The Double Encirclement of Morocco on the Diplomatic Frontline

Ever since King Mohammed VI’s speech in 2016 in Riyadh, the position of Morocco has been evolving, and its diplomatic relations are on the move, with both lines of alliance and fracture. The combination of Morocco’s new geopolitical ambitions in addition to the internal political shifts occurring in its neighboring countries created a sort of hostility in its immediate, and even secondary environment. Abdallah Laroui used to say that Morocco is an island; that is the case now more than ever.

What sets the country apart from its neighbors is its long-lasting monarchy, namely that its ruling monarchy breeds resilience and constancy across centuries whereas in neighboring countries, leaders and policies have changed radically over the past few years. This creates a divide in the diplomatic landscape of the region.

The first line of neighbors

In Spain, the arrival of Pedro Sanchez in 2018 after the Mariano Rajoy government’s seven years in power allowed for a spectacular rapprochement between Madrid and Rabat on the heels of, admittedly, a nearly complete freezing of relations. The letter the Spanish Prime Minister sent King Mohammed VI in March 2022 has considerably strengthened ties between Madrid and Rabat.. However, Morocco still remains the “unloved one” of Spanish foreign and even domestic policy.

Sanchez’s famed letter to the Moroccan monarch has created a lot of turmoil for its author, both from the perspective of Spanish society at large and, above all, from that of the political class, which saw his gesture as the Spanish government’s capitulation to Moroccan demands. The durability of the newfound Morocco-Spain reconciliation therefore remains open to question, despite Spanish Prime Ministers’ tendency to embrace realpolitik once in office.

The Algerian case is clearer in this regard. Hostility towards Morocco has been the constant in Algeria since 1963, with the exception of rare phases of improvement. During the Bouteflika era (1999–2019), relations between Algiers and Rabat were a “stormy friendship” at times, but most often a “courteous” animosity. Ever since the arrival of the Chengriha-Tebboune duo, however, the two countries have never been closer to a direct confrontation, with increasingly sealed borders, broken or severed diplomatic relations, and access to Algerian skies restricted to Moroccan aircrafts…

Faced with such a bellicose neighbor, Morocco has increasingly taken steps to prepare for any eventuality. The best signs of the kingdom’s preparedness are its defense deals with Israel and the creation of an eastern defense zone.

With Mauritania, relations remain stable. However, since the election of Mohamed Ghazouani in 2019, Nouakchott has undertaken to expand its partnerships, first drawing closer to the United Arab Emirates, whose diplomatic aggressiveness is well known; this aggressivity is showcased through the provision of aid equivalent to half of Mauritania’s GDP and an increasingly apparent military cooperation. There was also the visit of an Iranian diplomatic leader to Nouakchott last February, where he arrived on board an Algerian airplane. President Ghazouani has somehow “Mauritanized” King Mohammed VI’s famous Riyadh speech…

The spirit of that famous royal speech was the necessity for Morocco to maintain its traditional alliances while opening up to new partners. Yet Mauritania’s perceived rapprochement with Emiratis and Iranians is not necessarily good news for Rabat.

On the second line of neighbors

Morocco’s neighboring countries, including those that do not necessarily share borders with the kingdom, have of late tended to be less friendly than they used to be. Tensions with France, for example, are now common knowledge and, more serious than the differences between states, it is now societies that are drifting apart (mistrust of Moroccans and indifference of the French).

The maintenance of strong economic relations certainly has historic significance, but nothing seems to indicate the future persistence of the “French exception” in Morocco. All indicators actually suggest the opposite, based on the cultural, academic, economic, and emotional aspects.

This is also the case with Tunisia, with the difference that the growing distance between Tunis and Rabat is much more the result of President Kais Saïed’s current policy than the consequence of a fundamental divergence between the two traditionally friendly countries.

However, Macron’s France Maghreb policy is heightening tensions between Rabat and Tunis, tensions born of the Tunisian president’s welcoming of the leader of the Polisario separatists, and consolidated by the pressure exerted by Algiers on Tunis through the budgetary aid that Tunisia’s strangled public finances need. Tunisia cannot refuse Algeria anything, and it is an open secret that the Algerian regime shares France’s hostility towards Morocco.

Then there is Senegal. Since the beginning of 2023, multiple visits of King Mohamed VI to Dakar have been postponed, sometimes for health reasons, other times without any known reason. President Macky Sall, who is maneuvering to run for an (unconstitutional) third term, is supported by Emmanuel Macron’s France, which strategically needs to keep Senegal in its fold, especially after its hasty withdrawal from the Sahel.

A “Dakar-Paris axis” can only be achieved to the detriment of Morocco, which, after the installation of Wagner militias in Mali with the benevolent neutrality of Algiers, now has only the Senegalese route to ensure the continental extension it so vaunts to its non-African partners.

As suh, Morocco finds itself in a double chokehold between these two lines of hostile, unfriendly, and even distrustful neighborhood lines. After a decade of consistent, assertive, and at time even aggressive diplomatic actions, Rabat seems to have closed itself off from its geographical environment, preferring to extend its scope further away, towards the Israeli-American axis on one hand, and Arab-Gulf axis on the other hand, and even further away toward Asia and Latin America.

Is this a carefully thought-out policy, in light of the current geological upheavals and changes in alliance lines? Or is it the result of misunderstandings between Rabat and Paris, the two capitals having an equal (diplomatic) presence in this region of the world, with each party developing its competitive influence for its own strategic interests? Only time will tell.