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Rabat – More than six decades after the Indus Waters Treaty became one of the world’s most successful water-sharing agreements, it has once again become the center of growing tensions between India and Pakistan.
The two neighbors are deeply divided over the future of the treaty, with India arguing that changing security conditions justify its current position, while Pakistan insists that the agreement remains legally binding and cannot be suspended unilaterally.
History of the treaty
Signed in 1960 with the World Bank acting as a facilitator, the treaty divided the waters of the Indus River system between the two countries. India received control over the eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, while Pakistan was granted rights over the western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab.
Despite several wars and decades of political tensions, the treaty continued to function and was often hailed as an example of successful international water cooperation.
The latest dispute intensified after India placed the treaty “in abeyance” following the April 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan-based militants. Pakistan denied any involvement, but India argued that continued cross-border terrorism had fundamentally changed the circumstances under which the treaty was signed.
Indian officials and experts say the issue is not simply about water but about whether a treaty based on “goodwill and friendship” can continue to operate when relations have deteriorated.
India’s case
Former Indian Indus Commissioner Kushvinder Vohra also rejects claims that India’s actions are responsible for Pakistan’s water challenges. Instead, he argues that Pakistan’s own water management problems are the primary cause of its shortages.
“The real problem related to Pakistan’s so-called water scarcity lies in the mismanagement of the water it receives,” Vohra writes, adding that blaming India distracts attention from issues such as inadequate storage, inefficient irrigation systems, groundwater depletion, and poor governance. He cites studies suggesting Pakistan receives roughly the same, or even more, water from the western rivers than was originally estimated when the treaty was signed.
Former chairman of India’s Central Water Commission Atul Jain makes a similar argument. He says recent Pakistani claims of an immediate water crisis do not match hydrological data showing above-average river flows during parts of 2025. According to Jain, significant amounts of water continued flowing into the Arabian Sea because Pakistan lacked sufficient storage and distribution infrastructure.
“The biggest challenge facing the basin is not speculative claims of upstream deprivation, but unresolved structural problems,” Jain writes, pointing to limited storage capacity, sedimentation, inefficient water use, and governance issues within Pakistan.
Another opinion article by Jain argues that India has not fully used the share of water allocated to it under the treaty. Referring to the slogan “Haq Ka Pani,” or “our rightful water,” he says India is now seeking to make greater use of the water legally available to it for irrigation, hydropower, and development.
“Haq ka pani is about rightful utilization, not denial,” Jain writes. “India is asserting that every drop of the Indus system will now be used productively.”
Pakistan responds
Pakistan, however, strongly rejects India’s interpretation of both the treaty and international law.
Pakistani legal expert and former federal law minister Ahmer Bilal Soofi disputes India’s legal interpretation. Writing in Dawn, Soofi argues that the Indus Waters Treaty contains no provision allowing either country to suspend it unilaterally. He contends that India’s decision to place the treaty “in abeyance” violates international treaty law and maintains that disputes should instead be addressed through the treaty’s existing dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Pakistani officials argue that the Indus Waters Treaty contains no provision allowing either country to suspend it unilaterally. Islamabad maintains that the agreement remains legally binding regardless of political or military tensions and says disputes must continue to be resolved through the treaty’s established mechanisms.
Speaking at an international seminar in Islamabad this week, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar accused India India of attempting to “weaponize water.” He argued that water should never be used as a political tool and described India’s suspension of the treaty as illegal. Pakistani officials also repeated their position that any attempt to reduce agreed water flows threatens the country’s agriculture and long-term water security.
Pakistan also disputes India’s argument that the country’s internal water management is the main source of its problems. While acknowledging the need for infrastructure improvements and better water governance, Pakistani officials say that predictable river flows under the treaty remain essential for millions of farmers who depend on the Indus basin. They warn that uncertainty over water sharing could have serious economic and humanitarian consequences.
Beyond the political disagreement, the two countries also interpret the treaty’s legal framework very differently.
India argues that the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism was designed to encourage cooperation before involving outside institutions. Disagreements should first be handled by the Permanent Indus Commission, followed by a neutral expert if necessary, before any arbitration process begins. Bypassing these steps undermines the treaty’s original intent and supports India’s position that the agreement has not always been implemented as intended.
Pakistan strongly disagrees. Islamabad maintains that the treaty already provides clear legal procedures for settling disputes, including the use of neutral experts and international arbitration when necessary. Pakistani officials argue that these mechanisms were deliberately included to ensure that disagreements could be resolved peacefully, even during periods of political hostility. They also contend that no provision in the treaty allows either side to suspend its obligations unilaterally.
This disagreement has become increasingly important because several Indian hydropower projects on the western rivers, including the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams, have been challenged by Pakistan over the years.
Indian experts argue that those projects comply with the treaty’s technical requirements. Atul Jain notes that the Baglihar project underwent international review in 2007, when a neutral expert largely upheld its design while recommending a few technical modifications. He argues that temporary fluctuations in river flows are a normal consequence of reservoir maintenance, sediment flushing, and seasonal snowmelt rather than evidence of deliberate attempts to restrict water flowing into Pakistan.
Pakistan, however, has consistently expressed concern that upstream infrastructure could eventually give India greater control over the timing of water releases. Although India does not have the right under the treaty to divert the western rivers for large-scale irrigation, Pakistani officials argue that additional dams and operational changes could still affect downstream agriculture during critical planting seasons. For a country where the Indus River system supplies the overwhelming majority of irrigation water, even temporary disruptions are viewed as a serious national security issue.
Many Pakistani analysts also reject India’s claim that Pakistan’s water challenges are primarily the result of domestic mismanagement. While acknowledging problems such as outdated irrigation systems, groundwater depletion, and insufficient storage, they argue that improving water governance and protecting treaty guarantees are not mutually exclusive. In their view, Pakistan can and should modernize its water sector while continuing to insist that India fully comply with its international obligations.
Shared challenges
Independent experts note that both countries face growing pressures that did not exist when the treaty was signed in 1960. Population growth, climate change, melting Himalayan glaciers, changing rainfall patterns, and increasing demand for electricity and irrigation have all placed additional stress on the Indus basin. These factors have fueled calls, particularly from India, for updating parts of the treaty to reflect today’s realities. Pakistan, however, fears that reopening the agreement could weaken the protections it currently enjoys over the western rivers.
Despite their sharply different positions, there are also areas where experts from both countries broadly agree. Both recognize that climate change is making water management more difficult. Both acknowledge that aging infrastructure requires significant investment. Both face increasing pressure to improve irrigation efficiency, conserve groundwater, and prepare for more frequent droughts and floods.
For now, however, those shared challenges remain overshadowed by political tensions.
India maintains that it is exercising its sovereign rights and seeking to make better use of water allocated to it under the treaty while responding to what it views as an altered security environment. Pakistan insists that the treaty remains legally binding and warns that weakening one of the world’s longest-standing water-sharing agreements could create dangerous uncertainty for millions of people who depend on the Indus basin.
As both governments continue defending their interpretations of the treaty, the future of one of the world’s most successful examples of transboundary water cooperation remains uncertain. Whether the dispute is ultimately resolved through negotiations, legal proceedings, or diplomatic engagement, the outcome will shape not only relations between India and Pakistan but also the long-term management of one of South Asia’s most vital river systems.
