch by quoting emblematic figures of philosophical thought and diplomacy who have marked the history of mankind.
The idea is to question the contribution of certain political scientists and international relations theorists to the longevity of old ideas that perfectly align with contemporary geopolitics and attract the attention of academic and media circles.
Getting the Record Straight
In this regard, four political scientists and theorists of international relations have been more fortunate to be praised by Arab media and decision-makers in the Arab and Islamic periphery, particularly since 1990.
This applies to Francis Fukuyama, who is winning credit for his paradigm of the end of history; Samuel Huntington, who is applauded for his paradigm of the clash of civilizations; Joseph Nye, who is respected for his paradigm of the paradox of power; and Graham Allison, who is celebrated for his two paradigms: the Thucydides trap and his paradigm and the bureaucratic model.
The classification of these eminent authors and prolific writers is difficult to make. It would be unfair and a crime of lese-majesty to even consider classifying them, given how much their contributions shine in terms of analytical depth and prospective quality.
For the most daring readers, the reference to Henry Kissinger would ignite much of their curiosity. His work “Diplomacy” is a gigantic piece in which references to history provide a precise idea of the digressions and loss of focus to which the decision-makers of great powers are sometimes subjected (Kissinger H. Diplomacy. 1994).
However, there are other scholars and thinkers that Arab and Islamic media almost never mention because they refrain from stepping lavishly into political diatribes. Such is the case with James N. Rosenau, well-known among students of international relations for his paradigm, Linkage Politics; Robert Jervis (perception and misperception paradigms); Stanley Hoffmann (Gulliver’s Trouble paradigm); and Kenneth Waltz (transnationalism paradigm), to name just a few authors.
One can thus claim that the importance of academicians is seasonal and depends on the current international political news. They are sometimes invited onto television shows or into renowned think tanks to share their expertise on international affairs. Some wear the badge of diplomatic advisors on specific issues and hold positions within both Democratic and Republican administrations.
The Chinese head of state referenced Thucydides for the media to discover that the Thucydides trap had been used by American political scientist Graham Allison in a study of 16 conflicts that have marked the political history of the world.
Yet, Graham Alison is a reference in the field of international relations theory. He is especially known for his study of the bureaucratic model and its impact on the decision-making system in the United States through the rational actor paradigm.
Graham Allison’s views are debated in Europe. He also stood out for his emphasis on the conflictual dimension in interpersonal relationships and organizational behavior within the decision-making system. He applied his paradigm to the October 1962 missile crisis, which, within 48 hours, was on the verge of causing a third world war (Essence of the Decision, 1971).
Arab media follow the trend. They truncate President Xi Jinping’s reference to Thucydides into a kind of a new discovery. Yet the move ignores the almost organic relationship between the academic world and the political world in many countries, particularly the United States.
Yet, other American scholars have borrowed historical metaphors to shed light on the foreign policy of state actors. Stanley Hoffmann can, once again, be mentioned in this regard. He drew inspiration from the character of Gulliver in Jonathan Swift’s novel titled “Gulliver’s Trouble,” published in 1726, to study the impact of American power in a troubled world (Gulliver’s Trouble or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, 1968).
Adjusting the Compass
Stanley Hoffmann raises the question of the erosion of American power. The dichotomous perception of the impact of the Cold War already challenges the tranquility of the actors who engineered the Yalta Conference (1945). It calls into question the geopolitical interpretation of the post-Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and its costly repercussions of the Cold War.
The erosion of American power frightens academics who have held high positions within the American administration. This is the case of Zbigniew Brzezinski. He published a book titled “The Choice, Global Domination or Global Leadership” in 2004.
The main idea behind this finely documented work describes the dilemma the United States faced, swinging between the solitary choice of power, translated into a hegemonic perception of international politics, and the acceptance of a multipolar reality.
This reality imposes relative concessions and affects the hierarchy and influence that the United States has enjoyed since World War I. Brzezinski suggests adopting a flexible approach that accepts multilateralism while shaping it in a way that prevents the United States from losing out.
Although the judgment seems harsh, I cannot help but decry the way some Arab and Muslim researchers have been treated for defying the prevailing discourses related to the rift between the academic and political worlds. Amine Maalouf, Ghassan Salamé, Abdelbaki Hermassi, El Mahdi El Mandjra, Abdellah Saaf, etc. are among them.
This rift is concerning in that scientific production either scares political decision-makers or, at the very last, upsets them. Often, they do not accept being called to order or challenged on decisions that don not take necessary step back to be in tune with the times.
In our schools’ time, during years 1960-1990, Greek, Persian, Hindu, Chinese mythology and famous quotes were highly valued in literary and philosophical studies. Reference to such a valuable heritage was justified by the fact that it was part of the momentum of the Arab intellectual renaissance.
