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Foreign policy, although it is a public policy like any other which contributes to achieving the general interest, remains specific with its own constraints, because it is often considered as a domain reserved for the head of state or the prime minister depending on the nature of the political system.
However, when foreign policy affects economic and social balances and leads to a new distribution of wealth and social compromises (making winners and losers), this would be closer to public policies, according to political scientist James Rosenau. As a result, it can arouse the interest of different groups in society who become stakeholders in the decision-making process. This approach is particularly valid for foreign policy economic and trade issue areas, also known as economic diplomacy, which is characterized by the multiplicity of decision-makers and the involvement of societal actors.
The Morocco-American FTA, which this year celebrates its twentieth anniversary since its signing, was at the time one of only seven agreements of this kind concluded with the United States, the second with an Arab country and the first in Africa.
Since the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI, Morocco has adopted an ambitious foreign policy focused on economic diplomacy and the diversification of its economic and diplomatic relations. The initiative of the Agadir Agreement with Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt as well as several bilateral free trade agreements, notably with the UAE, testified to this commitment. Morocco is seeking to diversify its economic relations beyond Europe to the Americas and Asia. The free trade agreement with the United States is part of this strategy by aiming to strengthen trade and create new investment opportunities, while maintaining its partnership with the European Union. Morocco’s recent Atlantic initiatives are part of this repositioning of Moroccan diplomacy under the reign of King Mohammed VI.
For the United States, free trade and multilateralism are at the heart of its trade policy, however, in the face of the challenges of multilateral negotiations, the United States is increasingly focusing on regional and bilateral trade agreements to open new markets and protect American economic interests. The agreement with Morocco is therefore part of this strategy through strengthening economic and political ties with a country committed to reforms and perceived as a reliable and credible key partner in Africa and the Middle East, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001.
The negotiation process of the Free Trade Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States of America was in fact unique in its kind, for the first time in the annals of Moroccan diplomacy non-traditional actors expressed their views on foreign policy topics that are usually the prerogative of the State Summit and possibly political parties.
It is rare in Morocco’s diplomatic history to see trade agreements with a third country, to give rise to so many passionate and heated debates from the political class or civil society, only two agreements had provoked so much debate; these are the agreement with the EEC in 1969 and the agreement with the United States in 2003-2004.
The difference between the two agreements is the nature of the actors involved, during the agreement with the EEC it was mainly the parties of the left “the Koutlah” and certain intellectuals who criticized the agreement with the EEC, on the other hand the agreement with the United States saw the intrusion of new actors on the political scene, namely NGOs and socio-professional associations.
This situation can be explained by the differences in political contexts. The 1969 agreement was concluded at a time of tension between the government and the left opposition; it was the period of the “state of exception” when the left opposition was reduced to an incongruous portion. On the other hand, the context of the FTA with the United States concerns opening up spaces of public freedoms under the new reign of King Mohammed VI and a period of participation of the Koutlah parties Mr. Driss Jettou’s government, after the interlude of the alternation government led by Mr. Abderrahmane Youssefi.
Of course, this phenomenon is a Moroccan product; the main determinants were endogenous because interests were going to be affected by the Agreement, but the exogenous variables facilitated the process of irruption of these new actors, such as the various supports received from outside.
Non-traditional actors, or what the Swiss political scientist Jaques Freymond calls informal actors, have made a real irruption on the political scene, favored by the support of several international NGOs. Let us recall in passing that the Europeans took a dim view of this agreement, which could in the long-term threat their influence and their acquired interests in Morocco and Africa at large due to the rising influence of the Northern Kingdom in Africa.
Institutional framework for the negotiations
Following exploratory talks held in Washington on November 26 and 27,2002, between Taïeb Fassi Fihri, Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Robert Zoellick and Catherine Novelli, USTR Representative and Assistant Representative respectively, it was agreed that the first round of negotiations will take place from January 21 to 26 of 2003.
The agreement was initialed on March 2, 2004, and adopted by the Moroccan parliament in January 2005, after eight rounds of very laborious negotiations spread over 13 months of negotiations in the form of expert meetings in Rabat, Washington, Geneva and also via videoconferences. The agreement entered into force in 2008.
The negotiators in chief were Taieb Fassi Fihri, who in addition to his role as minister delegate was the current advisor the King., who made extensive consultations with the Moroccan business sector through professional associations such as CGEM, AMITH, the National Council for Foreign Trade (CNCE), FENAGRI or ASPAM, and Ambassador Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative.
