Over the past three years, the High Security Council in Algeria has held an unprecedented number of meetings that have been deemed strategically important. The latest one took place recently. At the end of the meeting, the Council announced the creation of a free trade zone between Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya, Chad and Tunisia. Following this announcement, the President of Mauritania was invited to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Algeria-Mauritania free trade zone. Should this announcement have surprised observers and political columnists? Not at all.
Everyone is accustomed to announcements of this kind, which testify to the panic that has become a ritual in the behavior of Algerian leaders. They can only surf in denial, which becomes a political label to buy time. Why do they persist in their ritual to gain time? Observers familiar with the Algerian political chessboard have no idea. Therefore, one could assume that the idea that the political chessboard in Algeria is difficult to decipher is no longer valid.
For many experts, Algeria has become predictable and easy to read. The assessment of its domestic turmoil, as well as its race against time to restore its foreign policy image, is now crystal clear. For at least three decades, Algeria has evolved with relative ease on the strategic and diplomatic chessboard. It wisely used the “revolutionary struggle for independence” as an ideology, and no one questioned its accuracy at the time. Thanks to the petrodollars the country enjoyed, people refrained from digging deep to find hidden histories about who was really resistant and who wasn’t, and who deserved the right to rise to power.
Suffice it to say that Algeria is going through a difficult period at the domestic political level and at the diplomatic level in a subregion in which it has at times been a powerful major actor. Today, disoriented as they may be, Algerian policy makers lack the psychological superiority they once had over other regional policymakers. At least, that was the impression for thirty years before the Algerian narrative began to be debunked.
Algerian leaders have worked hard to make their country’s image dazzling, even if it has led them to violate human rights for fear that freedom of expression might undermine their internal cohesion. The panic, if not paranoia, of Algerian decision-makers can be seen in a number of behaviors and decisions, both internal and external. Without going any further, we can cite a few examples that confirm this thesis, starting with the most recent.
A Free Trade Area is not a Flea Market
First, by announcing the creation of a free trade area between Algeria and the Sahel countries, Algerian leaders have demonstrated a naive and irrational interpretation of international economic relations. A free trade area is neither a flea market nor a walk in the woods of foreign trade.
What makes us think so? Algeria is a country that: 1) is struggling to join the World Trade Organization, with no good news on the horizon; 2) has a rollercoaster relationship with the European Union because it has not fulfilled its commitments to one of its members, Spain; 3) has seen its candidacy to join the BRICS rejected (precisely because it has a poorly diversified economy); 4) does not export much except hydrocarbons; and 5) imports almost everything, etc.
Second, by targeting countries that would be eligible for the free trade area, Algerian policymakers have made a political move that obscures their own initiators. With the exception of Mauritania (at least in theory), not all of these countries are in a state of sanctity with Algeria. And even Mauritania may change its perception of the meaning of good neighborliness after the death of the main bodyguard of the Mauritanian president during his visit to Tinduf in Algeria a few days ago.
Indeed, the neighboring countries of sub-Saharan Africa have a grudge against Algeria, which perceives them as second-class state actors, if not as a rear base in its struggle for leadership with its other African neighbors. Libya is no longer comfortable with Algeria’s interference in its internal affairs by siding with one faction against the others. The border dispute is back in the spotlight. Tunisia is considered by much of the Algerian political elite to be an Algerian department. The Tunisian people do not like this contemptuous attitude and description.
Third, by creating an international cooperation agency with a budget of $1 billion to promote cooperation with African countries in 2020, Algerian leaders sought to compete with the Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation, which had been in existence for almost fifty years. The countries targeted were those that had long been Algeria’s allies in its geopolitical rivalry with Morocco. The aim was to slow down the momentum of the withdrawal of recognition of the Polisario or to stop the calls for the expulsion of the pseudo-Sadr from the African Union.
