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The upheavals and poly-crises that have occurred in recent years, in
particular the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine, have led to a strong
return of geopolitics. Great power rivalries now dominate, overshadowing the
economic, diplomatic, and interdependence considerations that had prevailed for
decades.
Since the fall of the Soviet
Union on December 26, 1991, several geopolitical visions have dominated debates
on the future of the international system, particularly in the United States.
Francis Fukuyama, in The
End of History and the Last Man (1992), prophesies the generalization of
liberal democracy as the culmination of great ideological conflicts. In
contrast, Samuel Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations (1996),
envisages clashes structured around cultural, civilizational and religious divides.
Finally, John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
(2001), warns of the rise of China and announces a return to a bipolar world.
These three paradigms continue to structure the perception of decision-makers
and to guide contemporary geopolitical strategies.
Already called into question
in the summer of 1989, the idea of the “end of history” defended by
Fukuyama now seems largely obsolete. Yet, despite the refutations of his thesis
and the competition of alternative models promoted by Russia, China or Islamist
ideologies, Fukuyama persists in his analysis by maintaining that liberal
democracy will eventually triumph, it is only a matter of time.
As for Samuel Huntington’s
interpretation, it appears not only questionable, but also insufficient and
incoherent. Conflicts along cultural fault lines do not necessarily correspond
to wars of “civilization,” and the majority of crisis zones or
hotbeds of military tension do not fit into the narrative that the political
scientist has developed.
However, it seems to me more
relevant to cite the work of the English school of international relations, as
developed by Hedley Bull, which is closer to the concerns of the countries of
the South. In an article published in 2016 in Contemporary Security Policy,
Trine Flockhart analyzes a profound change in the international system, marked
by a transition from the liberal world order to a more fragmented and
diversified “multi-order” system. The concept of the
“multi-order system” offers a new paradigm for understanding the
transformations of the world order. This model is distinguished by the
coexistence and interaction of multiple international orders, each based on its
own values, identities and institutions. Flockhart argues that this transition
is already underway and stresses the need for policymakers to prepare for its
implications.
This approach seems
particularly relevant for the Global South, as the “multi-order”
system represents a fundamental break with previous international models. It
calls for a reassessment of the diplomacy, global governance and institutions
needed to manage the growing diversity and complexity of international
relations.
Alexander Dougine, a Russian
philosopher and geopolitician, proposes a multipolar vision of the world, rejecting
Western unipolar hegemony and putting forward regional cooperation, notably
through the union of Europe and Asia, in a dynamic based on civilizational
diversity. This approach is in line with Trine Flockhart’s approach to the
“multi-order system”, advocating a reassessment of world diplomacy to
better manage the growing diversity of international power relations.
Revival of geopolitics and return of old empires
“Donald Trump’s campaign slogan was ‘Make America
Great Again’. It is easily
transposable: Make Russia Great Again! Make China
Great Again!
Everywhere there is an attempt to go back. (Bruno Tertrais, the revenge of history)
Gilpin observed, as did the sociologist Ibn Khaldun centuries ago, that
dominant powers succeed one another and that any hegemonic power is inevitably
destined to decline. Indeed, at a certain point, expansion outweighs benefits,
the distribution of power within the system evolves, and other states emerge to
challenge this supremacy. However, the return of hegemons remains a phenomenon
that is still little theorized.
Economic indicators corroborate the competition between the United
States and other powers that challenge its hegemony, in particular China; the
United States retains its position as the world’s largest economy with a GDP of
$25.439 billion, followed by China, which has a GDP of $19.370 billion, and the
European Union, with $17.046 billion. However, in terms of trade, China is in
pole position, being the world’s leading exporter, with $3.5 trillion in
exports, while the EU has $2.7 trillion.
The United States, although leading in terms of GDP, sees its exports
reach $1.8 trillion, marking a slight decline from previous years. India and
Africa, with GDPs of $3.730 billion and $3.200 billion respectively, show
significant growth potential in international trade.
Indeed, we are
currently witnessing a return of empires or civilization-states, not in the
traditional territorial sense, but rather as revisionist powers seeking to
impose their influence and reshape the international order. The main players in
this phenomenon are Russia, China, Turkey and Iran and to some extent India.
