Regime change in Syria will continue to bubble and cause
hecatombs in the Arab periphery for years to come. The impact on the Maghreb is
unavoidable. Some observers share the view that more direct repercussions will
occur with respect to Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Is the domino theory
accurate to assess the situation?
I think that the Maghreb state-actors would be able to save
the day, provided that they understand the new geopolitical reality by adopting
a less bellicose approach (based on the fragmentation of independent states in
the region and in the Sahel countries). The objective is to create the Maghreb
so desired by the peoples of the region. This would begin with the resolution
of the crisis in Libya through what I would call “reconstruction through
the extremes.”.
What are my arguments? You must exercise patience to
comprehend my reasoning, which stems from an optimistic outlook previously
articulated in my recent articles. The outbreak of a new spring-autumn in the
region would not be a sound option.
Ambition, dream, and illusion depend on the faith,
determination, and tenacity of the one who carries them within himself no
matter what. But they also depend on context, timing, and duration in time and
space. Political actors who carry in their hearts a social project, a strong
dedication, or a geopolitical vision that contrasts with déjà vu may belong to
such a category of decision-makers. The former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi,
is one of them.
When he came to power, Gaddafi was attracted to Gamal
Abdenasser’s charisma, taking him as his model and mentor. He was haunted by
the dream of Arab unity and the illusion of being the king of African kings. He
failed because of his misreading of the context, the timing, and the duration
in time and space.
In this article, my aim is not to dwell on the governmental
experience of which the Libyan leader had become famous but on his geopolitical
project, which has impacted and continues to impact the Maghreb and African
spaces. A utopian project based on a sequential process of first destructing
and then building from scratch according to a one-way perception combining
strabismus and political and diplomatic myopia.
The Libya that Gaddafi shaped to sow disorder in the Maghreb
and sub-Saharan space could, today, despite the chaos from which it suffers, be
a source of hope to make a leap in the momentum of reconstruction that regional
geopolitical transformations are promoting, albeit laboriously.
To achieve this, I will work on three paradigms. The first
paradigm concerns the distinction between major state actors and minor state
actors in geopolitical configurations in which equality of power and ascendancy
is fragile but is nonetheless beneficial for maintaining control over the
dynamic status quo.
The second paradigm deals with what I would call proxy-actor
time-up in issues-areas and the zero impact of ascending states whose
maintenance on the strategic chessboard rests on a razor’s edge.
The third paradigm concerns the reconstruction by default of
state structures doomed to permanent disorder. The idea is to demonstrate that
the chaos in which Gaddafi participated for forty years can be a source of
inspiration to restore order in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan spaces.
A pretentious analysis on my part, but I would put forward
valid arguments, in my opinion, to open a chapter on a renewed perception of
geopolitics in the Europe-Maghreb-Africa triangle.
Why choose Libya to offer a daring reading of the Maghreb
and sub-Saharan geopolitical space? The first answer consists in the fact that
Libya presents an interesting case of the junction between politics and social
stratification, between the central power and the tribes, between the
construction of a modern state and the persistence of structures that are,
after all, feudal. The second answer consists in the fact that it will help me
to verify the three paradigms I spoke of above on the role of minor actors, the
end of proxies, and reconstruction through political pragmatism and social
genius.
Tribes in the political, diplomatic, social, and religious
chessboard
The crisis in Libya continues to be intriguing because of
its scale and the political myopia shown by the actors involved. Since its
inception, it has featured political and military actors, elements of the
Islamic State in Libya (ISIL), Salafist movements, transnational criminal
networks, and tribes that manage their membership and restraint according to
developments on the ground and the dividends to be reaped in the long term. We
can also add structures affiliated directly or indirectly with foreign state actors
(Russian Wagner, Janjaweed from Darfur, etc.).
The tribal dimension has always been present in the
organization of relations within Libyan society, particularly in the management
of intra-national conflicts in which political actors are entangled.
Many observers share this observation, as it is true that
both under King Idriss as-Senussi (1951-1969) and Muammar Gaddafi (1969-1911),
a certain aversion to state institutions was highlighted. This brought about an
atmosphere in which the king and the guide, respectively, relied on
non-institutional forces to rule the country.
Over time, the tribal dimension has been a source of
identity confusion in which clashes between national minorities, non-state
armed groups (NSAGs), and organized crime networks have plunged the country
into chronic instability.
