Morocco’s victory in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 15, 2026, gives new momentum to the process launched by UN Security Council Resolution 2797. By adopting its annual resolution with 152 votes in favor, two against, and seven abstentions, the committee explicitly incorporated a reference to Resolution 2797 into the UN framework, reinforcing Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the basis for a political settlement under Moroccan sovereignty.
This vote is more than a numerical victory. It signals a shift away from a debate focused primarily on the principle of self-determination toward negotiations on the practical terms of a negotiated autonomy arrangement. The process remains within the UN framework and does not legally prejudge the territory’s final status.
An unprecedented diplomatic endorsement
The Fourth Committee’s resolution, presented by the committee’s Senegalese chair, breaks with the consensus-based practice that had prevailed since 2006. It is important to note that the text was put to a vote at the request of the United States. It received the support of 152 countries, including Morocco, while the United States and Israel voted against it and seven countries abstained.
The decisive development lies in the incorporation of Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on October 31, 2025. That resolution called for negotiations to proceed “taking the Moroccan autonomy proposal as a basis,” while seeking a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution.
For Rabat, the objective is no longer simply to have its initiative listed among several possible options. The Autonomy Plan is becoming the operational framework around which discussions are expected to take shape, with its legitimacy reinforced by the Fourth Committee’s overwhelming vote.
The key shift: From proposal to negotiating framework
Resolution 2797 had already marked a major turning point. It did not merely mention autonomy; it established the proposal as the basis for negotiations while recognizing that genuine autonomy could represent the most feasible outcome.
The Fourth Committee’s decision to reiterate that reference further consolidates this direction. It confirms that the international debate is no longer primarily about choosing between independence and autonomy, but about the substance, safeguards, and mechanisms of an autonomy arrangement that must be genuine and effective under the terms of the UN framework.
The legal distinction nevertheless remains essential. Neither Resolution 2797 nor the Fourth Committee’s text declares autonomy a definitive outcome. Rather, both establish it as the basis for discussions aimed at reaching a negotiated political agreement. The responsibility of the other parties to the dispute, which the Fourth Committee’s resolution identifies unambiguously, is now explicitly at stake.
The Polisario faces pressure to negotiate
Meanwhile, the October 8, 2026, report by the UN secretary-general’s personal envoy reinforces this momentum by criticizing the Polisario Front for failing to examine the details of Morocco’s autonomy proposal seriously. The movement is thus being urged to move beyond its categorical rejection and examine the 39-page document, seek clarification, and propose concrete amendments if it has any.
This development puts the Polisario Front in a difficult position, making it more directly accountable for its decisions and distinguishing its responsibility from that of its backer. Rejecting all discussions on autonomy risks deepening its isolation among countries that increasingly favor a negotiated and feasible solution. Agreeing to negotiate, on the other hand, would force it to justify to its supporters the concessions it may have to consider.
The Fourth Committee’s resolution also reaffirms the responsibility of the four parties, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and the Polisario Front, to engage in the political process in good faith. This does not mean the Polisario Front has accepted Morocco’s plan. It does mean that its substantive participation in negotiations is becoming an explicit expectation within the UN framework.
Algiers faces mounting diplomatic pressure
Setting aside the defiant rhetoric and the noise generated by Algerian media outlets proclaiming a major victory following the committee vote, it is worth returning to the facts.
Algeria has faced a distinct challenge since the vote. Traditionally, it has defended a self-determination process whose outcome would not be predetermined. Yet the current diplomatic shift places Morocco’s Autonomy Plan at the center of discussions.
During the vote on Resolution 2797, Algiers did not participate in the ballot, while China, Russia, and Pakistan abstained. This precedent shows that consolidating the current direction does not guarantee unanimity, but it limits Algeria’s ability to keep the debate focused exclusively on a referendum and independence without addressing concrete political arrangements.
To avoid an even more damaging diplomatic isolation, Algeria was compelled to vote in favor of the Fourth Committee’s resolution, even though it refers to Resolution 2797, the very resolution Algeria rejected a year earlier.
The fact that 152 countries voted in favor represents a crushing defeat for Algiers and, of course, the Polisario Front, for which the Fourth Committee had become its last refuge.