Fourth, by attempting to create a Maghreb axis against Morocco, Algerian decision-makers are repeating the same scenario they have been working on since the 1980s. This began with the adherence to the Algerian thesis of marginal political movements or civil society actors in Tunisia and Mauritania (some of whose actors are subordinate to the Polisario, having acquired Mauritanian nationality) and in Libya. In this regard, it is worth recalling Rached Ghannouchi’s 2021 call for a Maghreb without Morocco and Mauritania. It is also worth mentioning that talk shows with some Mauritanian personalities have waged a virtual war against Morocco.
Fifth, by rehearsing the same narrative on the Sahara issue and using sporting and cultural events to stigmatize Morocco, Algerian decision-makers are proving that they lack arguments.
Sixth, by calling on former veterans of Algerian diplomacy to help restore the image of a country that has lost everything, Algerian leaders couldn’t help but sink into their own quagmire. These veterans were considered to be incomparable characters, while everyone knew that it was the petrodollars that helped them get the job done. One by one, they threw in the towel, realizing that the supposed golden age of Algerian diplomacy was just wishful thinking.
Seventh, by trying to keep political and strategic conditionality alive in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, Algerian policymakers wasted their time while Africans recovered from their alleged historical amnesia to be reborn in international politics.
Eighth, by resorting to an endless exploitation of history (la rente mémorielle) and the sacralization of a revolution whose real actors were either neutralized or murdered after 1962, the Algerian decision-makers brought about the bankruptcy of a system. They proved incapable of adapting to changes in the international political and diplomatic arena. For the record, 1962 coincided with the creation of the Algerian state following an arranged referendum on self-determination (independence in the continuity of conditional cooptation with France).
Ninth, by resorting to proxy, if not straw, actors in the geostrategic equations involving France and the former Soviet Union, Algerian decision-makers failed to resolve the dilemma of the state to be built and the nation to be invented.
The Generational Transition: A Virtual Answer in an Empty Political Shell
Tenth, by exaggerating the culture of bluffing, Algerian leaders are running a business that is on the verge of bankrupting the entire system.
Eleventh, by glorifying the scorched earth policy and the credo “After me, the flood,” Algerian leaders are not solving the equation of the impotence of a political system whose actors are running around in circles, dancing with the devil.
Faced with these observations, Algerian leaders, consciously or intuitively, are beginning to send messages to international opinion. The most recent message is that of the need for a “generational transition”. The use of the term “transition” is an echo of the failure of all maneuvers aimed at maintaining the political system in its current form.
In this regard, some observers share the view that various decision-making circles within the Algerian government no longer know which saint to worship. The disappearance of Khaled Nezzar, which was greeted with relief by most of his accomplices during the black decade (1991-2002), does not seem to have calmed the situation, either internally or internationally.
Therefore, it would be an incorrect assessment to say that the refrain of generational change could be a prelude to the scenario of postponing the presidential elections scheduled for December 2024. Would President Abdelmajid Tebboune no longer be the ideal choice of the dominant fringe within the military institution? Or would all this charade be an argument to keep him in power as long as there is no political visibility on the horizon?
Whatever the reading of the internal political chessboard, one thing is certain: Algerian leaders are floundering. President Tebboune himself is swimming in total confusion. He is still clinging to the hope of an official visit to France before the hypothetical date of the presidential elections.
It is now a matter of record that the candidates in the presidential elections held since the death of Houari Boumediene had to have the green light (if not the blessing) of the French authorities. A number of Algerian and French political and diplomatic figures have described in detail how negotiations between the Algerian military institution and French political and security decision-makers were difficult in order to agree on the appropriate candidate to become president.
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However, the French green light has become suspect since President Tebboune’s visit, scheduled for 2023, was postponed. But especially since the start of signals in France that reflect the desire of French decision-makers to gradually turn the page on the misunderstandings with Morocco. While these signals are being cautiously observed by certain decision-makers in Morocco, since the ambiguity of the French position on the Moroccan Sahara is still present, they are nevertheless a Kafkaesque drama for Algerian decision-makers. The recent visit of the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs did not clarify the French position, although a step forward is expected in the near future.