The complexity of the situation in Libya once again raises
the question of tribal states and their relationship with the central state.
The perception of political legitimacy—and therefore of social and
psychological ascendancy—has been and remains problematic in so far as the
first legitimacy is subject to the acquisition, in the first place, of the
second, but never in the opposite direction.
Relations with the state (weakened under Gaddafi through his
tribal-inspired slogan of non-state) are at once psychological, political, and
economic. Since 2011, economics has played a decisive role in the maintenance
of intranational and international alliance networks. The oil and gas reserves
located in the Sirte basin, the land par excellence of the powerful tribes of
the Magharbā and the Awaqir, are attracting foreign interests.
The process of national reconciliation in Libya is a
painstaking process—and it will remain so for much of the nation’s
reconstruction efforts. However, there is currently a trend that mutual
neutralization between tribes, which has been a weapon of war and survival at
the local level, should pave the way to a real understanding capable of saving
the Libyan state. This would prove to be a safe haven room despite the
institutional shortcomings observed over the past eight years.
This relatively peaceful trend pushes the dominant tribes to
appease inter-group tensions in order to increase their bargaining power with
the central government, which is still trying to save a spot in the contradictions
between the powers installed in Tripoli and Benghazi and that held by Marshal
Khalifa Haftar.
It appears that, in the current stage of contradictions, the
tribes remain tempted by (or receptive to) regional and international
alliances. They excel, as much as they can, in manipulation and accept, when
they are forced to do so, to be manipulated.
It goes without saying that these tribes (in particular the
Qadhadhafā, the Magharbā, the Majabr, and the Zuwaya) have a say in shaping the
political and economic future of the country. To do this, they use the classic
methods of maintaining cooptation. They resort to this practice by adopting an
ambivalent attitude that eventually shows their strength and weakness.
The outbreak of the Libyan civil war has laid bare the
fragility of the political fabric and that of the Libyans’ adherence to a
federative state structure. The long Gaddafi parenthesis did not allow the
reconstruction of the Libyan state that had existed under the Senussi dynasty.
Hence the superficial character of the institutional
organization centered on the idea of the Jamahiriya that allowed Gaddafi to
transform institutional confusion into an unquestionable instrument of power—at
least, theoretically.
The question that remains unanswered is how to understand
the true value of certain tribes’ reluctance to federative institutions.
Indeed, the tribes agree to submit to the state only on the condition that it
allows them to protect their interests and have their share in the distribution
of dividends granted in return for their formal adherence.
Despite its moments of fluctuation in relation to political
power, the tribal dimension remains important in the structures of a state that
has never really been constituted. The revival of the tribes’ influence was a
revaluation of tribal culture and a revenge against the Qadhadhafā. The latter
is regaining its say in the context of the Arab counter-revolution orchestrated
by certain Arab countries of the Gulf. It has also benefited from the
complicity of certain Western countries that have been forced to revise their
strategy initiated and tested between 1990 and 2011.
However, one observation that needs to be better assessed is
that of the place of religion in determining the degree of cohesion of tribes
divided into several identity fractions. In the past, tribes have proven their
resistance to being manipulated or joining extremist movements. They
demonstrate this again today by closing the door to the temptations of certain
countries of the Arab Gulf, Egypt, Turkey, and Algeria, who seek to integrate
them into their post-Arab Spring geopolitical visions.
The use of the tribal element to influence the Libyan
political and military scene is, on the surface, an intelligent reading of
tribal ties in the face of the exhaustion of the state structures painstakingly
put in place since 2015, at the time the round tables were held in Skhirat
(Morocco). However, this is limited by time and by the change in historical
data. This reading is reminiscent of that of Italian colonization (1911-1922),
which reinforced the rallying of the tribes to the As-Senussiya brotherhood as
an attempt to divide the tribes.
The geopolitical reading of the various interested actors is
reflected in the total embarrassment in which they are trapped in following the
fall of the Syrian regime. Proof of this is the mixed reaction of all parties
the day after the consultative meeting in Bouznika (Morocco) on December 18 and
19, 2024, between the High Council of State and the Libyan House of Representatives
as part of the inter-Libyan dialogue.