The fact that both Morocco and Algeria voted in favor of the Fourth Committee’s resolution illustrates the complexity of Algeria’s position. Algiers cannot ignore a text that reaffirms self-determination while simultaneously incorporating a reference to Resolution 2797 and establishing Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the basis for a settlement.
The return of refugees: A decisive human dimension
Another crucial element is the initiative raised by UN personal envoy Staffan de Mistura to allow Sahrawi refugees to travel voluntarily to Laayoune and Dakhla. Such an initiative would give refugees the opportunity to form their own opinions through direct experience rather than relying exclusively on the political narratives presented to them.
It is worth recalling that, for several years, the UN organized visits in both directions for Sahrawis who wished to see relatives. Many chose to remain in Morocco after visiting. Algeria eventually brought the process to a halt, for reasons that are not difficult to understand.
If implemented, the initiative would shift the debate toward practical questions: Which institutions would administer local affairs? What powers would elected representatives exercise? What safeguards would protect residents’ freedoms and rights?
Those held in the Tindouf camps would gain a clearer understanding of what is at stake and see for themselves the level of development from which they have been deprived for 50 years.
For Morocco, the challenge would be to demonstrate, through credible safeguards and verifiable facts, that a degree of autonomy already exists in practice through meaningful political participation and accountable local institutions. This could open up dignified prospects for return for a majority of those held in the camps.
What the next Security Council resolution could include
The mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) expires on October 31, 2026, requiring the Security Council to decide whether to renew it.
Several possible directions emerge from the personal envoy’s report and Resolution 2797:
- Explicitly reaffirming Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the basis for negotiations, with a call to work on its specific provisions.
- Issuing a stronger call for substantive negotiations without preconditions, including concrete proposals, amendments, and requests for clarification.
- Providing guarantees that autonomy would be genuine, including the powers of local institutions, mechanisms for political participation, legal safeguards, and implementation arrangements.
- Encouraging inclusive consultations, particularly with refugees, while distinguishing political consultations from a formal legal mechanism for determining the territory’s final status.
- Renewing MINURSO’s mandate in full continuity with the strategic assessment envisaged under Resolution 2797.
The wording adopted will therefore be crucial. A resolution that “takes note” of Morocco’s Autonomy Plan does not carry the same weight as one that calls for negotiations “on the basis of” the plan. The latter formulation would give Morocco’s initiative a much stronger operational role.
There will be a before and an after October 2026. Morocco’s patience, strategic acumen, and pragmatism will ultimately pay off.
Will Morocco have to make concessions?
The personal envoy believes that “historic flexibility” and “political courage” will be necessary, not only from the Polisario Front but also from Morocco. This does not necessarily mean Rabat will have to abandon its fundamental principles. Rather, it will have to demonstrate that its proposed autonomy arrangement offers substantial powers, lasting safeguards, and credible oversight mechanisms. Some of these elements, particularly those concerning local administration, are already in place.
The strategic distinction is essential: agreeing to negotiate the terms of autonomy does not amount to renouncing Moroccan sovereignty. The search for a compromise could hinge precisely on defining the powers, safeguards, and institutions that such an arrangement would entail.
From principles to practical arrangements
The October 15 victory in the Fourth Committee, which had until now been resistant to Morocco’s position, confirms that the diplomatic battle has shifted from principles to practical arrangements. By incorporating a reference to Resolution 2797 and securing 152 votes in favor, the committee gave broader support to the view that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan constitutes the basis for the negotiating process.
The Polisario Front is being pressed to examine in detail a proposal it contests. Algeria must contend with a framework in which Morocco’s initiative has become the explicit point of reference. Morocco, in turn, must demonstrate that its Autonomy Plan can offer a lasting, credible, and adequately safeguarded compromise.
A shift in the diplomatic framework does not, by itself, resolve a longstanding dispute. It does, however, fundamentally change the conditions under which a settlement will now be pursued.
As for Algeria, it will have to come to terms with 50 years lost in its relentless pursuit of destabilizing its neighbor and obstructing its development, remaining faithful to the spirit of Houari Boumediene, who deliberately sought to put “a pebble in Hassan II’s shoe,” as he reportedly put it.
King Hassan II, followed by King Mohammed VI and the Moroccan people, remained faithful to their long-term strategy and have ultimately prevailed.
The Sahara is part of Morocco, and Morocco is part of its Sahara.
Now, it is time to celebrate on October 31.