Indeed, Paris remains one of the few member countries of the European Union to play for time, asking Morocco to understand that it cannot abruptly take a clear position in its favor without provoking a hecatomb in Algeria that could go so far as to push Algerian decision-makers into a folly with dangerous military, security and diplomatic consequences, jeopardizing regional and international stability and security.
While some French politicians admit that betting everything on Algeria to the detriment of Morocco was a naive and unfortunate strategic mistake, they nevertheless believe that Algeria remains their only foothold in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan regions after being expelled from most of their former colonies in Africa.
Algeria’s desperate decision-makers are moving from the offensive diplomacy that has long been their spearhead to a reactionary diplomacy that makes neutral observers smile. This is evidenced by the jerky recent tours of the head of Algerian diplomacy in some Arab and African countries. In the Arab countries, the Algerian diplomat pleaded the cause of the victim of his country’s conflict with Morocco and the United Arab Emirates. With African countries, he used the carrot and stick policy. He forgot that times have changed, to use Bob Dylan’s line in his epic song from the 1960s.
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In fact, the aim was to convince the Maghreb countries to support the candidacy of the pseudo-Sadr for the presidency of the African Union, within the framework of the regional rotation that is applied in this area. The move was a complete failure. Algeria may now be convinced that its days of using and controlling the African Union are over. It has lost the war against Morocco over the Sahara and it will lose its fight to keep alive a proxy entity that is already in a situation of clinical death.
Algeria also wants to leave its mark on the upcoming election of a new chairman of the African Union Commission. Indeed, the mandate of Moussa Faki Mahamat is about to expire. A Maghreb candidate would have a good chance of winning. However, this may not be the case, as the scenario of the rotating chairmanship of the African Union described above is likely to change.
Algeria, which is at odds with most of its Maghreb neighbors, is said to be pushing for the candidacy of a Tunisian, as it did for the presidency of the African Union, where it is said to have convinced President Kais Said to try his luck at the last minute. It is in this context that the latter’s planned visit to Mauritania can be seen – some thought that he would plead for the Algerian case. Diplomatic absurdity and geopolitical short-sightedness could go hand in hand and end up in a quagmire.
Moreover, some observers, including Algerians, have recently spoken of the militarization of Algerian diplomacy. The army, as a component of the High Security Council, can participate in foreign policy decision-making, but, the same observers argue, it cannot engage in diplomacy. Conversely, the Chief of Staff of the People’s National Army seems to interfere more in foreign affairs than the Head of State or the Foreign Minister, especially in matters concerning Morocco, which he calls ”the eternal enemy.”
However, it is certainly impossible to build a state, win the support of the people and be part of the international system by inventing fictitious enemies and sanctifying the conspiracy theory at will.
The ideological narrative, as a reference to existence, is consumed by a lack of objective and unproductive rational choices. In this regard, the same software of otherness and hatred has been used, with a few exceptions, against Morocco and certain African and Arab countries, both by the supporters of the system and by those who claim to be in opposition.
At the top of the list of these actors are some who are nostalgic for Boumedienism and the National Liberation Front. They are reminiscent of the behavior of the proponents of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism in many African and Arab countries. These actors seem to ignore the new geopolitical issues that need to be addressed with a fair and unbiased assessment.
It goes without saying that Algerian decision-makers have only one obsession: Morocco. Working hard to bring this country to its knees, they are losing their compass. In the process, they are drawing from their amnesia the sources of their wanderings. They forget that their country was a strategic dependency, not to say a French overseas department, as some historians call it.
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The creation of an artificial conflict to prevent Morocco from recovering its southern provinces ended up backfiring on Algeria. The demarcation of its borders with neighboring countries, invented by France, has been controversial for decades and is even more so today.