New balances and new priorities
The Muslim Brotherhood’s obsession, the dichotomous
perception of maritime borders that brings the country face to face with Turkey
and Egypt, and the engagement in a risky geopolitical equation alongside
certain Gulf countries are Libya’s Achilles’ heel. A dire strait that will
probably not be solved by foreign intervention or a risky use of the tribal
element.
As a result, the tribal equation will now be difficult to
resolve insofar as the actors involved in the crisis play the role of being
their own spokesmen. Worse, they are subservient to foreign interests. The
tribes are certainly weakened, but they will ask for their share of the pie in
case a solution is considered eventually.
However, the solution to the Libyan crisis involves a number
of determinants. And it embraces a global dimension and may even be the cause
of the thawing of the iceberg of geopolitical disagreements in the subregion.
How could this be demonstrated?
First of all, there is the apparent side of the game. It
consists of the series of agreements reached between the parties to the
conflict since 2015, including the Skhirat peace agreements (December 2015) and
two rounds of the inter-Libyan dialogue in Bouznika and Tangier (2020-2021),
the various partial agreements concluded since 2016 to integrate the security
concerns of neighboring countries and the considerations of certain foreign
actors interested in the geopolitics of energy.
To this must be added the consultative meeting in Bouznika
(December 2024) between the High Council of State and the Libyan House of
Representatives, which has already been mentioned. However, this is not the
crux of my analysis.
Indeed, if Libya is the victim of the attempts at
fragmentation that certain separatist movements endorsing chameleon-like state
intermingling’s love, it can, with a little intelligence from the parties to
the conflict, provide safe solutions of national unity.
Separatism was cherished and encouraged by Muammar Gaddafi.
The latter was at the origin of the creation of the Polisario in 1973, before
the separatist movement was taken over by Algeria. Gaddafi officially financed
and armed the Polisario until 1984, when the Arab-African Union between Libya
and Morocco was created, which was dissolved a year later.
Gaddafi supported dissident movements in Africa no matter
what, provided they asked for his assistance. This was the case with his
support for Frolinat in Chad, dissidents in Darfur and Kordofanian province in
Sudan, Jon Grang in South Sudan, the Polisario, etc.
However, the most important involvement was the attempt to
achieve a feat that would have been an event never equaled in history: the
promotion of separatism for the creation of the union. This was the project
that Gaddafi had been working on for the past three decades in power.
The objective was to federate the Tuaregs scattered between
Libya, Algeria, Niger, and Mali in a kind of United States of the Sahara. A
project that dates back to the colonial period, supported above all by France.
This is precisely referred to in the same spirit as the
project to allow Algeria to have access to the Atlantic by giving its support
for Polisario’s separatism. Indeed, it is a project also carried out by France
between 1914 and 1918 that cost Lyauty, who had opposed it, his job while he
was resident general in Morocco.
Gaddafi even went so far as to wink at Iran when, in 2007,
he proposed the establishment of a “second Shiite Fatimid state in North
Africa” to revive the experience of part of North Africa, Egypt, and the
Fertile Crescent.
However, both objectives could not be achieved. There are
two reasons for this. On the one hand, Gaddafi’s perception of unity in the
spirit of Nasserism and classical pan-Arabism was based on superficial
considerations that overestimated the strength of segmentarity (assabiyyat).
On the other hand, because Nasserism or Gaddafiism ignored
the fact that their designers were only ideological subcontractors in a
geopolitical equation that was enshrined in the Sykes-Picot agreements (1916),
the aftermath of the two World Wars (1914-1918 and 1935-1940) and the Cold War
(1945-1990). This resulted in the failure of all attempts at union in which
Nasser and Gaddafi were involved.
Support for separatism and attempts to destabilize
neighboring countries have debunked the two leaders’ propensities to work for
Arab unity. Libya is currently in a situation where it is threatened with
endemic destabilization unless there is a patriotic outburst that combines
tribal particularism with the unionist state tradition of which the monarchy
was the foundation par excellence.
The reconstruction of Libya should first better balance
priorities based on new balances whose driving force would be inclusion and not
exclusion. This is a difficult equation to solve, because certain tribes or
diffuse interests would always be motivated by the temptation of revenge.
There is a positive signal, however, and that is the fate of
Sayf al-Islam Gaddafi. Another no less positive signal is that of the room for
maneuver granted to Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These people, among other tribal
chiefs or enlightened personalities, are mostly needed for the reconstruction
process.
