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Marrakech – In the gilded corridors of an Oslo peace forum on Thursday, the architecture of the Western Sahara endgame acquired another load-bearing wall.
Massad Boulos, Senior Advisor to President Donald Trump for Arab and African Affairs, sat down with UN Personal Envoy Staffan de Mistura for what amounted to a strategic synchronization session – a deliberate, choreographed convergence of American muscle and multilateral machinery aimed squarely at translating Security Council Resolution 2797 from parchment into political reality.
“We discussed strategies to further the implementation of UNSCR 2797, specifically ways to assist the parties in achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution,” Boulos declared on X. “The Western Sahara dispute has dragged on for more than 50 years and, as UNSCR 2797 underscored, the parties should urgently realize a resolution.”
Good meeting with UN PESG Staffan de Mistura. We discussed strategies to further the implementation of UNSCR 2797, specifically ways to assist the parties in achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution. The Western Sahara dispute has dragged on for more… pic.twitter.com/z0hrwksPqZ
— U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs (@US_SrAdvisorAF) June 11, 2026
The terminology is precision-tooled, the message is irreversible, and the undertone is impossible to misread. There is no ambiguity left in Washington’s posture – no diplomatic fog, no rhetorical escape hatches. Resolution 2797 enthroned Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the singular viable framework for settlement. Boulos’s invocation of it is not courtesy; it is policy enforcement.
The Oslo encounter arrived barely seventy-two hours after de Mistura wrapped up a two-day stopover in Tindouf – Algeria’s open-air warehouse for a separatist militia that has hemorrhaged credibility, territorial relevance, and international goodwill in roughly equal measure.
What transpired in those camps was less a diplomatic exchange than a ritualistic recitation of expired grievances. The Polisario’s pseudo-foreign minister, Mohamed Yeslem Beissat, trotted out the fossilized lexicon of “inalienable rights” and “self-determination” as if the geopolitical calendar had frozen somewhere around 1978.
Brahim Ghali, the militia’s aging figurehead, granted de Mistura a conspicuously truncated audience – a terse, almost perfunctory encounter stripped of the theatrical bombast that once characterized his performances before UN envoys. The communiqué that followed read like a bureaucratic afterthought: flat, formulaic, drained of the rhetorical venom Ghali had unleashed in September 2025 when he still believed the independence mirage retained oxygen.
It does not. And the Polisario’s own apparatus knows it.
The most devastating confession came not from Tindouf this week but from the separatist leadership’s own lips weeks earlier, when Beissat – addressing El País and other Spanish-language journalists in Auserd camp – delivered the admission that effectively disemboweled the separatist cause from within.
“We cannot make independence the only option,” he conceded, adding that autonomy “as an option presented to the Sahrawi people can be discussed and accepted.” Half a century of exile, proxy warfare, Algerian bankrolling, and manufactured victimhood – and their chief negotiator publicly folds the cardinal doctrine with the weary resignation of a man rearranging furniture on a vessel already taking water.
This is the context in which Boulos and de Mistura calibrated their next moves in Oslo. The envoy, who in April informed the Security Council behind closed doors that the Polisario must “make the historic concessions necessary to reach an acceptable solution,” has irreversibly pivoted. The man once suspected of harboring partition fantasies now operates strictly within the 2797 corridor – Morocco’s autonomy framework as both floor and ceiling.
Meanwhile, the Es-Smara attack of May 5 – a reckless, strategically suicidal provocation by the Polisario – detonated whatever residual sympathy the militia still commanded. Washington condemned it within forty-eight hours.
Paris, London, Madrid, and a constellation of Arab capitals followed. The separatists earned not leverage but universal opprobrium, confirming what every serious observer already understood: armed escalation is not a strategy for the Polisario – it is an accelerant toward its own irrelevance.
Between Oslo and Tindouf, between American resolve and separatist paralysis, the Western Sahara file is no longer a negotiation. It is a managed conclusion – and the only remaining question is whether Algiers will permit its proxy the dignity of walking to the table or insist on dragging it there.
Read also: The Sahara Dispute: The Beginning of the End
