The historical trajectory of international organizations is marked by setbacks, false starts, exits, and dissolutions, with two specific types of member state withdrawals intensifying the risk of organizational demise.
Firstly, when a significant portion of member states withdraws, rather than just one, the probability of an international organization’s collapse increases. This collective departure serves as a signal of fundamental problems within the organization, which prove challenging to address from within. While the withdrawal of a single member state may not raise immediate concerns, the simultaneous withdrawal of others within a similar timeframe creates a contagion effect, hastening the organization’s decline.
Secondly, the exit of key member states, especially regional hegemons, can profoundly impact the fate of international organizations. Following the departure of a regional hegemon, the organization may face a swifter demise, as the remaining member states grapple with reduced funding, leadership, and legitimacy. In this scenario, the organization’s resilience is compromised, expediting its decline (Inken von Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulas, 2022).
The historical narrative of African countries’ withdrawals from regional and continental agreements echoes the complex dynamics of regional integration, political sovereignty, ideological divergences and economic considerations.
One notable example is Mauritania, which departed from ECOWAS in 2000, for political and economic motives (being an LDC country) but later signed a new associate-membership agreement in August 2017.
Economic driven Leave
The failure of many regional economic groupings in Africa is linked to the inequitable distribution of benefits among the partners; the most advanced members often attract more benefits in terms of exports and FDI than the least developed ones. In this context some groupings give up the market driven approach by adopting the institution development driven; the secund generation of such groupings created mechanism to offset the inequality in distribution of benefits and costs of integration through innovative mechanisms (setting up of compensatory measures and correctives measures like the development Bank or special funds for LDCs etc..)
I may quote two cases : The first case is the Customs Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) which suffered a setback in April 1968 when its two landlocked members, the Central African Republic and Chad, announced their intention to leave the Union. This move was driven by dissatisfaction over the distribution of benefits, in particular the distribution of industrial projects and the distribution from the Solidarity Fund. The secund case is Tanzania which has left the COMESA in 2000 due to a zero-tariff reduction agreement ; Tanzania’s heavy reliance on revenues from trade tariffs and VAT led to the perception that reducing tariffs to 0% posed a threat to its economic stability, moreover would affect the domestic industries due to unable to sustain the competitiveness of the market for imported goods from other member countries.
Ideological and political driven leave
Within this category we can quote the withdrawn of Chile from Andean Community in 1976 following the takeover of power by General Pinochet who changed radically the model of development and foreign policy orientation of Socialist President Alliende and the decision of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela on April 2006 to leave the same grouping for ideological reasons since Peru and Colombia signed FTAs with the USA.
The decision of the three Sahel (AES) countries to leave ECOWAS with immediate effect on 28th of January 2024, namely Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger is a mitigated case; the direct and declared motive is political in reaction to the suspension of their membership after democratically elected leaders were removed in a series of coups over the past four years and following repeated conflicts with ECOWAS over the return of democracy and the fight against terrorism.
Indeed, none of the military regimes (which together formed a mutual defense pact AES in September 2023) has laid out a clear timeline for a democratic transition, the three states have repeatedly argued that they want to restore security before organizing elections as they struggle to deal with jihadist insurgencies linked to al Qaeda and Islamic State in their various countries.
The AES decision to exit ECOWAS is not perceived as a rationale choice and domestic driven decision by their partners and suspect that its more motivated by the wish of the three military governments to stay in place indefinitely encouraged in this endeavor by the increased influence of Russia in the region.
The three Sahelian countries have many things in common: they are former French colonies, landlocked, among the poorest countries in the ECOWAS, ruled by military with a new foreign policy orientation increasingly turning to Russia and China and Simultaneously more distant from France and Europe, furthermore they are suffering from transborder armed groups incursions and political instability for decades.
According to the joint communique of January 28th, issued by the military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the withdrawal from ECOWAS is motivated by the fact that the Grouping has fallen under the influence of foreign powers and betrayed its founding principles of economic development and welfare of populations and failed to aid its member states in their fight against terrorism and insecurity. They also criticized sanctions imposed on military regimes in the region by ECOWAS qualifying them as “illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible”.