Later, the adjective “Islamic” was added to the narratives. Hence, the ambiguity took over the Arab-Muslim academic landscape for at least six decades. Because the pioneers of this renaissance were in majority of Christian faith. The contribution of thinkers of Islamic faith was also valuable, but it was drowned in diatribes focusing on shallow matters and neglecting the substantial ones.
Paradigms are not a Walk in the Desert
Publications sponsored by research centers affiliated with certain universities in Egypt and Lebanon that had research programs with Western universities, particularly American or British, have allowed a group of researchers to shed light on the path to revival and to challenge their colleagues misled by often mimetic scholastic production.
To highlight scholars who are in the spotlight, I can mention Joseph Nye. Nye’s paradigm on soft power is referred to everywhere. Nye explores the means that enable state actors to succeed in a troubled political world. The paradigm was first used in 1989 (Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics).
The soft power paradigm challenges the smart power paradigm. Soft power combines military and economic coercion, while smart power favors diplomatic persuasion and cultural influence. However, Joseph Nye is especially better known for having contributed, in association with Robert Keohane, to the publication of a masterpiece book on international economic relations. They proposed a new concept called complex interdependence to reflect on an international system in a hectic transition (Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition, 1977).
Nye resumes its interests in the matter later and poses a surgical question about the paradox of American power. He questions the status and role of the United States in the world in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power, 2002).
Nye believes that there has been no state as powerful as the United States since the Roman Empire; however, alone, it can do nothing about issues related to terrorism, environmental degradation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Nye proposes a roadmap to enable the United States to continue its leadership in the world and to reduce its sensitivity and vulnerability, two concepts he already studied in 1976.
Questioning previously unquestioned narratives thus becomes a matter of great interest. The importance of context and timing is fundamental and requires a regular and orderly reassessment to keep pace with changes in the international system.
The “deconstruction” paradigm proposed by Jacques Derrida in 1967 pertaining to the critical analysis of Western thought is very enlightening in this respect. It particularly focuses on aspects that carefully challenge logocentrism and the instability of meanings related to the predominant ideas shaping Western mindsets.
The concepts are the emanation of an individual perception of each decision-maker, even if they appear to be among the most rational compared to other decision-makers. Language is eloquently translated by gesture and spontaneous behavior. There is self-interest in every choice of expression, even those that give the impression of being innocent and aiming to unify. The ultimate goal is seemingly to avoid confrontation with the others while waiting for better options.
Xi Jinping’s proposal referring to Thucydide is genius. It lies in the fact that he would have assumed that Donald Trump liked to strike deals. Would this assumption be exaggerated? Not at all. Jinping’s intention might be stemming from Sun Tzu’s stratagems, more used by businessmen than by neophyte leaders in politics.
Undoubtedly, one can get an answer with Kissinger, one of the architects of the normalization of relations between the United States and China. For the record, Kissinger was among the architects who paved the way to Richard Nixon’s historic visit as president to Beijing in 1972.
In “Diplomacy,” Kissinger’s monumental work, he provides a precise idea of his perception of history. He indirectly responds to Stanley Hoffmann and criticizes the paradigm of Gulliver’s troubles, the latter used to describe the United States’ power in the world.
A Hazy Mazy Multipolar System
Kissinger explains the political philosophy of the United States toward China. America approaches it from a position of strength but aspires to a sound dialog that does not deviate from China’s traditional thinking.
The way Kissinger introduced “diplomacy,” to make his point, is crystal clear in this specific matter. One can easily understand his argument on the rise and fall of empires. He successively cites the Western powers that have dominated the world.
The beginning and end of civilizations are a cycle that recalls the law of nature. According to Kissinger, each century sees the emergence of a country that possesses the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral catalyst to outline the contours of an international system that corresponds to and translates its own values.
It follows, according to Kissinger, that we witnessed the emergence of the concepts of the nation-state and national interest championed by France in the 17th century. Next, the concept of the balance of power was supported by Great Britain in the 18th century.
Just as Metternich’s Austria introduced the concept of the Concert of Europe in the 19th century before Bismarck dismantled it, plunging Europe into a dramatic game of political power. In the 20th century, the United States favored the concept of timorous pragmatism according to circumstances and the imperatives of immediate interests.
However, the most surprising thing is the imperial temptation that emerges from Kissinger’s findings. They recall Nye’s allusion to the Roman Empire as the only ancient power to which the United States can be compared. Perhaps this reference is not innocent. It would recall Janus, that Roman deity with two faces, one peering into the past and the other spying on the future, masterfully managing transitions.
One would be entitled to wonder what if Trump were also playing Janus to respond to Jinping, who was playing Sun Tzu? Indeed, Xi Jinping would have had another precise idea by referring to Thucydides. Would he indirectly be translating traditional Chinese strategic thought, whose most famous master today was Sun Tzu (c. 544 BC – c. 496 BC), which is described in 36 stratagems? Tzu prioritizes circumvention, cunning, and understanding (or harmony) to buy time and play on the opponent’s mind and wear them down.