The free trade agreement between Morocco and the United States includes 22 main chapters dealing with agriculture, market access, textiles, financial services, and intellectual property. For industrial products, Morocco will reduce its customs duties on 99% of American products, with dismantling periods spread over ten years for the sensitive products. Textiles benefit from temporary derogations for the use of imported fabrics within specific limits. In agriculture, most products will be traded freely, with a few exceptions such as cereals and meat, which are subject to quotas and a dismantling of tariffs over several years.
The agreement is in line with Morocco’s commitments to the WTO, while introducing additional protections in some cases. Services are covered by a negative list, allowing for gradual but full opening in sectors such as banking, insurance and telecommunications. Intellectual property rights include provisions on trademarks, copyrights, and protection against counterfeiting, reflecting American standards while taking into account Moroccan specificities. Environmental and labor commitments aimed to ensure a high level of environmental protection and respect for fundamental workers’ rights.
Involvement of non-state actors in the negotiation process
In countries in the process of democratization, the status of non-state actor has two realities.: It is necessary to distinguish between institutional non-state actors and informal non-state actors.
The first, are recognized by the political system, as well as interest groups (trade unions, associations and socio-professional organizations) that participate formally in the decision-making process (consultation for the preparation of draft laws, representation in parliament etc.). The second, include various NGOs and associations, whose influence takes place outside the official process through a wide range of means of action – ranging from lobbying to the threat of sit-ins and peaceful marches – to building a vast network of exchanges, information and contacts, often very personal, with foreign NGOs and associations.
Institutional non-state actors: professional and employers’ associations
Since the launching of the negotiation process of the FTA, direct and indirect contacts have been established between the heads of the negotiating groups and representatives of the private sector and professional associations. This has been done in order to better understand the problems raised by Moroccan exporters and to inquire about technical assistance needs for an upgrade.
A close institutionalized consultation has been set up with the Moroccan private sector, represented by its professional associations and by the Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (CGEM) and the National Council for Foreign Trade (CNCE), which has been bringing together representatives of the private sector as well as the administrations concerned, since January 2003. Representatives of the private sector and the chief Moroccan negotiator held no less than 5 meetings held between January 2003 and March 2004, in which representatives of four major associations took part, including the CGEM, ASMEX, GPBM, as well as the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Services.
At the sectoral level, each negotiating group ensured close, almost daily coordination with the private sector it represents to establish a common, concerted and coherent position and to develop Moroccan offers and proposals. For example, on the thorny issue of intellectual property and medicines, the working group was composed of the Ministry of Health and the Pharmaceutical Products Association. It is also noted that the pharmaceutical industry sector was very well represented by 15 companies in the sector in addition to the Moroccan Association of Pharmaceutical Industries (AMIP).
Similarly, it should be noted that the National Foreign Trade Council of the United States, in collaboration with members of the Business Council for International Understanding, have created a Moroccan-American alliance, called the U.S.-Morocco FTA Coalition, to support the negotiation and ratification of the FTA between the two countries.
The US-Morocco FTA Coalition is made up of representatives of companies and professional associations interested in a partnership with Morocco, including the famous American Chamber of Commerce in Morocco (AMCHAM), the CGEM, the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Services, ASMEX and GPBM, among others. It is in this context that the American side has organized meetings with the private sector with the aim of presenting the various opportunities that were offered by this agreement to Morocco (in both January and October 2003).
It can be deduced that the American side encouraged the Moroccan business sector to adhere to the agreement by explaining its benefits through AMCHAM, which is another coalition in favor of the agreement, which will deepen the isolation of the anti-agreement coalition (CONACALE).
Informal non-state actors: “NGOs”
On the eve of the 5th round of negotiations for the signing of the free trade agreement between Morocco and the United States, several associations sent a memorandum to the prime ministerin which they sounded the alarm about the possible consequences of a poorly negotiated agreement on the availability of generic drugs in Morocco.
The signatory associations of the Memorandum, meeting on 15 January 2003 in Casablanca, came together to create “The Moroccan Coalition to Defend the Right to Care and Access to Medicines” with the participation of health professionals, associations for the defense of human rights, culture and the Amazigh movement.
In addition, the Moroccan Coalition for the Defense of Cultural Pluralism was formed, with the participation of several actors in the cultural, artistic, intellectual and press fields, which was created in December 2003. Initially made up of seven cultural and artistic associations and unions, it later had 13. Its declared concern was the defense of the “legitimate right to cultural difference in Morocco” and, more generally, “human identity and creativity”. The coalition did not so much denounce the agreement, nor American culture, but said it is campaigning to “protect our identity among other distinct identities” and the perpetuation of “the moral and financial support of the State for the development of cultural property in Morocco”.
These two coalitions would later join to create the “National Coalition Against the Free Trade Agreement” (CONACALE), which was formed on October 25, 2004 at the headquarters of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH). It was here that it also took up residence as its secretariat, initially had 22 founding members, and later reached about fifty organizations.