Following the decisions of ECOWAS, the WAEMU grouping also applied sanctions by cutting off their access to the regional financial market, and the regional central bank. It later restored Mali’s access but Niger remains suspended.
However, the three Sahel countries didn’t declare, so far, any intention to exit from WAEMU. However, their severe criticism of the CFA franc (the common currency WAEMU) could lead to the renunciation of their membership from this scheme as well.
Is the Withdrawal Legal?
Legally speaking the “withdrawal with no delay” is not possible; per Article 91 of the ECOWAS revised treaty of 1993, the organization must wait for a minimum of one year before revoking the departing members’ benefits from its association agreement and the departing member State shall continue to comply with the provisions of this Treaty and shall remain bound to discharge its obligations under theTreaty.
If effective, this withdrawal is the most challenging issue facing the subregion since the CFA Franc crisis in January 1994.
The withdrawal of the three countries from ECOWAS will mark a significant setback for the regional bloc considered as a model of integration and cooperation in Africa. This exit will diminish ECOWAS’s size, population, and economic influence, undermining its credibility and legitimacy as a key regional player.
Economic implications of the Withdrawal
ECOWAS is still far from being an effective economic union, and whose common currency, the ECO, has become virtually stillbirth according to many analysts. Designed at its inception in 1975 to promote economic integration among member states, ECOWAS, turned to an organization focusing on peace keeping and the coercive sanctions to reverse the military regimes in the region, including Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and in Niger last year.
ECOWAS has a population of about 400 million people and a combined GDP of about $816.4 billion and a trade of about $150 billion. In terms of landmass the triad accounts for about half of ECOWAS but only 8% of the GDP.
Therefore, we can conclude that the exit of the three states is not expected to substantially undermine Ecowas in the immediate future, particularly from an economic standpoint, as their contribution to the bloc’s overall gross domestic product is relatively small.
If the withdrawal is acted, tariffs and new restrictions on the movement of goods from the three countries will be applied at ECOWAS entry borders. Theoretically, the remaining members of ECOWAS could begin to apply import taxes, and demand visas for citizens of the AES states.
The trio’s economies will lose free movement and preferential trade with seven countries especially Ghana and Nigeria, which account for about two-thirds of ECOWAS GDP, it’s important to note that Niger shares a 1,500 km border with Nigeria, and 80% of its trade is conducted with its neighbor. Mali and Burkina Faso , in turn, rely heavily on imports from ECOWAS, constituting respectively 34.9% and 24% of their total merchandise imports in 2022.
Still on the economic front, Burkina Faso and Mali have attracted substantial investments from both the Regional Investment and Development Bank (RIDB) and the Ecowas Investment Development Bank (IEDB), totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.
This withdrawal is likely also to impact negatively trade corridors, especially for economic stakeholders in these countries. The three countries are landlocked they rely on ECOWAS coastal countries to allow the transit of their goods. They can invoke international agreements on the rights of transit of landlocked countries to force them to do so if need be.
Burkina Faso’s and Niger international trade are dependent on the ports of Cotonou (Benin) and Lomé (Togo) and Lagos (Nigeria), placing them in a challenging position if they exit the bloc. Although there is potential for some trade from all three states to be rerouted via the coastal state of Guinea, which itself has been suspended from the bloc since 2021 following its own military coup.
The unique viable option is to embark in the new initiative launched by H.M King Mohammed the VI in 2023 to open corridor for Sahel Countries to reach Atlantic Ocean and using the Moroccan ports and infrastructure in the future.
Social implications of the Withdrawal
In a region where the free movement of people has allowed significant diaspora populations from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to settle in other ECOWAS countries and vice versa, the withdrawal decision raises concerns and apprehensions for millions of nationals from the three countries who settled in neighboring states as the bloc allows visa-free travel and right to work. Ivory Coast alone is home to more than 5 million people from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Ghana, Togo and Benin also have also a big diaspora from Niger who may need to regularize their status if a new migration policy is implemented between their host and home countries.
Burkina Faso also holds the second-highest count of civil servants employed in ECOWAS institutions. Their withdrawal would have adverse effects on these individuals and their families, intensifying regional unemployment. “It would pose a considerable challenge for those facing job losses.