The record of Algerian diplomacy is not the most brilliant. A series of failures: 1) no breakthrough within the Non-Aligned Movement in the last eight years; 2) no consensus on its membership in the BRICS; 3) no convincing results in its tug-of-war with Spain and France; 4) no dividends despite its campaign of persuasion and deterrence aimed at the Arab countries of the Gulf to harm Morocco; 5) a Scottish shower following the declaration by the new head of French diplomacy on France’s willingness to seriously normalize its relations with Morocco, taking into account the existential nature of the Sahara issue; normalization without integration of this dimension would be meaningless and would be rejected by Morocco; 6) a cry of panic following the rise of voices in the United Kingdom demanding that this country clearly support the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco to resolve the Sahara conflict-or even recognize Morocco’s sovereignty like the United States.
A campaign against this appeal has been launched by Algerian lobbying firms in the British Parliament. It is likely to fizzle out, as strategically important projects between Morocco and the United Kingdom are on the agenda. These projects are moving towards a deeper understanding of the conditional perception of cooperation that Morocco intends to have with its partners.
Naturally, Algeria is restless and calls on the few relays it has left in Africa: South Africa, to name the most important one. This move is doomed to failure, except for a cacophony that is beginning to get on the nerves of its African interlocutors.
The most recent action is the lobbying for a visit of the Polisario leader to the Republic of Ireland, where he was received by the head of state of that country. This is not the first time this has happened. Such a move caused a diplomatic rift between Rabat and Dublin, which was later healed by the opening of an Irish embassy in Rabat in 2021. Despite the panic of some observers in Morocco, this visit is of no consequence.
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The Irish embassy in Rabat issued a statement saying that the Republic of Ireland does not recognize the pseudo-Sadr. If this visit remains inappropriate, regardless of the capacity with which the Polisario leader was received, some observers believe that certain political spheres in Ireland want to distance themselves from the United Kingdom, as they did on the occasion of Brexit.
This is not a convincing argument, but it does not matter because the Sahara issue is moving towards its solution in the terms that Morocco has been repeating for a long time: autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.
To sum up, here are a few observations for the sake of brevity. First, the stubbornness that Algeria is showing in the form of so-called “economic diplomacy” to counter Morocco’s already solid foothold in Africa is a waste of time and energy, as Morocco has been economically present in many African countries for more than thirty years. Morocco bases its economic policy in Africa on the principles of co-development, win-win and gradual integration.
Second, the creation of free trade areas is a long-term process. If it were easy, strong African economies could have signed agreements with the United States, as Morocco has done.
Third, the financial windfall from the sale of hydrocarbons is absolutely worthless without a coherent social project that cements the people and their leadership.
Fourth, Algerian leaders should get rid of their fixation on the alleged Moroccan threat and cure their political myopia in order to face multiple challenges that continue to grow.
Fifth, Algerian leaders should stop the increasingly blatant intervention of the military institution in foreign policy.
Sixth, the Moroccan Sahara is no longer an issue for Morocco. It is now a Franco-French and Franco-Algerian affair.
Seventh, Algerian policymakers must come to the conclusion that because Algeria is in conflict with almost all of its neighbors, there is a problem of perception and behavior that they must sort out in order to find a solution.
Eighth, building a foreign policy on the basis of positions held or adopted by rivals for the sake of regional leadership is one thing; trying to impose one’s perception of geopolitics on the basis of an outdated perception is another.
Ninth, a healthy political culture that relies on its roots and not on the practice of cultural and civilizational hold-ups is one of the potential keys to resolving the Algerian identity complex.
By way of anecdote, it should be recalled that the battle on social networks about the origin of the zellij between Moroccans and Algerians had its epilogue a few days ago: Morocco offered a brand new fountain to the headquarters of the African Union on the occasion of the 44th session of the Executive Council and the 37th Summit of the African Union. The whole of Africa now knows that Zellij is Moroccan. And it’s not just the zellij… A stroll through the various regions of the Maghreb can be a pleasant surprise to conclude the debate on Moroccan heritage.
And there is no need to go further back in the history of the region to taste the delights of the various Moroccan dynasties whose power encompassed parts of what is now the Maghreb. But Morocco has a forward-looking vision. It uses the past only to set the record straight. Sure, Morocco is interested in time management, but it does so in an intelligent and constructive way.
