Doha – When Hezbollah was first designated a terrorist group by the United States, many in academia and media still clung to a narrative of “resistance.” It took years — and undeniable proof of violence, trafficking, and foreign backing — for that myth to collapse.
A similar reckoning is now underway. American academic institutions and policymakers are finally ripping away the veil that has long shielded the Polisario Front — founded in 1973 with the financial blessing and overwhelming strategic sponsorship of Algeria — from scrutiny, exposing the organization not as freedom fighters, but as a dangerous terrorist proxy fueling regional instability.
A comprehensive analysis by the Hudson Institute has shattered the Polisario’s self-portrayal as a liberation movement, instead revealing it as a paramilitary organization that functions as “a destabilizing militia.”
In particular, the richly documented analysis unmasked the separatist group as steeped in arms smuggling and the indoctrination of youth, while “aligning itself with the strategic agendas of Iran, Russia, and China.”
The report, authored by Zineb Riboua and published on April 18, meticulously documents how the Polisario’s activities “go far beyond the standard for a terror designation.”
The organization routinely violates the United Nations-backed 1991 ceasefire agreement, diverts humanitarian aid to fund its militant infrastructure, and collaborates with designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).
Republican Congressman Joe Wilson has announced plans to introduce legislation aimed at officially labeling the separatist militia as terrorists.
Wilson declared on social media that he “will introduce legislation to designate the Polisario as terrorists,” while accusing Algeria and Russia of exploiting the front to establish a strategic foothold in Africa.
This initiative followed Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent affirmation that Morocco’s autonomy proposal represents “the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute.”
Does the Polisario meet the legal criteria for terrorist designation?
According to the Hudson Institute’s analysis, the answer is an unequivocal yes. The Polisario Front conclusively meets all three statutory criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
First, it operates as a foreign organization based entirely outside the United States, with its leadership and infrastructure concentrated in Algeria’s Tindouf region.
Second, it actively engages in terrorist activities as defined under US law, including attacks that violate ceasefire agreements, violence against civilians, and operational coordination with designated terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. In 2018, Morocco severed ties with Iran over the confirmation of Hezbollah training camps in Tindouf.
Third, its activities directly threaten US nationals and undermine American security interests by weakening Morocco—a major non-NATO ally and key counterterrorism partner—while enabling hostile powers to expand their influence in the strategically vital Sahel region.
Most alarmingly, the Hudson Institute confirms that the Polisario “receives drones from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) through transfers facilitated by the Algerian regime” and “smuggles arms to jihadist insurgencies that threaten American forces across the Sahel.”
The report specifically highlights the case of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, who reportedly held a role in the Polisario before becoming the emir of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
Under his leadership, ISGS carried out numerous attacks across the Sahel, including a 2017 ambush in Niger that killed four US soldiers.
This trajectory “underscores how militant ecosystems in the region overlap and evolve” and demonstrates that “the Polisario’s political infrastructure in Tindouf has long facilitated radicalization, trafficking, and terrorist mobilization.”
The Hudson Institute has mapped out that designating the Polisario as a terrorist organization would deliver seven critical strategic gains. Chief among them: freezing the group’s assets to dismantle smuggling networks, contributing to regional stability, and disrupting Iran’s proxy warfare capabilities.
It would also expose Algeria’s destabilization strategy, diminish arms flows to Sahel jihadists, undercut the Polisario’s international propaganda campaigns, and address the longstanding abuse of refugee status in the Tindouf camps—all while projecting American power efficiently and conserving resources.
The Polisario’s camps: Militarized enclaves, not refugee havens
The Hudson Institute’s assessment demolishes the notion that the Polisario’s camps in Tindouf, Algeria, serve as humanitarian refugee centers. Instead, they function as “militarized enclaves” where the front “enforces strict control over a population of approximately 90,000 people.”
Human Rights Watch has documented the absence of elections or free press in these camps, along with practices of forced conscription backed by imprisonment. More disturbing still are reports suggesting “some refugees under Polisario control may be enslaved.”
The European Anti-fraud Office has corroborated these findings, documenting the Polisario’s systemic theft of humanitarian aid “to sustain its militias while residents suffer.”
A 2015 OLAF report covering the 2003-2007 period exposed that “separatist group leadership has long been directly involved in selling humanitarian aid provided in the Mauritanian and sub-Saharan markets to buy weapons.”
The Atlantic Council similarly reports that “the diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subjected to corruption and reselling in open markets.”
The Tindouf Autonomy Support Forum attributed the “severe health crisis in the camps” to this widespread smuggling of medical equipment and supplies.
Similarly, former Polisario members including Mustafa Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud and Hamada El Bihi have long revealed that “more than 80% of the population in the Tindouf camps is composed of Tuareg people and individuals from countries across the Sahara Desert, including Mali, Algeria, Libya, Niger, and Chad.”
This explains Algeria’s persistent refusal to allow a census of the camp population despite international demands.
An obsolete UN mission and Polisario’s crumbling legitimacy
Multiple American think tanks have eviscerated both MINURSO, the UN peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara, and the Polisario’s claim to legitimately represent the Sahrawi people.
Just last month, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute characterized MINURSO, established by the UN Security Council in 1991, as a prime example of “failed UN peacekeeping operations” that “may actually preserve conflict.” Rubin notably lamented that “thirty-four years and billions of dollars later, MINURSO has not even conducted a census.”
In a scathing op-ed published in the Washington Examiner on March 19, Rubin also ridiculed MINURSO officials. “Today, the best way to find MINURSO officials in Western Sahara is to visit one of Laayoune or Dahkla’s bars, where MINURSO vehicles are ever-present,” he wrote.
In a separate policy analysis published by the Middle East Forum on April 7, Rubin urged President Trump to demand that UN Secretary-General António Guterres “immediately terminate recognition of the Polisario Front as the Sahrawis’ representative.”
Rubin challenged the international community’s stance on Polisario’s legitimacy, asserting that “no one has ever elected them to such a position and no one has given the Sahrawi any say.”
He instead pointed to the emerging Sahrawi Movement for Peace (MSP) as a more legitimate alternative, noting it “not only rejects violence but also seeks consensus across broad segments of the Sahrawi population.”
The Atlantic Council concurred in an analysis published on April 9 by resident senior fellow Sarah Zaaimi, characterizing MINURSO as being in “spectator mode” and serving only to maintain a “state of paralysis throughout the years.”
The think tank highlighted how MINURSO staff “remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020.”
In a crushing blow that deepens Algeria’s isolation and exposes its proxy’s vulnerabilities, UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy Staffan de Mistura has abandoned his previous partition proposal and acknowledged that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan represents “the only viable path to a lasting and politically feasible resolution” of the conflict.
This represents a complete reversal from his October 2024 position and effectively confirms what seasoned observers have long recognized: “there is no feasible solution to this Algeria-engineered dispute outside the parameters of the Moroccan autonomy plan.”