A major obstacle that perhaps should be paid attention to is
the fate of the alliances that Libyan political forces have established with
countries such as Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Algeria,
Italy, France, Russia, and the United States. The answer is simple: none of the
countries mentioned currently has the ascendancy or an unshakeable grip on the
Libyan political chessboard.
The time has come to compromise. Because Donald Trump’s
return to power in the United States will be accompanied by control of the
energy chessboard. He would be keen to make compromises in the geopolitics of
hydrocarbons, with gas at the top of the list.
Indeed, the significant discoveries of gas fields in the
Eastern Mediterranean, encompassing Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and
Palestine-Israel, will push the actors involved to seek compromises instead of
entering into legal battles over the delimitation of their respective
territorial seas.
The achievement of peace in Libya is fundamental because it
will help to put an end, in the medium term, to the policy of axes that a
country like Algeria has been trying to revive since 2022. On the one hand,
because the major international players are fed up with this sterile policy
that prevents the Europe-Maghreb-Sub-Saharan Africa area from being brought
into line with the new changes on the global geostrategic chessboard. On the
other hand, because the so-called minor state actors in the Maghreb no longer
accommodate themselves to the hegemonic temptations that prevailed during the
1970s and 1990s.
The resolution of the Libyan civil war can contribute to the
resolution of inter-Maghreb contradictions as well as those that sow discord in
the Sahel-Saharan space. I put forward as an argument the fact that it was
Gaddafi who was the most determined to promote the idea of regime change in
both spaces, while he was mandated, as proxy, to play on the dichotomy between
republican and monarchical systems on the one hand and on the fervor
represented by pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism during the 1970s and 1980s on the
other.
Some would be tempted to play down this explanation by
insisting on the persistence of political and diplomatic differences between
the countries that furnish the Maghreb and Sahel-Saharan areas, as evidenced by
the renewed interest in the issue of borders inherited from colonization.
Recently, the Tunisian Minister of Defense announced that his country would
never give up its borders attached by colonization to Libya. In doing so, he
knowingly forgot to mention those that were annexed by France and conceded to Algeria.
Indeed, President Habib Bourguiba made sure to remind
Presidents Houari Boumediene and Muammar Gaddafi of this fact at the Kef summit
in 1972 when the latter two invited him to join a tripartite union they aimed
for in the wake of two attempted coups in Morocco and in the midst of
negotiations on the future of the so-called Spanish Sahara.
The most informed analysts see in the statement of the
Tunisian Minister of Defense the hand of Algerians who are upset by the
movements of Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s troops on the borders with Algeria. It is
worth reminding that Libya does not recognize the borders between Libya and
Algeria despite the existence, for three decades, of a commission on border
issues.
Reconstruction of the Maghreb by the extremes
So, does my argument fall by the wayside? Not at all. First,
the resolution of endemic conflicts in the Maghreb and Sahel-Saharan spaces is
an absolute necessity. This also is part of the move aimed at neutralizing
strategic intermittents who are obstructing the reshaping of post-Covid-19
global geopolitics.
Secondly, the resolution of endemic conflicts is a logical
continuation of the process of the neutralization or even the elimination of
paramilitary movements or non-state armed groups in the Arab world, Latin
America, and Asia. The validity date of these movements, or that of NSAGs, has
expired, indeed.
Thirdly, some political regimes in place in the Maghreb and
Sahel-Saharan region are reluctant to let go and refuse to reform. They are
becoming a handicap in the new geopolitical reality. They are unbearable in
that the fragility of the institutional structures they maintain at all costs
no longer meets social expectations. Moreover, they risk causing widespread
destabilization that threatens peace and security in the
Europe-Maghreb-sub-Saharan Africa triangle.
Fourthly, the bet on the reconstruction of the Maghreb space
by the extremes is not a shallow intellectual construction. In this scheme, Libya and Mauritania
play an important role (H, Hami, Mauritanie: le pari de la transparence et
de la stabilité, MD du 08-07-2024). Two actors, so-called minors, who no longer sacrifice to the
“Patron-Client” paradigm and who, thanks to a positive neutrality
towards Algeria and Morocco, would force them to consider repudiating their
endemic disagreement. Morocco’s decision-makers wouldn’t mind.