These countries, often seen as the heirs of former empires, challenge
the U.S.-dominated world order. Their aspiration to regain a lost imperial
status plays a crucial role in their contemporary geopolitical ambitions.
While some revisionist countries celebrate their glorious past and
aspire to regain the supremacy, glory and prestige of their past, others,
marked by the shadows of their historical past, are determined to avoid any return
to those “troubled times” characterized by collapse, division and
foreign interference.
These “neo-empires” (Bruno Tertrais, 2024) seek to reshape the
world order to their advantage without re-establishing traditional imperial
structures. Driven by a combative nationalism and an instrumentalization of the
past, these powers use a variety of strategies: recourse to Sharp power,
spiritual or religious discourse, manipulation of information, historical
rewriting, and economic coercion.
The ambitions of certain states, such as Russia, China, Iran and
Venezuela, are part of a desire to reconstitute or expand their sphere of
influence; in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia for Russia, in the China
Sea and Taiwan for China, dreams of restoring Ottoman influence for Turkey, the
expansion of Shiism in the Middle East and even beyond for Iran. As for
Venezuela, which claims the legacy of Simon Bolivar, it is seeking to recover
the vast territory of Essequibo (about 160,000 square kilometers), a region rich
in hydrocarbons located west of French Guiana.
To this end, these states mobilize a spiritual and identity-based
discourse to justify their initiatives and legitimize territorial claims
perceived as legitimate by presenting themselves as promoters of traditional
values in the face of decadent Western models (Bolivarianism, defense of the
Eastern Orthodox Church, Confucianism, Islamism, Shiism, etc.).
Conceptual analysis and typology of strategic
revisionism
The concept of revisionism in international relations
refers to an approach or position that seeks to modify or challenge established
historical norms, agreements, or interpretations. It reflects the tensions between the
established order and the aspirations of certain States or groups to redefine
their place in the international system.
There is no consensual empirical definition of
revisionism, however, we can propose a set of carctéristics capable of
describing this phenomenon or what is called the ideal-type of a revisionist country. It is
generally a former empire or a “civilization state” that has
known periods of greatness, but which has been dismembered and fragmented
by Western colonization and is trying to recover its territorial integrity.
The State has significant economic capabilities, including military
capabilities, and a skilled political leadership that uses ideology
to strengthen the unity of the political class and eliminate all forms of
opposition.
This proto operational definition leads us to envisage the emergence of
a new wave of revisionist countries that meet these criteria if the world order
of 1945 is not reformed mutatis-mutandis.
In our humble opinion, these are Indonesia and Japan in Asia, Hungary
and Germany in Europe, Mexico and Argentina in Latin America, and Ethiopia in
Africa. Most Arab countries that have tried to challenge the international
order have been stifled because of the threats they posed to Israel’s security
(such as Nasser’s Egypt and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq). This does not exclude,
however, the emergence of Arab countries adopting a reformist variant of
revisionism, without jeopardizing Israel’s security.
The typology of revisionist
actors in international politics, as developed by scholars Alexander Cooley,
Daniel Nexon, and Steven Ward, identifies four ideal types of revisionist
states based on their positioning in relation to the international order and
the distribution of military capabilities. According to this modeling, states
can be classified into four broad categories: Status Quo, Reformist,
Positionalist and Revolutionary.
Reformist
states, such as Germany, Brazil and
India, aspire to change some aspects of the international system while
accepting the existing military balance, focusing on institutional reforms and
the establishment of new norms. Positionalist states, such as China,
Turkey, , recognize the world order but seek to rebalance military forces to
their advantage, emphasizing their regional influence.
Finally, revolutionary
states, such as Russia, Iran and Venezuela, are challenging the
international order and the distribution of military power, aiming to radically
transform the balance of global power to promote a new vision of the
international system. This typology allows for the analysis of how different
countries interact with the global system according to their respective strategic
objectives and positions.