For the record, American foreign policy is characterized by its oscillation between interventionism, passivism, and isolationism. These attitudes have been marking the diplomatic behavior of the United States since their independence in 1776.
Imperial Temptation and Skeptical Concern for Permanent Stabilization
Henry Kissinger eloquently explained interventionism, pacifism, and isolationism witnessed in American foreign policy in his abovementioned masterpiece “Diplomacy.” One discovers a description of the rise and fall of powers. These paradigms therefore deserve a more measured reflection in light of the latest developments on the global strategic chessboard.
Scenes of déjà vu are glaringly obvious. There is nothing sensational; however, the reflection is this time trapped by ready-made readings. I will not fall into the trap of redundancy.
So, I take as a starting point the reference made by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the Thucydides’ Trap during the visit of American President Donald Trump to Beijing.
The deliberate or random sparring between the Chinese and American heads of state reminds me of two strategists who marked their time: one Indian and the other Russian. And it is not an aberration to stress that India and Russia are among the actors participating in changes that the international system is undergoing.
On the one hand, Kautilya (3450BC-283BC) deserves some credit. He is compared for the purpose of this article to Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Bismark in terms of political realism and the art of smart compromise. Kautilya lays out his strategic thinking in his book Asthrashâstra, where he presents, among other things, what he deemed sound at the service of the Emperor Chandragupta.
On the other hand, there is the Russian Alexander Svetchine. He became famous for associating military strategy with the art of politics. The operational art is a concept he formulated in his work “Strategy,” published in 1927.
The combination of the art of defense and attack to achieve total war was his hallmark as an unparalleled strategist. This did not spare him, and he was executed in 1938 as part of the policy of neutralization Joseph Stalin implemented.
In Memoirs of a King (1993), Éric Laurent asks King Hassan II what profession he would have liked to pursue if he were not a king, and he replied that he would have liked to be a historian. The Moroccan monarch’s fascination with history is well-known. It might have led him to admire Machiavelli, from whom he would have drawn inspiration for making some strategic decisions.
He would have also drawn inspiration from Sun Tzu, particularly in his strategy of circumvention, to outline the main lines of the organization of the Green March.
History is full of lessons, and it is no surprise that François Mitterrand liked to repeat the maxim “Let time take its course,” whose origin would trace back to Miguel de Cervantes in Don Quixote, “Dar tiempo al tiempo.”
History and Time Management
Mitterrand would also have had plenty of time to digest Alain Peyrefitte’s premonition, “Quand la Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera” (1971), an essay published during the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) orchestrated by Mao Zedong. And China woke up. Peyrefitte dedicated an essay to it with the same title in 1996.
History and nothing but history, then! I cannot forget in this column an academician whom I greatly appreciate. James N. Rosenau, whose contribution to systemic studies and foreign policy is immense. In his book “Distant Proximities” (2003), he expresses his astonishment at the coexistence of parallel processes of integration and disintegration in a transitioning international system.
Rosenau could have changed his optimistic perception of international relations in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, but he did not fall into the trap of pessimism. To him, the gap of divergences is transformed into an opportunity to narrow the gap between the major international players, be they state or non-state actors.
Now, how to draw inspiration from all these academics and military strategists to explain the strategic and diplomatic chessboards in a state of turmoil? Once again, history is the answer. But also, the projection on the future of the international system must emerge from the uncertainties exacerbated by a transition that can no longer last indefinitely.
Therefore, the hasty analyzes that fill television studios and populate podcasts in Western Europe and the Middle East about the imminent erosion of great powers must be put into perspective. This is also true for the overestimation of the role of the BRICS, which, some stress, would emerge strengthened from the current geopolitical situation.
The same goes for certain tailor-made paradigms such as the “de-Westernization” or “de-Orientalization” of the Middle East. The underlying idea of these analyzes would be the defeat of the United States and the victory of Iran.
To strengthen their argument, they conclude that Russia has also lost the war against Ukraine. They do not realize that this categorical statement weakens their argument about the future influence of the BRICS, in which Russia plays a leading role.
The same goes for certain tailor-made paradigms such as the de-Westernization or de-Orientalization of the Middle East. The underlying idea of these analyzes would be the defeat of the United States and the victory of Iran.
It looks like these promoters were not lamenting the new status of Western allies. The latter would feel like the quintessential orphans of the Cold War. They refuse to admit that history—and nothing but history—would allow serious analysts to avoid subscribing to haste.
The imagined (and desired by sore losers) strategic break has not yet occurred. Thucydides, Tzu, Janus, Kutylia, and Gulliver are closely monitoring the situation, and it is hoped that their legacy will motivate major decision-makers to maintain a low profile in order to protect humanity from total anarchy and chaos.
