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The Polisario has just shot itself in the foot. That is perhaps the most fitting expression one could use to describe the reckless attack the separatist group carried out this week against the Moroccan city of Smara. It appears that the separatist front and its Algerian patron have failed to draw any lessons from the crushing failure they suffered in the autumn of 2020, when they attempted to alter the status quo in the Guerguerat area, in the far south of the Moroccan Sahara. In Guerguerat, armed elements of the separatist group sought to regain global sympathy to their cause by reviving interest in the Western Sahara story. Blocking the passage of Moroccan trucks toward Mauritania and from there to Sub-Saharan African countries, the group hoped for a disproportionately forceful Moroccan response that they would then be able to sell the world as proof of Moroccan oppression and repression.
Meanwhile, and from a purely operational standpoint, one of the declared objectives of that move was to demonstrate Polisario’s ability to exercise effective field control over that crossing and prevent Morocco from transforming it into a major continental gateway toward Sub-Saharan Africa. However, these strategic and operational calculations by both Algeria and the Polisario quickly collapsed. Morocco succeeded — with an ease that surprised many observers — in expelling Polisario elements from the area and secured the support of the overwhelming majority of UN member states for the operation it undertook to guarantee the uninterrupted passage of commercial trucks.
Everyone knows what followed afterward. Just a month after this incident, Polisario was dealt a historic blow with the American recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara. This was swiftly followed by Spain’s explicit endorsement of the autonomy plan, then France’s recognition of the Moroccan character of the Sahara. This period of doom and gloom for Polisario’s statehood delusions culminated last October with the adoption of Resolution 2797. As I have argued elsewhere, this latest UN Security Council resolution has all but definitively and irreversibly settled the legal debate over the conflict by consecrating the Moroccan autonomy plan as the sole basis for reaching a final settlement to this artificial dispute.
MINURSO won’t save brain-dead Polisario separatism
The sweeping transformations the Sahara dispute has registered in recent years, coupled by the current US administration’s firm resolve to relieve the United Nations of long-standing missions that have produced no tangible results, have brought the question of MINURSO’s fate to the forefront of debate. Indeed, discussions have intensified in recent weeks within the Security Council around the prospect of altering — or even abolishing — the mission’s mandate and rebranding it entirely, on the grounds that prevailing political realities and legal developments surrounding the file no longer warrant its continuation in its present form.
This would constitute a major blow to Algeria, which sees the continuation of the mission in its current structure — even if it can no longer alter the new legal reality — as at least providing it with room to maneuver towards maintaining its misleading narrative about the continued relevance of the already buried self-determination referendum thesis. As such, given that MINURSO’s principal mission since the end of 2003 has essentially been limited to monitoring the ceasefire, all indications suggest that Algeria instructed its proxy, the Polisario, to carry out a rocket attack against the city of Smara. That the attack is militarily insignificant is both the point and beside the point.
Because the goal is not to deal Morocco an operational blow. Instead, in their desperation to salvage some modicum of relevance for Polisario’s dying statehood dreams, what matters for Algeria and the Polisario leadership is to still portray Morocco’s southern provinces as a zone of an unsettled war between Morocco and Polisario separatists. The goal, simply put, is to show this lame but reprehensible attack as proof that MINURSO cannot be dismantled or renamed with tensions still prevailing in the region.
Yet in making this move, the Polisario has effectively committed political suicide while handing Morocco a golden opportunity. Rabat has long worked to rally its Arab, African, Asian, and American allies to secure the designation of the Polisario Front as a terrorist organization threatening international peace and security.
Recent signs suggest this strategy is already bearing fruit. Two bills have already been introduced in the US Congress seeking to designate the Polisario as a terrorist organization. Even if mustering the majority required to pass such legislation may take time, the mere introduction of these bills constitutes an ominous development — one with dangerous implications for both the Polisario and Algeria.
Yet rather than heeding this message and refraining from any action that could be interpreted as contradicting the latest Security Council resolution — or as a threat to international peace and security — Algeria and the Polisario have chosen to double down. In embarking on this reckless escalation, they apparently believe it would convince Security Council members to preserve MINURSO and its current mandate and structure.