Revisionism: A Kaleidoscope of Ambitions and
Strategies
The competition between the
revisionist powers and the West, especially the United States, has intensified
on several economic, technological, space, geopolitical and ideological fronts
since November 2011 when President Obama administration launched the “pivot
to Asia” strategy and the annexing of Crimea by Russia in 2014.
On the economic front, the trade war between the United States and
China, characterized by American charges of social and monetary dumping, as
well as the reciprocal imposition of sanctions and high tariffs on traded
products, illustrates their growing rivalry. In response, China is seeking to
promote the yuan as an international reserve currency in order to reduce its
dependence on the dollar.
In the technological field,
the race for innovation, particularly in artificial intelligence, the
semiconductor industry, 5G and space, is becoming a major global leadership
issue.
Geopolitically, the two powers
as well as Russia are seeking to expand their influence in the Asia-Pacific,
Africa and Latin America, which have become strategic battlegrounds. The
central issue of this competition tends to crystallize around the China Sea and
the Eurasian “central belt” at the heart of geopolitical rivalries
for centuries, a strategic region stretching from the Balkans to Southeast
Asia, reminiscent of Mackinder’s “Heart Land” or Spykman’s
“Rimland”.
The rivalry between the West
and the revisionist powers, especially China and Russia, opposes two models of
development and two worldviews, the “Washington Consensus”, based on
economic liberalism and civil rights, and the “Beijing Consensus”,
which advocates state capitalism and non-interference (Zhang
Weiwei, Fudan University, 2010).
China adopts a pragmatic vision of multipolarity that evolves at the
pace of its rise to power, it advocates “peaceful development”, while
asserting its presence in its neighborhood and on other continents, especially
in Latin America, considered the sanctuary of the United States. Its strategy
is characterized by a lack of a pre-established framework, favoring a flexible
approach that can be adapted to local contexts.
The soft strategies of India and Brazil
– India has ambitions for global power, supported by
“all-out” diplomacy, which includes a multi-alignment strategy aimed
at preserving its strategic autonomy. Emerging India remains in a way faithful
to the non-aligned line drawn by Nehru, and the preservation of this strategic
autonomy has become an imperative. As part of its desire to play a central role
in a multipolar world order, it is striving to develop non-exclusive strategic
partnerships with the major powers, thus fostering relations with the United
States, Russia, China, Japan and the European Union without submitting to an
exclusive alliance.
In parallel, India has recently launched several major initiatives to
improve its logistics infrastructure and establish new international alliances,
including through the creation of a logistics corridor connecting India, the
Middle East and Europe IMEC. These efforts aim to position India as a key
player in international trade while strengthening its connectivity with
important markets.
These strategic initiatives represent not only an economic breakthrough
for India, but also a geopolitical response to diversify trade routes and
reduce dependence on Chinese infrastructure.
In addition, these two countries are actively promoting the reform of
the Bretton Wood institutions by advocating for increased representation of
developing countries in forums such as the UN and the IMF or the World Bank, by
strengthening their cooperation within the BRICS group to promote inclusive
multilateralism
India and Brazil are challenging the hegemony of the US dollar by
exploring monetary alternatives and strengthening bilateral exchanges in local
currencies, particularly within the BRICS, where they are advocating the
creation of a common currency to facilitate trade between member countries
without resorting to the dollar.
Just recently, at the G20 summit in Rio (November 2024), many countries
in the Global South renewed their dissatisfaction with the double standards of
Western countries, which seemed to pay disproportionate attention to their own
interests while downplaying the challenges faced by the nations of the South.
It should be recalled that President Lula Da Silva recalled the need to
strengthen international institutions so that they become more representative
and effective.
– Brazil‘s strategy is
based on three main axes: the exploitation of its natural resources,
which gives it a great deal of room for manoeuvre due to the diversity of its
wealth; regional development, aimed at consolidating its leadership in
Latin America by promoting regional integration and involving its neighbours in
the benefits of its rise to power; and the use of soft power, through
diplomacy based on cooperation and the promotion of its development model
through regional institutions such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR (Union
of South American Nations).