The distribution of the components of CONACALE by sector shows that the health sector represents 35% of all NGOs, followed by general NGOs with 20%, trade unions with 18%, the cultural sector with 17%, and the human rights and agriculture sector with 4% each. Even so, the AMDH has weighed with all its weight in CONACALE, discreetly supported by far-left parties such as ANAHJ ADDIMOKRATTI, Fidelity to Democracy and the United Socialist Left which was also going to vote against the Agreement in parliament.
CONACALE stated that it set itself the following objectives:
• Protest against the signing of free trade agreements without any public debate and without consultation with representative organisations”
• Call on the Moroccan Parliament not to ratify this agreement”
• Call on all the nation’s living forces to mobilize against these onerous agreements, for a mobilization of national resources, sound management and equitable distribution, against the squandering of public goods.”
The means of action and resources of informal actors
Informal non-state actors generally use a variety of means of action or influence that can be grouped into two categories.
The first includes indirect pressure activities; initiated unilaterally by NGOs, which they use to work on public opinion with a dual objective of education and mobilization and to exert pressure on the state. This includes the dissemination of information, pressure through networks, “lobbying” campaigns to raise public awareness, contact with the media, sending positions, and petitions.
The second embraces direct pressure that includes forms of direct interaction between NGOs and the authorities (sit-ins, peaceful marches, open letters, etc.).
It has been observed that the Moroccan government’s behavior towards non-state actors was polymorphous; on the one hand, consultation with institutional non-state actors, i.e. socio-professional associations that have been officially associated with the negotiation process and that have been regularly consulted during the negotiations (CGEM, FENAGRI, ASPAM, AMITH, etc.). Onthe other hand, a quasi-ignorance of the informal non-state actors (the components of CONACALE) were, with a few exceptions, excluded from the consultations.
This behavior led CONACALE to proclaim in the public square their dissatisfaction with the agreement between Morocco and the United States, using several methods of influence. These ranged from from press releases to sit-ins, lobbying in the Moroccan parliament and mobilization the most influential NGOs working in the field of health and human rights around the world; the coalition has used the international networks of alter-globalists such as the Association Traitement Droits Sociaux Nord/Sud (Act Up-Paris), Médecins Sans Frontières and ATTAC.
Observation of the facts revealed that institutional non-state actors such as the CGEM or the AMITH have resorted to direct influence within the consultation bodies, on the other hand indirect pressure (via public opinion and the media) and secondarily direct pressure (sit-ins) have been preponderant in the actions exercised by CONACALE and other informal NGOs.
Impact of the influencing process with government authorities
Neither the mobilization of some 40 Moroccan NGOs grouped in a coalition, nor that of the largest international NGOs working for access to medicines, nor even the repeated warnings of Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winner in economics and former advisor to Bill Clinton, who was visiting Morocco, succeeded in changing the position of the Moroccan negotiators, who were facing intransigent American counterparts on issues related to intellectual property.
Ultimately, it must be noted that the pressure exerted by informal non-State actors has not been very conclusive because it has not led to the satisfaction of CONACALE’s main demand, namely the abolition of intellectual property rights relating to medicines.
On the other hand, the lobbying of professional associations, which used the consultation bodies, bore fruit insofar as the former prime minister, Driss Jettou, outlined, during an inter-ministerial commission, the red lines not to be crossed. These particularly concerned textiles as well as the agricultural field where problems were going to be raised, especially for cereals, red meats and legumes. Transition periods were mandatory for the survival of these vital sectors of the Moroccan economy. Subsequently, the prime minister even went to the United States to sensitize senior American officials to Moroccan constraints.
Indeed, thanks to the consultation between the Moroccan private sector and the government, and following the forceful leadership of Moroccan negotiators, the American side ended up agreeing on the one hand to soften its position on the issue of the rule of origin for access to the American market for Moroccan textiles, and on the other hand the principle of a transition period beyond 10 years to protect Moroccan cereal farming and livestock.
It is noted that despite the means deployed by NGOs, which position themselves on the margins of the Moroccan political system occupied by traditional and institutional actors, they have not won their case. In our view, it was a showdown between the center of the political system and its periphery.
On the other hand, the institutional actors recognized by the system were given the right to the chapter, as we have seen, since the prime minister intervened personally to draw the red lines not to be crossed by the negotiators following the grievances of the socio-professional associations.
I believe that it is the interference of external actors that would have been fatal for CONACALE and that has blocked its recognition as a full partner associated with the negotiations. The Moroccan government does not tolerate the instrumentalization of political parties or NGOs by external actors.