Smara helps make the case for expediting Polisario’s terrorist designation case
So far, Belgium, France, the UK, the UAE, and the Czech Republic have all energetically condemned the separatist front’s attack and described Morocco’s autonomy plan as the only viable route to peace and prosperity in the Western Sahara region. “Escalation must stop in line with UNSC Res. 2797 (2025), taking Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the basis for a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution consistent with the UN Charter,” the Czech embassy in Rabat said in a statement on Friday. London echoed that sentiment in a statement, stressing: “The UK condemns Polisario attacks of 5 May, which risk undermining efforts towards peace. We support UN-US efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, in line with UNSCR 2797. We encourage all parties to engage in the spirit of compromise to achieve a lasting resolution.”
The Emirati statement went even further, denouncing the attack as a criminal conduct that bore the hallmarks “forms of violence, extremism, and terrorism that seek to undermine security and stability.” Perhaps more critically, the Gulf country concluded by renewing its “steadfast position of solidarity with and full support for the Kingdom of Morocco, its legitimate sovereignty rights in the Moroccan Sahara, and everything that ensures the security, stability, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom — contributing to the reinforcement of peace, stability, and sustainable prosperity in the region.
With such an outpouring of international support, especially from countries with a sizable weight in international arbitration, there is little doubt that Morocco will seize this windfall and exploit it to the fullest. Moreover, the separatist group’s attack on Smara comes at a particularly ill-chosen moment. The United States is currently serving as the principal — albeit unofficial — sponsor of negotiations aimed at implementing Resolution 2797, which clearly and unequivocally defines the Moroccan autonomy proposal as both the framework and the intended endpoint of those talks. In that sense, the Polisario’s reckless gambit will only hand Morocco additional leverage to intensify pressure on both the separatist and its Algerian handler, buying Rabat considerable time to compel them into compliance with international legitimacy.
And so, Morocco need not wait for Congress to pass legislation designating the Polisario as a terrorist organization. It now possesses compelling arguments to persuade the US administration directly — whether the White House, the State Department, or the Treasury — to take executive measures to formally designate the separatist front as a terrorist entity.
Under US law, various branches of the American administration may classify organizations or entities as terrorist groups without necessarily requiring congressional legislation. Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State may designate a foreign group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization without Congress adopting a specific law. Likewise, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control may designate individuals or entities as terrorist actors pursuant to Executive Order 13224. In addition, US law also grants the American president the authority to issue an executive order designating any organization as a terrorist organization.
Given the advanced state of Moroccan-American relations and Washington’s strong desire to bring this file to a close in line with Resolution 2797, the prospect of the State Department, the Treasury, or even President Trump himself designating the Polisario as a terrorist organization has never been more plausible.
In this light, the decision by the United States Permanent Mission to the United Nations to publish a post on X condemning the Smara attack is a telling signal. In it, Washington stressed that the attack runs counter to both the spirit of the current political process and the letter of Resolution 2797, and reaffirmed that the autonomy plan remains the sole basis for a final settlement. This is a clear indication that the US administration has no intention of standing idle — and is, in fact, poised to intensify pressure on the Polisario and Algeria to bring them into full compliance with Resolution 2797.
Brandishing the authorities vested in the President, the Secretary of State, and the Treasury Department to designate the Polisario as a terrorist organization may well become one of the US administration’s principal tools in pursuing this objective.
The Polisario’s targeting of Smara also lays bare one of the defining pathologies of Algerian foreign policy over the past decade: a persistent misreading of the profound geopolitical transformations that have reshaped North Africa, and a stubborn tendency to analyze regional and international developments through the same outdated lens Algeria relied upon from the early 1970s through the first decade of this century.
Morocco, meanwhile, has been a direct beneficiary of this Algerian confusion and strategic disorientation — and has known how to exploit it. At a time when Moroccan diplomacy has demonstrated remarkable skill, sophistication, and strategic acumen, Rabat has gained considerable ground in accelerating the resolution of this conflict. One might argue that had former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika remained in power, Algeria would not have so readily handed Morocco the string of political gifts that Rabat has proven so adept at exploiting. In this sense, the separatist front’s decision to strike Smara at such a delicate juncture may be the starkest illustration yet of the shallowness, despondency, and strategic bankruptcy into which Algeria has descended.
Samir Bennis is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. You can follow him on Twitter @SamirBennis.