The United States Facing the Revisionist Challenge
In the face of growing challenges to its global hegemony, the United
States is strengthening its strategic alliances, particularly within NATO and
in the Indo-Pacific region, while increasing military spending to deter rivals
such as China and Russia or Iran. At the same time, they are using economic
sanctions to isolate adversaries like Russia in the wake of its invasion of
Ukraine, while calling for reform of international institutions, such as the
IMF and the UN, to better reflect contemporary realities.
However, the style of response varies depending on the administration in
place, the Jacksonian vision (Russel Mead’s typology) of the foreign policy of Republican presidents in general and President Donald Trump in particular is
based on a tenacious defense of national security and the economic well-being
of American citizens, coupled with assertive nationalism and a unilateral
approach that privileges national interests to the detriment of the
international alliances or institutions.
In contrast, Democratic presidents, especially President Joe Biden, are
aligning themselves more with the Wilsonian school, which prioritizes the
promotion of democratic values and human rights globally. This approach is
based on the idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to
intervene to defend democracy and build international institutions that promote
peace. President Biden has emphasized re-establishing traditional alliances,
international cooperation, and active engagement in organizations like NATO and
the United Nations, seeking to restore U.S. leadership on the world stage after
a period perceived as isolationist under the Trump administration.
In November
2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring, the Obama administration launched the
“Pivot to Asia”, this turnaround marks a relative decline in American
interest in Atlantic and especially Middle Eastern affairs in favor of an
increased focus on emerging geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.
within this
process, they have formed regional blocs through their “Indo-Pacific
strategy”, forming exclusive alliances such as the Five Eyes, the Quad and
AUKUS, while putting pressure on countries in the region to choose sides. This
hybrid approach favors hard power, based on military and economic instruments,
as evidenced by the military maneuvers in the South China Sea and economic
sanctions. Technological power is also being used as a geopolitical weapon
through unilateral sanctions and legislation such as the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act.
This strategy launched
under President B Obama, intensified under D Trump administration with a
tougher approach to China, and consolidated under Biden through a renewed
commitment to regional allies.
Revisionist Attempts: A Mitigated outcomes
In the context of the growing challenge
of US hegemony, revisionist attempts have ended with mixed results.
– China‘s economy has
been seriously impacted by retaliation and the US-led trade war; in 2023, its
GDP growth fell to 3%, due to high tariffs, relatively weak domestic demand,
and an overall slowdown in exports, retail sales, and industrial production. As
a result, the “Middle Empire” has revised its growth model by turning to its
domestic market and has intensified its efforts to reduce its technological
dependence on the United States, investing heavily in local innovation and in
key industries such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence. The Made
in China 2025 plan embodies this ambition to position China as a leader in
advanced technology sectors, defying the restrictions imposed by Washington.
– Russia has reportedly
suffered significant setbacks on several fronts. Its intervention in Ukraine
has failed to achieve the desired objectives, leading to considerable weakening
at the internal level and increasing isolation on the international scene.
– Iran has failed to achieve its hegemonic goals of expanding
its area of influence, despite its efforts to establish a “strategic
rhizome” (Gilles Deleuze’s concept) in the Middle East through Shiite
militias (weakened and bled dry following the latest setbacks suffered in 2024)
and its growing dependence on Russia, which is in trouble. President Donald
Trump’s questioning of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) has further exacerbated
the situation of Iran as it seeks sanctions relief. Donald Trump’s return to
the presidency could deepen Iran’s isolation by strengthening the “maximum
pressure” strategy and consolidating regional alliances, including with
Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Under the presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian, elected in July 2024, Iranian
foreign policy seems more moderate and conciliatory, particularly towards the
United States and the Arab monarchies, with attempts at rapprochement in
particular with Saudi Arabia and Morocco, although the latter has conditioned
any normalization on respect for its sovereignty and the end of support for the
Polisario separatist movement.
This development suggests a
strategic retraction by Iran, which, like Venezuela, seems to be adopting a
more “positionalist” posture without calling into question the world
order.
– On the other hand, we can
see that India and Brazil are progressing cautiously but
effectively. Thanks to strategies based on multi-alignment, soft power and
practices such as forum shifting (BRICS, G20, SCO), these two nations
are strengthening their regional and global influence while avoiding direct
confrontations. Their approach, marked by proactive and diversified diplomacy,
is asserting itself as a pragmatic alternative and a model to follow in a
multipolar world.