The other, Algeria, still needs to be convinced. Morocco has
already responded to the Algerian suggestion that the Polisario be taken into
consideration in the prospected resolution of the Moroccan Sahara issue. This
suggestion argued that the separatist movement might be granted parts of the
buffer zone beyond the defensive walls.
Indeed, aware of Algeria’s obsession with having access to
the Atlantic Ocean, the King of Morocco seized the opportunity of the
celebration of the anniversary of the Green March, on November 6, 2024, to
indirectly invite Algeria to join the dynamics of the resolution of the
conflict by being part of the initiative to open up the landlocked Sahel
countries that the Sovereign launched in 2023.
The idea of extremes is judicious insofar as Libya and
Mauritania would be freed from their contradiction of dual belonging,
respectively, to the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa or to both at the same
time without being able to decide to integrate the various partnerships under
construction in the two Arab and African spaces.
Similarly, Libya and Mauritania are now important players in
the geopolitics of energy. The achievement of national reconciliation in Libya
will allow the country to regain its comfortable place among
hydrocarbon-producing countries.
Moreover, the idea of building a gas pipeline between
Nigeria and Libya, which was floated in 2009, has recently been taken up,
albeit timidly. If it seems difficult to consider it in the medium term, the
idea is not in contradiction with the Africa-Atlantic gas pipeline project
between Nigeria and Morocco, and why not, later between Nigeria and Algeria
going through Niger?
Fifthly, during the 1980s and 2000s, the literature on
international relations theory refined the paradigm of the balance of power by
adding a sort of hierarchy of actors in issues-areas. This hierarchy is based
on the distinction between major and minor actors who exercise variable
processes of cooptation, persuasion, and deterrence.
Sometimes it is the major players who pull the strings of
the sub-regional strategic game; sometimes it is the minor players who perform
this task. In the first case, the major players dictate the law, because they
are mandated by other, more powerful extra-regional actors or because they have
the wind in their sails. In the second case, the minor players exploit the
hesitations or potential weaknesses of the major regional players to their
advantage.
However, sometimes the relative balance of power in the
sub-region concerned is so burdensome that it allows the minor actors to be the
real bosses of the geopolitical rivalries between the major regional actors.
In the Maghreb, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya have cleverly
used this situation for three decades to outwit Algeria and Morocco, suspected
of seeking to win the race for regional leadership.
Yes, not only is it possible, but also the rules of the game
according to the paradigm of the balance of power in issues-areas have changed.
The change is leading towards the concentration of decision-making power on the
systemic level, which no longer rhymes with the divisor of labor with strategic
intermittents who no longer have an impact on process and the structure of the
international system.
This hypothesis resembles a kind of aerobatic jump on the
surface of quicksand if we consider the headlong rush shown by Algeria and, to
a lesser extent, Tunisia. Proof of this is, on the one hand, the equivocal
remarks noted in the speech delivered by Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune
a few days ago.
And on the other hand, the note verbale of the Libyan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on December 22, 2024, following the Bouznika
consultative meeting between the High Council of State and the Libyan House of
Representatives. In this note, the Libyan ministry expresses its astonishment
to its Moroccan counterpart that this meeting was not coordinated beforehand
with the authorities of the Government of National Unity in Tripoli. This is
quite intriguing, as Morocco does not play a mediator role but only acts as a
host-facilitator.
Some observers interpret the Libyan’s diplomatic gesture as
a trigger pulled by Algeria. I often go beyond such an explanation and see it
as a testimony of nervousness on the part of Libya’s neighbors, who fear that
the conditions that have blown up the Syrian regime’s edifice are now in place
to bring about regime change in their country in the long term.
Between ambition, dreams, and illusion, there comes a time
when reason takes matters into its own hands to set the record straight. Those
who wish to see the Maghreb rise from its ashes persist and sign in their
ignorance the geopolitical changes that are taking place all over the world; the
Maghreb subregion is no exception. Jump on the bandwagon or burn slowly and
surely; this is what is left for those who lack geopolitical vision and sound
reading of their intranational realities.
Yes, the time has come for Libya (including all political tendencies)
to understand that by opting for the political resolution of the crisis, taking
into account the evidence recalled above, it would save the horizontal Maghreb
space so that it does not lag behind the dynamics that are playing out in the
Atlantic and Sahel-Saharan space. There would certainly be attempts to put a
spanner in the works of the initiators of these ambitious projects, but the
process and its outcome are irreversible.