Security implications of the Withdrawal
However, the most significant challenge lies within the security domain of the region. The potential withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS raises critical security concerns for the Sahel region, which is already wrestling with issues such as terrorism, illegal migration, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). In 2022, the tri-border region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) witnessed over 2,400 terrorist attacks, leading to nearly 8,000 deaths. This area has one of the highest concentrations of SALW per capita globally, contributing to increased violence and instability. The Sahel is also becoming an increasingly utilized route for drug trafficking, particularly cocaine, with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger serving as transit points.
The withdrawal of these countries poses a significant challenge, as they are considered pivotal states in the Sahel. Developing an effective regional security strategy and cooperation plan without the involvement of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger would be highly challenging. This situation could particularly affect coastal countries like Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana.
Nigeria, in particular, must proactively foster a strong relationship with the withdrawing nations to effectively address the security crisis plaguing its Northern region.
Legal implications
Since the ECOWAS is a Customs Union with a Common External Tariff and a common trade policy, the departing countries shall engage in negotiations with foreign trade partners which have concluded agreements with ECOWAS on behalf of the 15 members, for example the ECOWAS and WAEMU have EPA agreement with EU (three countries signed so far the agreement namely Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria); therefore, the departing countries shall conclude a new agreement with this bloc to replace the ECOWAS one.
The second main agreement is “the trade and investment framework agreement between the government of the United States of America and the Economic Community of West African States” which shall be renegotiated with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) .
Last but not least, The three Countries shall also manage on their own the negotiations with WTO which is in itself a big challenge.
As far as the kingdom of Morocco is concerned, fortunately for them, there is no need to negotiate with Morocco since there is no global agreement between Morocco and ECOWAS; the main trade flows are governed by separate bilateral agreements of first generation concluded between Morocco and eight countries, namely: Nigeria; Cote d’Ivoire; Senegal; Niger; Burkina Faso; Mali; Benin and Guinea, the trade with remaining ECOWAS countries is ruled under GATT WTO agreements.
WAY FORWARD
in response to the announcement of Sahel Exit from ECOWAS, the Commission has insisted that it “remains determined to find a negotiated solution to the political impasse.” Such a statement is opening the door for negotiations and mediations of third countries.
In conclusion we highly advocate for a revitalization of ECOWAS grouping and redefinition of its vision and mission by putting more emphasis on programmes and initiatives that improve welfare of populations and enhance economic integration and reassess to the greatest extent possible the peace keeping operations and the coercive measures. The reform shall also consider the enlarging the criteria for new membership to Atlantic countries in order to add new blood to the grouping.
It’s worth recalling that Kingdom of Morocco has applied for a membership in ECOWAS which was accepted in principle but not acted so far, this membership would enhance the credibility, the efficiency and the strength of the grouping and would be the best option for its awakening and escape from the current big crise.
As far as economic integration is concerned there is a big room for improvement, since the intra trade is still low due to many impediments, inter alia, the trade regime requires that in order to benefit from preferential treatment, industrial products must be approved for the regime by the Executive Secretariat and observe restrictive rules of origin which shall also be revisited and modernized in order to open the region to the entry of more FDI and installing regional supply chains.
Also, the longer deadlines for the implementation of trade liberalization were not sufficient for LDCs, in particular those landlocked, to be able to benefit from the preferential regime of ECOWAS and UEMOA. The Nigerien authorities, for example, explain the blocking of the liberalization of intra-community trade due to the absence of a mechanism for compensation to compensate for the loss of customs revenue.
ECOWAS must move beyond conventional trade integration based solely on market forces and monetary policies, instead, it should envision and implement new mechanisms for establishing a development-driven scheme, especially for Sahel countries.
Nigeria, the “big brother of ECOWAS countries” with a population comprising roughly half of the 420 million people in West Africa and contributing to 77 percent of the region’s trade, is in a prime position to spearhead ECOWAS reform.
“We’re going to need some clever steps, diplomatically on this matter, and I think that ECOWAS needs some fast thinking to make sure that this situation does not get out of hand.” Akinyemi (former Minister of FA of Nigeria).