What
strategic agenda for Africa?
A crossroads of global maritime trade, surrounded by the Atlantic and
Indian Oceans as well as the Mediterranean Sea, Africa’s geopolitical position
has been described by Francis A. Kornegay as “insular Africa” (2020).
However, despite this advantageous central position, the African continent is
often perceived as an island due to its political and economic fragmentation
inherited from colonization, which makes it vulnerable to rivalries and
interference from great powers.
– To address these challenges, Africa has adopted a new vision
“Agenda 2063” of the African Union and President P Kagame’s report on
the institutional reform of the African Union. While Agenda 2063 sets out a
long-term vision for the continent’s development, the Kagame report proposes
concrete measures to strengthen the institutional arsenal needed to achieve
this vision. This projection into the next fifty years reflects the desire to
make a united Africa a world power.
Agenda 2063 is not just a development plan; it is a geopolitical strategy
that aims to strengthen Africa’s position on the world stage while meeting the
aspirations of its peoples.
However, there are very few scientific studies on the assessment of
Vision 2063; the latest AU institutional report of 2022 shows satisfactory results
in the implementation of Agenda 2063, with East Africa in pole position in this
implementation. The most significant development was the launch of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into force on January 1, 2021.
(UQAM University 2023)
However, it is imperative to accelerate the implementation of this
vision by adopting a proactive approach in order to advance this agenda in a
changing world, because governing means forecasting and anticipating in the
light of geopolitical and geoeconomics realities while regularly assessing the
results obtained.
It can be noted with satisfaction that some countries contribute
autonomously and on a voluntary basis to the operationalization and
implementation of projects and initiatives that complement this vision, as is
the case of the Kingdom of Morocco, which has launched three initiatives: the
Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project, the initiative to open access to the
Atlantic to the Sahel countries and the Atlantic African States Process (AASP). which brings together 23 African countries
bordering the Atlantic Ocean to promote regional cooperation in areas such as
maritime security, the fight against terrorism, piracy and transnational crime,
the blue economy and sustainable development, through the pooling and the
concerted management of resources.
Africa should therefore value its resources and rely above all on itself
and its skills while establishing equitable partnerships with world powers. It
is also essential to avoid any new form of dependence and predatory of
resources, particularly with regard to emerging players such as China, Russia,
India or Brazil.
At the same time, it is imperative to intensify efforts to reform global
governance structures, including by advocating for greater representation in
institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. The
African Union’s accession to the G20 is a first step forward, strengthening the
continent’s role on the world stage.
The success of such a geopolitical vision for Africa relies heavily on
political leadership that can transcend internal divisions and unite states
around a common strategy. By adopting harmonized negotiating positions, African
countries could significantly influence the process of future international
norm-setting and policy-making. A united and resilient Africa is essential to
effectively navigate a changing multipolar global landscape.
In conclusion, it is clear that the post-1945
international order is being challenged and international law is in decline,
despite its imperfections, it has nevertheless contributed to global stability
and prosperity for decades.
The interpretation of the
behavior of the revisionist powers divides observers. Some see it as a real
threat to the international order established after World War II, while others
see the danger as exaggerated, arguing that American hegemony remains strong
and enduring.
The debate between the
American political scientists Walter Russell Mead and G. John Ikenberry
illustrates this divergence of opinions. Mead believes that countries like
China, Russia and Iran have never fully accepted the geopolitical rules set
after the Cold War and are actively seeking to transform that order. Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and China’s territorial claims are, according to him,
illustrations of this.
Ikenberry, for his part,
qualifies this vision. He argues that these powers do not aim at a complete
overthrow of the international order, but also benefit from it, including
through access to trade, investment flows, and technological advances. It also
points out that the United States, backed by a network of robust alliances,
retains significant military superiority over Russia and China.
Thus, a fundamental question
emerges: do these powers pose a real threat to the world order, or are they
simply seeking to readjust it to their own interests and maximize their
benefits?
